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Abstract 
Under what conditions will successful nonviolent revolutions be followed by 
democratization?  While the scholarly literature has shown that nonviolent resistance has a 
positive effect on a country’s level of democracy, little research to date has disaggregated this 
population to explain which cases of successful nonviolent resistance lead to democracy and 
which do not.  In this study I present a theory of democratization in civil resistance transitions in 
which I argue that political actors’ behavior in three strategic challenges: mobilization, 
maximalism, and holdovers policy, systematically affect the likelihood of democratization.  I test 
this theory using a nested research design that begins with statistical testing on a dataset of 
every political transition from authoritarian rule in the post-World War II period and continues 
with three in-depth case studies informed by interviews with key decisionmakers.  The testing 
supports the important of two out of the three challenges: differences in mobilization and 
maximalism have strong, consistent effects on democratization after civil resistance. 
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Preface/Introduction 
 
“Liberation may be the condition of freedom but by no means leads automatically to 
it…the notion of liberty implied in liberation can only be negative, and hence, that even 
the intention of liberating is not identical with the desire for freedom.  Yet if these 
truisms are frequently forgotten, it is because liberation has always loomed large and 
the foundation of freedom has always been uncertain, if not altogether futile.” 
        -Hannah Arendt, On Revolution 
 This study seeks to answer a deceptively simple question: under what conditions are 
successful nonviolent revolutions followed by democratization? Which political transitions 
initiated through nonviolent resistance lead to democracy and which do not? Two puzzles 
inspired this question, one from real world events and the other from the scholarly literature. 
The real-world puzzle was the failure of the Arab Spring uprisings, for the most part, to lead to 
significant democratization. What happened to the massive revolutionary coalitions of 2011 
who went to the streets calling for “bread, freedom, and social justice?” Why were the 
moments of hope in 2011 followed by long years of frustration and, in many cases, despair, as 
democratic openings failed to develop into new, representative regimes. 
Many scholars have examined the problematic transitions following the Arab Spring 
from a country-specific or regional perspective (Zartman, 2015; Roberts, Willis, McCarthy, & 
Garton Ash, 2016).  Yet an examination of the history of successful nonviolent resistance 
movements will quickly reveal that the Arab Spring was far from unique.  Both in the occurrence 
of large, primarily nonviolent uprisings and in the variation in their democratization outcomes, 
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the uprisings of 2011 are only one of the latest in a long historical trend that includes waves 
from Africa in the 1960s, Southern Europe in the 1970s, Latin America in the 1980s, and Eastern 
Europe in the 1990s.  Thus my interest expanded from seeking to understand the outcomes of 
the Arab Spring to instead looking at the broader phenomenon of democratization after 
nonviolent revolutions. 
 The second puzzle relates to the scholarly inability to predict democratization in a 
robust consistent way. This is surprising because while the scientific study of nonviolent action 
remains fairly new, the study of democratization is not.  For decades scholars have attempted to 
explain why countries democratize, and developed a wealth of potential explanatory factors.  
Yet we still remain very uncertain about which countries will successfully move from autocracy 
to democracy. 
 This is particularly true in political transitions following the kinds of large, nonviolent 
uprisings observed in the Arab Spring. There is a reliable quantitative finding that these 
transitions are more likely to result in democracy than other types of transitions (Chenoweth 
and Stephan 2011, Celestino and Gleditsch 2013), but little examination of the variation within 
this particular population of transitions.   
 In this study I propose and test the first theory to systematically explain this variation.  I 
argue that patterns of behavior by political actors and ordinary people during periods of political 
transition shapes the likelihood of a transition to democracy. I postulate three particular 
strategic challenges around which these patterns of behavior are particularly important: 
transitional mobilization, maximalism, and holdovers.  
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 The core of the analysis is quantitative, taking political transitions after large nonviolent 
uprisings – what I call Civil Resistance Transitions or CRTs – as instances of a phenomenon and 
seeking to explain variation within this phenomenon through quantitatively operationalizing my 
three patterns of behavior as independent variables.  To justify my focus on these patterns of 
behavior I then move outward from my specific question to discuss the nature of causation and 
explanatory social science when looking at large, rare occurrences like democratization.  I 
critique the typical focus in quantitative social science on searching for exogenous structural 
variables and instead encourage scholars to operationalize all of the steps between a remote 
structural causal factor and a political outcome.  It is my hope that this discussion will be a 
scholarly contribution that goes beyond my specific question.      
 In Chapter 2 I test the impact of these particular patterns of behavior, first offering 
arguments for my unique operationalization of these concepts and then testing their impact on 
both levels of democracy and the likelihood of a transition to at least a threshold level of 
democracy.  I also test the contention that informs my study – that nonviolent resistance at the 
beginning of a political transition significantly pushes a transition towards democracy – using 
more robust statistical techniques than have previously been used in testing this contention. 
 Chapters 3-5 ground my statistical analysis in three in-depth studies of particular CRTs, 
following Lieberman’s procedure for integrating quantitative and qualitative social science 
through “nested analysis” (Lieberman, 2005).  The transitions that I examine are the transition in 
Nepal in the 2000s following the 2006 Second People’s Movement, the transition in Zambia in 
the 1990s following the overthrow of President Kenneth Kaunda by the Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy, and the transition in Brazil in the 1980s away from military rule.   
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The studies are not comparative, except in the sense that they test the relevance of my 
proposed patterns of behavior in three contexts that are radically different, and demonstrate 
the plausibility of three transitional paths that are implied by my theoretical framing.  The 
process tracing in these chapters is based primarily on three months of field work, in which I 
collected interviews from over 120 decision-makers and close political observers in all three 
countries. 
 Chapter 6 concludes the study, summarizing the insights gained from the research and 
proposing new directions to continue examining this important research puzzle.  While my 
research offers significant insights it also opens many new questions.  My theoretical proposals 
from Chapter 1 in particular open up many different avenues to explore a diverse set of political 
science questions, only a few of which I have space to even sketch in this chapter.   
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Chapter 1: The Structuration of Democracy. 
 
 In this chapter I present the core argument of my study.  I begin by addressing the 
puzzle of democratization in the aftermath of nonviolent resistance and presenting my central 
argument.  I then broaden my focus to consider the deeper theoretical underpinnings of my 
argument.  I draw on structuration theory to make a critique of traditional structural approaches 
to democratization and show some of the larger implications of my approach for other 
questions in political science generally and the study of democratic transitions specifically. 
Understanding Nonviolent Resistance 
 When we say nonviolent resistance we often mean either too much or too little.  The 
concept is one of which both the scholarly community and popular audiences likely have some 
conception, but those conceptions are highly divergent.  Even nonviolent resistance scholars do 
not speak with a single voice, as I will show below.  Thus in a work of empirical scholarship that 
draws heavily on the concept of nonviolent resistance it is crucial to speak clearly about what I 
mean when I say nonviolent resistance, civil resistance, or nonviolent action.1  Articulating a 
clear concept of nonviolent action is necessary in order to ensure that my argument about 
nonviolent resistance and democratization is coherent. 
                                                          
1 I use these terms interchangeably. 
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 Thus in this section I take on three questions.  First, what do I mean when I say 
nonviolent resistance?  Second, what is the relationship between nonviolent resistance and 
political order generally?  And third, what do we know and what can we theorize about the 
impact of nonviolent resistance on political systems specifically in the context of transitions 
from authoritarian rule? 
 What is nonviolent resistance?  For most readers these words conjure powerful 
historical images: Mahatma Gandhi marching to the sea or Martin Luther King, Jr. at the head of 
a column of marchers on the Edmund Pettus Bridge.  For others, more tragic images such as a 
lone figure standing in front of a column of Chinese tanks moving on Tiananmen Square in 
Beijing may come to mind.  Others may think of incidents from their own national histories: 
Russians surrounding parliament in 1991 to stop the Soviet hard-liner coup, South Africans 
launching strikes and boycotts in the townships to bring down Apartheid, millions of Filipinos 
gathering on the EDSA Boulevard to prevent President Ferdinand Marcos from stealing an 
election, or many others. 
 What do these images share?  First, they are actions undertaken by unarmed civilians.  
In nonviolent resistance individuals come together to use their force of personality, moral 
authority, and non-cooperation, rather than their direct ability to impose physical costs.  
Nonviolent resistance is not only something that people without engaging in physical violence 
but also without bringing weapons; without the threat of violence. 
 What is the relationship between nonviolent resistance and other forms of violence 
such as psychological or structural violence?  Todd May has argued that, in order to be 
nonviolent resistance, campaigns must also eschew connection to these other forms of violence 
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(May, 2015).  He draws on, but also critiques Galtung’s influential definition of violence as 
“when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations 
are below their potential realizations” (Galtung, 1969, p. 168).  Galtung’s definition of violence is 
useful in considering the impact of practices and structures that may not involve the most direct 
and visible forms of violent interaction, but its operationalization is more problematic.  For 
nonviolence to be meaningful by Galtung’s standards requires an almost infinitely complex set 
of practices to ensure that no form of violence is present.  Furthermore, as an outside observer 
it will be nearly impossible to determine if a particular action is in fact nonviolent in a rigorous 
and consistent way. 
 May simplifies this definitional knot quite a bit by deconstructing the Galtungian 
definition of violence somewhat.  He ends up with a definition of nonviolence as political action 
founded upon principles of dignity and equality (May, 2015, p. 46).   
 While these principles are normatively appealing they are also problematic to apply 
consistently across contexts.  They provide significant space for the observer’s preferences to 
bias their observation.  The observer will doubtless find evidence for these principles 
predominating in movements they care for and likely not find it in movements they do not care 
for.  This bias will then taint anything that can be said empirically about nonviolent resistance 
since other observers will approach the question of defining nonviolence with different 
normative lenses. 
 To avoid these problems I simplify nonviolence’s definition to the most obvious and 
straightforward manifestations of violence: actual physical assaults upon persons or the 
plausible threat of such physical assaults.  The presence of arms is one key separating factor.  
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Where weapons are either directly employed or even simply present, violence is likely present.  
However, arms are not a necessary factor to undermine whether a particular phenomenon is 
nonviolent resistance.  In many cases, violence occurs without the use of arms through 
improvised weapons such as rocks or sticks, or even simply the human body.  Such incidents are 
no longer nonviolent resistance by this definition. 
 Nonviolent resistance as I am discussing it is political.  Some activists may take issue 
with this word – it certainly limits things from the perspective of more holistic approaches to the 
concept that think of nonviolence or, in the Gandhian parlance, ahimsa, as a life-principle.  
Nonviolent resistance may be linked to such holistic notions, but is not necessarily.  If nonviolent 
resistance is something done by unarmed civilians, it is something done to political targets.   
 These political targets are often governments but need not be so in order to fall within 
this definition of nonviolent resistance.  When I say political, I refer to the broad definition of 
politics formulated by David Easton: politics as the “authoritative allocation of values (Easton, 
1953).”2   Political struggles are struggles over how value will be defined and allocated in our 
communities. Limiting nonviolent resistance to the political, while limiting the scope of inquiry, 
remains quite broad.   
 Nonviolent resistance is resistance, by which I mean it is active political engagement.  
Actions that lack physical violence or the threat of physical violence may be non-violent but they 
do not necessarily constitute nonviolent resistance.  Nonviolent resistance as resistance stands 
in opposition to the normal modes of constituting and conducting politics.  Political actions that 
                                                          
2 The general theme of this definition of politics goes as far back as Aristotle’s definition of the state as 
that community that seeks to attain the highest good and ensure the good life (Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, 
Chapters 1 and 2) 
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are nonviolent but fall within the normal bounds of institutional politics are not nonviolent 
resistance.   
 As an action that stands in opposition to normal modes of politics, nonviolent resistance 
is destructive to the current power structure.  Gene Sharp describes nonviolent resistance in 
terms of refusing to cooperate with the current system of power, refusing by one’s consent to 
continue to allow the structure to operate and thus undermining its ability to replenish itself 
(Sharp, 1973).  Stellan Vinthagen describes nonviolent resistance as inherently “power-
breaking” (Vinthagen, 2015). 
 Because of this, context is important in defining what is and is not nonviolent resistance 
since the same action may not have the same import in different contexts.  A march supporting 
a political candidate in an advanced democracy is not nonviolent resistance since such marches 
are a normal, accepted, and power-reinforcing aspect of such countries’ politics.  However, the 
same march undertaken in a context where the political opposition is highly repressed or illegal 
and such marches undermine the rule of a particular political regime, would clearly be 
nonviolent resistance. 
 Thus nonviolent resistance is not synonymous with any one political action, method, or 
tactic such as protests, strikes, or boycotts. In order for an outside observer to know whether 
nonviolent resistance is occurring requires some degree of familiarity with the power structure 
in that particular society at that particular moment in time.    
 So, having defined nonviolent resistance, what should we expect nonviolent resistance’s 
effects on political order to be?  I identify two primary effects, the first negative and the second 
positive. The negative effect follows logically, almost tautologically, from the definition of 
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nonviolent resistance. If nonviolent resistance is non-institutional and intended to disrupt 
current patterns of political behavior then by definition it will be destructive of the existing 
political order.  One need only look at the metaphors employed by scholars of nonviolent 
resistance to see this destructive character at work.  Robert Helvey describes the goal of 
nonviolent resistance as to “undermine, neutralize, or destroy…the pillars of support” (Helvey, 
2004, p. 9) that uphold a power holder.  It undermines current political institutions, demanding 
their redefinition and reconstitution.  It eliminates fear from people’s minds and calls upon 
them to no longer defer to existing authority relations (Sharp, 1973). 
 This effect of nonviolent resistance may be perceived as normatively appealing or 
unappealing depending on the observer’s perspective.  When nonviolent resistance is employed 
in non-democratic regimes that abuse human rights outside observers will widely praise its 
ability to break down those authority relations.  When it is employed against stable democratic 
regimes that protect human rights the same outside observers will widely condemn it.   
 Nonviolent resistance has a second aspect to it that is inherently constructive.  
Nonviolent resistance as I have defined it here requires an act of agency, a stepping outside of 
the routines and expectations of political life to envision a different political order.  Thus it is 
inherently politically creative, expressive, and empowering. It puts political action tools in its 
participants’ hands and practices them in engaging in politics. It spreads civic culture and 
engagement, building greater social capital and investment in future political outcomes.3 This in 
turn is likely to build the social trust and norms of civic engagement necessary for a long-term 
                                                          
3 See for example Fernandes 2015, which examines this relationship through comparing the Spanish and 
Portuguese transitions to democracy. 
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sustainable political order (Putnam, 1993). For this reason nonviolent resistance, while 
destructive of individual political orders in the short term, will have a positive long-term effect. 
 This positive long-term effect can be attenuated or exacerbated depending on the 
particular resistance tactics and modalities employed by nonviolent resistance campaigns.  
Highly regimented tactics, for instance, that rely on strict hierarchical leadership, while they may 
still be nonviolent resistance, would be expected to have this effect largely on leaders, not on 
the wider populace.   
 Nonviolent resistance is also a tool of those who lack traditional avenues of political 
power.  As above, this is almost tautological based on my definition.  Those with political power 
employ institutional means because they have designed such institutional means to suit their 
particular ends.  Institutional politics solidifies the particular set of players in power and 
excludes challenger groups.  In Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s (2005) terms, institutional politics is 
the weapon of the winning coalition.  As long as the same institutional mechanisms are 
employed the winning coalition will remain of a similar size and composition. 
 If, however, nonviolent resistance is regularly employed then the boundaries of the 
winning coalition will be under almost constant challenge.  The elite will never be entirely secure 
in their position as the corridors of power are assaulted from outside.  To avoid institutional 
arrangements’ complete breakdown elites will have to bargain with those who use nonviolent 
resistance, expanding institutional avenues of access to power.4  Nonviolent challenger groups 
will then be incorporated into new institutional arrangements, with a concurrent expansion in 
                                                          
4 My distinction between groups within the polity and challengers from outside draws on Tilly’s (1978) 
model of politics. 
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the size of the winning coalition.5  With each new instance of major nonviolent resistance from a 
new challenger group there is likely to be an attendant increase in winning coalition size, 
gradually expanding the representativeness of the political order and thus by definition making 
the political system more democratic. 
 So, given this definition of nonviolent action and these expected political effects, what 
can we expect about nonviolent resistance’s impact in periods of political transition? 
 The first implication is the one that has become the most common contention in the 
literature on this subject: that nonviolent resistance during political transitions is likely to make 
democratization more likely and the democratic quality of the resulting regimes higher.6  
Nonviolent resistance can break down less representative political orders and create greater 
civic engagement that will push regimes towards greater democracy.  In particular, the powerful 
example of nonviolent resistance being used to oust the old regime will make it an attractive 
political tool for more challenger groups to employ. 
 Not all of these challenges will be successful, of course.  Their success will depend on 
any number of contingent factors, from their level of popular support (Chenoweth & Stephan, 
Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Resistance, 2011), to the 
availability of resources and allies (McAdam, 1982), to the strategic capacity and skill of the 
challengers (Ganz, 2009), to the cohesiveness of whatever winning coalition has initially come to 
                                                          
5 For example, consider the examination of the labor movement in Latin America in Collier and Collier 
(1991).  While labor initially functioned in opposition to the political order, when repression failed to 
suppress the movement Latin American political elites engaged in various strategies to incorporate the 
demands of labor into routinized politics, a shift that had important consequences for political contention 
across the region for decades following the initial incorporation.  
6 The literature on this subject is large and growing.  Some of the most important works to date are 
Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005, Johnstad 2010, Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, Celestino and Gleditsch 
2013, and Bayer, Bethke, and Lambach 2016.  
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power during the transition (Lichbach, 1998).  But it is reasonable to assume that even if a small 
proportion of nonviolent challenges are successful during the transition it will have important 
spillover effects far into the future.  Shifts in political institutions to accommodate new 
challengers will be more likely to occur in the more fluid time of a political transition.  Once 
these shifts have taken place the reinforcing feedback mechanisms of newly-established political 
institutions will make them more difficult to dislodge.  Hence, we may expect a general trend of 
more highly democratic and representative political arrangements to continue well into the 
future. 
 However, in transitional periods the winning coalition is far from set and the boundaries 
of the political elite are uncertain.  Thus, the power-breaking effect of nonviolent resistance may 
be particularly potent, and potentially destructive if employed to too great a degree.  Indeed, 
when drawn to an extreme the pattern of continued challenge and expansion of the winning 
coalition that I have described is deeply antithetical to stable politics.  If the first-order problem 
of defining who is in the polity is a constant preoccupation then second-order political problems, 
such as encouraging economic growth, will have difficulty gaining traction. 
 Thus, in short, we may expect that nonviolent resistance as a force initiating a political 
transition will be likely to have a democratizing effect on the political order, opening the bounds 
of competition and shifting the polity in a more democratic direction.  This is in fact what the 
literature to date has found, showing empirically that, on average, transitions initiated through 
nonviolent resistance are much more likely to result in democratic regimes than other types of 
transition.  However, of course, empirically in many cases we do not see this effect obtaining.  
Why is this the case?  To address that puzzle, we must focus not just on the nature of nonviolent 
resistance in initiating a political transition but in what happens after the transition has already 
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occurred: the challenges of politics in a post-civil resistance transition.  I now turn to these 
challenges, whose nature make up the core of my argument. 
The Challenges of Civil Resistance Transitions 
 My core contention is that patterns of political behavior following civil resistance 
campaigns, during periods of political transition, can help us explain the puzzle of 
democratization after nonviolent resistance.  How can we identify which kinds of patterns are 
likely to be important? 
 The transitology school of thought in democratization theory, which has taken up 
variations of this approach in the past, has shown how scholars can productively theorize along 
these lines.  Beginning with foundational works from Rustow (1970), and particularly O’Donnell 
and Schmitter (1986), and continuing through more recent attempts to “revive transitology” 
(Mohamedou & Sisk, 2016), transitologists have identified a few key heuristics in identifying 
where to look for patterns of behavior that may facilitate democratization. 
1. Look at behavior during the transitional period, rather than before or after it. 
We can observe the impact of agency diverging from structural expectations most 
prominently when the rules of political behavior are limited or contested.  Thus, we should look 
for potentially important patterns during times of transition.  This is because transitions are 
periods in which the rules of the game are up for grabs.  The basic deals that have been struck to 
define the range of acceptable political behavior have been badly shaken, or even dismantled, 
by prior events.   
In Bayesian terms, the priors of the major political actors have been badly shaken.  The 
impact of particular actions is unclear, necessitating a new process of updating and refining as 
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the transition unfolds.  Political actors and ordinary people may hold beliefs about the likely 
impact of their actions that have not yet converged on new institutional norms.  We are thus 
most likely to see actions that do not flow cleanly from structure during transitional periods.   
Empirical support for this assertion goes well beyond O’Donnell and Schmitter’s 
observations on transitions from authoritarian rule.  Consider, for instance, Aristide Zolberg’s 
discussion, later taken up by Sidney Tarrow, of “moments of madness,” that is to say periods of 
political action in which all seems possible, and actors rebel against the confines of structure 
(Zolberg, 1972; Tarrow, 1993).  Such moments are perhaps best captured in moments of regime 
breakdown and political transition. When such moments occur, while their utopian dreams 
almost always fail to be fully instantiated, the choices made there continue to shape the future 
long after the moment has passed. 
Using this empirical heuristic does not imply an argument that patterns of political 
behavior during transitional periods are sui generis, or that agential choices off the structural 
equilibrium path cannot impact important political outcomes either before or after the 
transition is underway.  However, it does provide a strong indication that, when looking for the 
impact of agency, we should look at the point in which agency is most likely to operate in ways 
that cannot be fully explained by observable structural factors. This point, by definition, is a 
period of political transition. 
2. Multiple causal pathways can lead to the same pattern of strategic choices. 
This is a crucial aspect of my argument.  Patterns of political choices, of individual and group 
agency, of course arise from prior factors.  Agential choices are not sui generis.  Multiple, 
potentially infinite factors go into creating the particular set of choices that occur during a 
 16 
 
political transition.  Some of these can be captured through cross-national statistical analysis.  
Many more are contingent, or case-specific, and evade generalization. 
What can be captured in creating a general theory is looking at when these causal paths 
converge into common patterns of behavior and when, subsequently, these common patterns 
of behavior systematically affect the formation of new political institutions.   
Paths leading to transitional patterns of behavior have a certain degree of equifinality.  We 
may see any number of pasts, but during the transitional period we can reduce these many 
different pasts to a simple set of transitional patterns of behavior.   
These patterns are, of necessity, theoretical constructs.  The researcher defines their 
parameters and judges their degree of usefulness.  Yet the theoretical nature of these patterns 
does not imply that they are purely subjective.   When operationalized statistically we can 
measure their statistical significance and predictive power.  When examining particular cases 
qualitatively we can also see how closely the pattern of behavior described theoretically 
matches up with the patterns of behavior during transitional periods described by close 
observers and participants.  Both are critical tests of the causal validity and epistemological 
usefulness of these theoretical constructs.    
3.  Preferences regarding the old regime and new regime and access to levers of political 
power are the most important dividing characteristics between actors. 
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) divide the actors in a political transition from 
authoritarian rule along these two dimensions, with their famous fourfold division of hard-
liners, soft-liners, moderates, and radicals.  The transitional game is played among the elite 
leaders of these four social forces.  In the model laid out in TAR, the game is essentially one of 
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soft-liners and moderates allying or pacting in order to prevent the excesses of the radicals and 
dis-incentivize the hard-liners from seeking to disrupt the transition through a coup. 
Scholars have critiqued the TAR model of transitions as a poor description of the many 
third wave and fourth wave transitions that took place after the book’s publication (Bratton & 
Van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective, 
1997; Carothers, 2002; Geddes, 1999).  While pacts may have been important in the Southern 
European and Latin American transitions they were of much less importance in the wave of 
transitions beginning in Eastern Europe and continuing through Africa, East and Southeast Asia, 
and most recently the Middle East.  If TAR fails to explain these transitions, is this basic insight 
still valuable? 
I argue strongly that it is, and the shape of my argument brings me into my next point:     
4. Focus on universal transitional characteristics. 
Where O’Donnell and Schmitter’s model falls short is that it is too specific.  In statistical 
terms it overfits to its sample.  While it is a powerful descriptive account of that set of cases it 
failed as a predictive model when new cases were added.  For example, their focus on the 
importance of pacts between elites failed to explain insurgent transitions where the impetus for 
democratization came primarily from non-elite groups (Wood, 2000).  When our models 
become too specific, overfitting is always a problem.  Instead of explaining democratization we 
are instead explaining democratization in these five cases, and presenting lessons of dubious 
value for future analysis.   
Hence, when seeking to add patterns of political behavior as an explanatory factor in 
democratization, as in other efforts in social theory, we should avoid overfitting by abstracting 
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from as many dimensions of potential behavior identification as possible.  Our goal should be 
parsimony and out of sample predictive power. 
I do not mean to imply that rich description does not have scholarly usefulness.  Detailed 
descriptions of particular cases make many important scholarly contributions.  They can help us 
generate new understandings of causal mechanisms, or suggest more complex interactions of 
various factors.  Deep description is an important check on the imperializing tendencies of 
broad, abstract theory, and without it, the ground for theoretical growth on any question in 
political science will be fallow indeed.   
However, when our goal is to explain variation and to predict potential patterns of variation 
in the future, rich description will do little to get us there.  The specificities of each individual 
case will bog down our theoretical insights and lead to overfitting.   
My arguments here go back to the long scholarly debate over parsimony and the 
advancement or deterioration of scientific research programs.  I follow Lakatos in arguing that 
we know a research program is advancing when we are able to explain additional data without 
ad hoc additional theorems (Lakatos, 1970).  Systematic, simple theory gives us explanatory 
leverage. 
With these four points I have laid out the basic characteristics of the behavioral patterns 
that we might best expect to predict democratization outcomes.  Before moving on to laying out 
the specific patterns that I empirically test, a few words of clarification and address to potential 
alternate explanations are in order. 
A critic might ask why the focus on preferences and power rather than other common 
dividing lines such as ethnicity or economic class.  Both have been used in prior work to explain 
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democratization outcomes and predict particular patterns of behavior.  For the first, an 
important theoretical work is Rabushka and Shepsle’s (1972) Politics in Plural Societies, which 
makes a powerful formal argument that in ethnically divided societies greater preference for in-
group private goods over public goods will inexorably lead to the disruption of democracy 
through ethnic outbidding.  A number of important academics works on democratization have 
taken the second, class divides, as a key axis around which to predict behavior.  Two recent and 
influential contributions are Carles Boix’s (2003) Democracy and Redistribution and Acemoglu 
and Robinson’s (2006) Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.   
I do not find ethnicity to be a reliable axis around which to make a general theory about 
democratization and patterns of behavior primarily because its core independent variable is 
unclear.  Kanchan Chandra’s (2006) critique of the use of ethnicity and ethnic divides as an 
independent variable is one particularly powerful assault on the sloppy use of ethnicity to 
explain political outcomes.  Chandra convincingly argues that, in both qualitative but especially 
quantitative research, the concept of ethnicity is used in different and conflicting ways based on 
ad hoc descriptions of specific national environments.  In reality, ethnicity plays a variety of 
different roles, and is structured and practiced in radically different fashions.  We cannot, 
looking from the outside, know what ethnicity means in a particular context.  All individuals 
belong to multiple identity groups and those identity groups will have different valences at 
different times. 
 Rabushka and Shepsle’s model, for instance, begins with one key assumption: that in 
plural societies there is a consistent greater preference for in-group private goods over public 
goods.  Yet, as these authors would be the first to admit, plural society does not have a 1 to 1 
correspondence to ethnically heterogeneous society.  It depends on the particular constitution 
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of ethnicity in that society at that time.  Thus, by its nature it is not generalizable, unless we 
think of their model simply in terms of a binary plural and not plural.  But more importantly, the 
distinction between plural and not plural can only be made post facto.  In order for their 
argument to hold, there must be a strong and consistent in-group preference.  We might be able 
to know, prior to actual events, the strength of such a preference, through opinion polling – 
though even here I am somewhat skeptical – but by definition we can only know the consistency 
of this preference after it has proven itself to be consistent.  Thus Rabushka and Shepsle’s model 
cannot be predictive.  It overfits by definition because one cannot know the values of the 
independent variables until the dependent variables have been observed. 
 What of economic class?  Here there are stronger grounds for holding onto class as an 
important factor not to abstract from when theorizing on the shape of patterns of transitional 
behavior.  A long tradition going back to Marx has used economic class as a powerful predictor 
of behavior.  One’s incentives can be easily deduced from class position, and consistent 
exogenous factors such as measures of economic growth, inequality, and the portability of 
capital be employed as independent variables.  Much of the best work on democratization, both 
historically and recently, has been based on analysis defining actors and behavior on the basis of 
economic class (Moore B. , 1966; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992). 
 As with ethnicity, though, I argue that, when attempting to define generalizable 
patterns of transitional behavior, economic class is instantiated differently across different 
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societies.  It is not a truly general factor.  The long effort by Marxist theorists to save dialectical 
materialism from its general failure to predict the future is one major piece of evidence for this.7   
 Note that my argument here is not that either identity-based or economic-based factors 
are unimportant in explaining democratization; far from it.  However, for the purpose of 
theorizing I argue that we must abstract from them. 
 Why do past regime preference and degree of political power not fall into the same 
category as ethnicity of economic class?  Because by definition they obtain in every political 
transition.  Transitions are moves from one political regime to another.  Therefore, in all cases 
there is an old regime and an emergent regime.  Political elites and ordinary citizens by 
definition have some degree of preference between the two.  Even ambivalence is a particular 
configuration of preferences.   
Degrees of access to political power are also something present in all political systems, 
again, by definition.  A political system is the authoritative allocation of values (Easton, 1953), a 
pattern of relationships that involve control, influence, power, and authority (Dahl, 1991), and 
so on. By its very nature it involves some players with greater degrees of power and some 
players with lesser degrees of power, some players with a greater ability to affect the rules of 
the political game, and some players with a lesser ability to affect the rules of the political game.   
The definition of political power is a tricky theoretical problem that many previous theorists 
have spent long years developing.8  I do not engage directly with this literature, since my 
concern is not necessarily with power per se but with a specific subset of power – the power to 
                                                          
7 For prominent critiques of Marxist approaches to history and prediction see Popper 1962, Kolakowski 
1978, and Giddens 1995.  For a recent defense of Marxist historical approaches see Blackledge 2006. 
8 See, for example classic discussions of the topic from Weber (1978), Lukes (1986), and Dahl (1957). 
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affect the political rules of the game and the distribution of values through politics.  This type of 
power does not directly fall into some of the previous taxonomies of power developed by 
previous scholars such as Barnett and DuVall (2005).  Both coercive power and cooperative 
power are relevant. Similarly coercive power and productive power are both useful.  Various 
forms of capital: economic, moral, social, and otherwise, play into one’s ability to affect these 
outcomes. 
 Thus, simply and directly stated, I define political power – the type of power with which 
I am concerned – as the ability to affect the authoritative allocation of value and the rules 
whereby it is allocated.  Actors both inside and outside formal governmental institutions have 
such power.  Actors’ sources of capital that grant them this power vary in salience and degree 
depending on the context.  Some actors, for instance, have very little political power alone but 
when linked with a network of other actors have a degree of power that far exceeds the sum of 
their individual parts. 
 To sum up my points thus far: I have presented a definition of nonviolent resistance as 
political action in opposition to current structures of power that does not involve physical 
violence or the threat of violence.  I have argued that, considered in this way, nonviolent action 
will be destructive of political order in the short term but will be sustaining of representative 
political order in the longer term, thus explaining the general finding that nonviolent resistance 
at the beginning of a political transition tends to leads to higher levels of democracy.   
 The fact that we see significant variation in democracy after nonviolent resistance 
movements constitutes a core puzzle.  I have outlined an approach to answering this puzzle 
through looking at broad, generalizable patterns of political behavior during transitional periods.  
 23 
 
I now turn to outlining the specific patterns of behavior arising from this approach that I expect 
to be most important in shifting political transitions following civil resistance towards 
democratic outcomes. 
I argue that there are three important patterns of behavior as defined by my highly 
abstract framework that would theoretically lead us to expect a greater likelihood of 
democratization.  The salience of these patterns arises directly from the nature of political 
transitions and nonviolent resistance as I have defined them above and follow my criteria of 
focusing on the power positions and orientations towards the old and new regimes.   
I have previously outlined the model from O’Donnell and Schmitter that describes the 
transition from authoritarian rule as one in which Hardliners, Softliners, Moderates, and Radicals 
compete over the shape of the political future.  In addition, I have described the potential 
effects of nonviolent resistance on re-shaping the elite pact-focused picture that O’Donnell and 
Schmitter argue is most conducive to democratization.  Nonviolent resistance has the potential 
to break the cohesion of previous ruling coalitions, including their control over the forces of 
state coercion.  Thus, the balance of coercive force is more likely to be tilted towards actors 
whose bases of political support and socialization in the process of resistance incline them 
towards greater democratization  
 Thus, in contrast to the traditional model of political transitions in which fear of a coup 
is the overwhelming concern, transitions initiated by civil resistance have a different type of 
possible defection that can drive democratization outcomes: a return to resistance.  If the 
democratizing reforms of the transition are not suitably extensive and inclusive, the people may 
return to the streets and push for more.  Thus costly defection in a civil resistance transition is 
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less likely to be a game of compromise between softliners and moderates to avoid overly 
threatening the core concerns of hardliners but instead an attempt by softliners and moderates 
to as much as possible meet the demands of the revolution while still maintaining their own 
privileged position.   
Simply stated, the coercive force in a transition initiated by civil resistance is much more 
likely to be in the hands of the Radicals and less likely to be in the hands of the Hardliners.  
However, since the victory of the Radicals has been nonviolent, forces of the ancien regime both 
hard and soft, remain political players with points of leverage over the transition. 
 This particular balance of coercive force contrasts sharply with transitions that have 
been initiated either by top-down liberalization or by armed insurrection and overthrow of the 
state.  In the first case, the balance of force lies more closely with the ancien regime, and the 
strategic dynamics approximate those laid out in the original wave of transitology literature.  In 
the second case, military victory implies an overwhelming advantage of force on the part of the 
opposition, and democratization becomes a matter solely of bargains worked out amongst the 
moderate and radical victors.  
This basic theoretical assumption frames both the contention that civil resistance 
transitions are unique and the set of challenges that are inherent in their progression and key in 
moving from the breakdown of authoritarianism to the establishment of democracy.   
The first challenge, transitional mobilization, has to do with keeping the balance of force 
in favor of the people.  If a rapid demobilization follows the beginning of the transition then the 
balance of force shifts back to the old regime, and we are back in a traditional elite-led 
transition to democracy.  The process of expansion of the winning coalition that I described in 
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the previous section fails to obtain.  I expect these transitions to lead to limited but incomplete 
democratization, and conclude in what I describe as an elite semi-democracy.    
Demobilization may occur for any number of reasons.  The existence (real or perceived) 
of new legitimate channels for expressing political grievances may encourage those previously 
hitting the streets to instead simply wait at home for their chance to hit the ballot box (Muller & 
Seligson, 1987; Kingstone, Young, & Aubrey, 2013).  Alternately, diverse coalitions that came 
together to oust the old regime may divide over differing visions of the new regime, reducing 
the available resources for public mobilization.  Moderate opposition forces may even support 
repression against elements that seek to continue mobilization, as occurred in several important 
cases of CRTs such as Chile (Hipsher, 1998).   
The second challenge, which I refer to as the problem of holdovers, relates to the 
remaining, though limited, power of the ancien regime.  A successful civil resistance campaign is 
likely to have fragmented the elites of the old regime, but too radical moves towards purging 
former elites (a lustration strategy)9 reverses the effect that civil resistance has on undermining 
incumbent cohesion.  Policies that push for removal of all or even the majority of old regime 
elites can unite them against the transition.  In particular, this process is likely to remove the 
undermining effect of civil resistance on hardliner control of the armed forces and increase the 
likelihood of a coup.   
If a coup occurs in response to the lustration strategy, three outcomes are possible.  If 
mobilization during the transition is extremely high, popular opposition to the coup may lead to 
its defeat, as in Burkina Faso in 2015 (Pinckney, 2015).  The hardliners thus fail in their attempt 
                                                          
9 Lustration has been examined in most detail following the transitions from Communist rule in Eastern 
Europe.  See for example Fowler and Szczerbiak 2005 and Letki 2002.  
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to reverse the transition and it resumes its course.  Second, the coup may not have sufficient 
momentum to successfully overthrow the government, but may put pressure on the 
government to attenuate its holdovers policy, as occurred in Argentina with the rebellion of the 
carapintadas (Barahona de Brito, 2001).  Finally, if the coup is successful then the hardliners 
establish a new authoritarian regime, possibly even harsher than the previous regime.  
Even if a coup, the most dramatic outcome of a full-fledged lustration strategy, does not 
occur, this strategy may still undermine the likelihood of democracy at the end of a transition by 
forging solidarity among the former partisans of the ancien regime against the new democracy 
and creating the seed of a disloyal opposition that sees no place for itself in the new regime and 
may work to dismantle it over time.10 
On the other extreme, a strategy that cedes control of the transition to old elites and 
fails to put pressure on them to conform to new democratic norms, or that fails to in any 
meaningful way reconcile with the abuses of the past, is most likely to lead to co-optation of the 
transition and only limited and incomplete democratization, resulting, as with the challenge of 
mobilization, in an elite semi-democracy.  
The strategies at these two extremes each reduce or even eliminate one of civil 
resistance’s advantages in increasing the likelihood of democracy.  The first eliminates its ability 
to undermine old elite cohesion, while the second eliminates the balance of force advantage 
possessed by those likely to be democratizers.  Thus, I argue that the optimal strategy for 
increasing the likelihood of democracy falls between the two.  I describe this strategy as 
integration, an approach in which some punishment for abuses of authoritarian rule occurs, and 
                                                          
10 See Linz 1978, 34-35 for an excellent discussion of this aspect of the challenge. 
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members of the old regime face some degree of accountability for their actions, but where 
there are meaningful paths for many of these old elites to become integrated into the new 
structures of power.   
Hungary is an excellent example of such a strategy towards old elites.  While there was 
mild pressure placed on old regime elites who were responsible for particularly egregious 
violations, the new political structure allowed many former members of the Communist regime 
to compete in new elections, motivating their involvement in the democratic process (Jenkins, 
1992; Smithey & Kurtz, 1999). 
The third and final challenge of maximalism11 has to do with removing the potential for 
a coercive nonviolent defection from the realm of political possibility and shifting to regular 
democratic politics.  This challenge has to do primarily not with the members of the old regime, 
but with conflicts among the political forces that came together to oust it.  While these civil 
society forces are often portrayed in rosy terms during the campaign against the old regime, 
they often consist of widely heterogeneous elements with conflicting visions of the future and 
little tying them together but anti-incumbency sentiment (Pishchikova & Youngs, 2016; 
Beissinger, 2013; Tucker, 2007).  As Przeworski says: 
Conflicts inherent in transitions to democracy often occur on two fronts: between the 
opponents and defenders of the authoritarian regime about democracy and among the 
proto-democratic actors against one another for the best chance under 
democracy…societies are divided in many ways, and the very essence of democracy is 
the competition among political forces with conflicting interests.  This situation creates 
a dilemma: to bring about democracy, anti-authoritarian forces must unite against 
authoritarianism, but to be victorious under democracy, they must compete with each 
other (Przeworski 1991, 66-67). 
                                                          
11 Thanks to Colin Beck for suggesting this name. 
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The experience of a successful civil resistance campaign can be highly empowering for 
the leaders of social and political forces able to mobilize the mass numbers necessary to achieve 
success (Sharp, 1973).  However, by its nature civil resistance involves going outside of the 
bounds of institutional politics in ways that are disruptive.  Such disruption can be extremely 
powerful in ending political oppression.  However, on a more basic level it can be used as a 
powerful tool to shift the balance of political power. 
In the weakly institutionalized setting of a transition from authoritarian rule, the forces 
that came together to oust the previous regime may be tempted to rely upon this particularly 
powerful tool to further their own narrowly-defined interests in the new regime.  In many cases 
this leads to a radicalization of politics, a constant move to the streets when electoral outcomes 
or government policies fail to satisfy the demands of particular political forces.    
This radicalization can take a number of different forms, depending on the society’s pre-
existing social and political cleavages.  In societies deeply divided along ethnic or religious lines, 
these points of identity cleavage often become the touchstones for competing civil resistance 
campaigns, as in Kenya following the fight for restoration of multiparty democracy in the 
1990s.12  Alternately, political parties led by particular charismatic individuals may become the 
centers of this maximalist mobilization, as in Bangladesh following the ouster of President 
Ershad (Schaffer, 2002).  And in some cases both political parties and identity-based groups may 
serve as the basis for this type of mobilization, as in Madagascar in the early 2000s (Marcus, 
2004).   
                                                          
12 This model of radicalization of politics follows a similar logic to Rabushka and Shepsle’s (1972) analysis 
of politics in “plural” societies that I have described briefly earlier but expands the scope beyond ethnic or 
cultural divisions.    
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All of these cases resulted in what I describe as a fractious semi-democracy, a polity in 
which the forms of democratic politics exist but their legitimacy and effectiveness is so limited 
that they fall short of genuine democratic rule.  Electoral outcomes are rarely if ever accepted 
by the loser, and the ability to inflict costs through action on the streets becomes the primary 
arena of political contention.   
The specific contours of contention vary depending on political actors’ capacity to 
impose costs.  When the balance of forces is fairly even, irregular alternations in power will be 
frequent as particular factions take advantage of short-term advantages of position.  This has 
been the case in Thailand, where from 2006-2014 the primarily urban Yellow and primarily rural 
Red factions engaged in several back and forth resistance campaigns, often succeeding in 
achieving power but never moving from its temporary achievement to a consolidation of power 
and institutionalization of alternation in power. 
 In cases where one group possesses significantly more mobilization capacity than 
another, yet maximalism remains high, alternations in power are less likely, but because the 
institutional mechanisms for loyal opposition are either non-existent or lack legitimacy and 
influence, politics remains fractious, with the dominant group relying on more directly coercive 
mechanisms to suppress dissent and the weaker group attempting to undermine the dominant 
group’s position through constant moves to disruptive mobilization.  This political dynamic 
characterized the relationship between the Morsi government in Egypt and the liberal 
opposition from 2012-2013, ultimately motivating the liberal opposition to seek the support of 
the military in ousting Morsi in the 2013 coup.     
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In contrast, a move across the threshold of democracy is more likely if political or 
identity group leaders eschew even nonviolent defection and instead begin to develop formally 
institutionalized mechanisms of politics.  Greater willingness to accept uncertainty in outcomes 
and the potential of losses, as well as compromising one’s own goals with the other forces 
involved in the transition, will centrally push new democratic politics forward.    
The set of challenges I have enumerated here is not intended to be closed.  Other 
challenges could certainly be theorized using the same or a similarly parsimonious set of criteria.  
In describing these challenges I have not definitively solved the puzzle of the CRT but rather 
taken a first stab at articulating how scholars might consistently cross-nationally describe these 
types of transitions and the dynamics that might both facilitate and undermine democratization.  
Future work can continue to articulate new challenges, with the usual understandings of the 
benefits of parsimony and attempting to explain as much as possible using a limited set of 
variables.  Distinguishing between a contingent factor of a particular case and a challenge that is 
more or less helpful in understanding a class of events will be an empirical question requiring 
research. 
 How much do individual political leaders choose to engage in a particular pattern of 
behavior?  Can a democratically-minded leader choose to have a particular pattern of behavior 
obtain in her own country?  This is a crucial question to address if I am arguing that agency plays 
a role here.   
 The simplest answer hearkens back to the quote from Marx about the interplay of 
agency and structure.  Structures no doubt constrain, but individual leaders do act with a certain 
degree of agency.  The ability of any one particular leader to affect the trajectory of their 
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transition will be delimited by their own degree of political power and can be hampered by the 
actions and attitudes of other leaders and mass publics.  For instance, even if a large group of 
political elites seek to continue mobilization into the transitional period they will fail if the 
people do not find them credible and so do not show up to their demonstrations or do not 
participate in their strikes.  However, for mobilization to even be a possibility there must be 
positive choices made in its favor.  Routinely in the three transitions examined in depth in this 
study, and in many more, leaders and people behaved in unexpected ways, ways out of the 
structural program, and changed the trajectory of their transitional path. 
 The next step in my argument is to take the highly abstract picture that I have painted 
above and operationalize it.  What easily identifiable empirical indicators can we rely on to 
capture or reliably proxy for these various abstract patterns? 
 The first to consider is mobilization and demobilization.  How can we tell if a populace 
has remained mobilized during the transitional period and is thus putting pressure for continued 
reform on the new elites? 
 The most basic and straightforward indicator here is the actual levels of political activity.  
How great is political participation in the transitional period?  Participation can be roughly 
divided into two basic forms: institutional and non-institutional.  The first refers to how 
widespread and comprehensive participation in the new institutions being set up during the 
transitional process is.  Electoral turnout would be one key measure here.  Measure of public 
engagement and consultation in matters of policy, how much interest the public takes in these 
matters, would be another measure. 
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 Non-institutional refers to methods of political participation that are outside of 
institutional channels but still seek to achieve particular political goals such as public protests 
and demonstrations or strikes.  These are the tactics of nonviolent resistance applied not just 
during the struggle against the old regime but as part of a larger effort to keep the new regime 
accountable.   
 A high level of mobilization during the transition will be characterized by high levels of 
both these categories of political participation.  Mobilized and engaged citizens will turn out to 
vote in large numbers, will access official channels in large numbers, but will also engage in 
political action outside of these avenues.  This is particularly true because during transitional 
periods by definition these institutional channels remain new and untested and non-institutional 
methods are likely to be both the most widely understood and powerful. 
 There are many ways to operationalize these two forms of political participation.  The 
literature on political participation on advanced democracies has, of course, developed very 
detailed and comprehensive means of measuring political participation, based on survey data.  
Ideally, an operationalization of mobilization could rely on these types of measures, looking at 
the prevalence of common categories such as voting, contacting an elected official, or 
participating in a protest.  However, consistent cross-national survey data is limited in this 
regard, and does not cover most of the countries during transitional periods.  Thus, we must rely 
on more general observational data. 
 However, scholars of democratization have produced many different data resources 
that allow us to reliably measure these forms of participation.  For example, many different data 
projects have sought to capture counts of protests, strikes, and other forms of non-institutional 
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political participation.  Other data sets rely on expert knowledge to measure the degrees of 
public engagement, civil society activism, and other measures of mobilization.  And of course 
many different scholars and practitioners have collected data on electoral turnout.  I rely on 
these measures in my testing in Chapter 2. 
 The challenge of holdovers is somewhat more difficult to measure, because its 
operationalization relies on knowing the perception of threat from old elites during the 
transition’s process of dealing with the sins of the past.  Because we cannot reliably and 
generalizably know this, we must rely on somewhat indirect proxying.  However, I contend that 
this does not present a major challenge to my analysis.   
 Our perceptions of threat are based on two key factors: actions of others towards us, 
and actions of others towards those like us.  When we see those similar to us facing threats our 
own threat perception is increased.  Thus, in the challenge of holdovers, we can reliably proxy 
for the perception of threat that old elites perceive by looking at the costs that their fellow elites 
face.  As these costs rise, and as they are imposed with greater and greater generality, the 
perception of threat is likely to similarly increase.  
 Thus, we may measure behavior in the challenge of holdovers by looking at the scope 
and intensity of punishment that old elites face during the transitional period.  This primarily 
takes shape through the mechanisms of transitional justice, something on which prior scholars 
have collected extensive data (Olsen, Payne, & Reiter, 2010).  One can also examine lustration 
policies, and other more informal practices of exclusion or punishment of political elites.  
 Finally, observing the maximalism challenge involves two key factors: the stated goals of 
political participants and the tactics that they use to pursue those goals. 
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 The issue of goals may be boiled down to a simple empirical question: do certain 
political groups articulate maximalist goals of transforming the political system?  Do they follow 
an absolutist discourse in which they alone represent the national interest and their opponents 
are not just political rivals but in fact enemies of the people?    
Historical studies of political polarization generate numerous examples of this type of 
discourse.  For instance, in Egypt the Tamarod movement, which sought to remove President 
Mohamed Morsi from office, did not simply paint Morsi as a political opponent but essentially as 
a traitor to the country, as a figure whose continued presence in power was not just undesirable 
but in fact represented a fundamental threat to Egypt as a country.  This was shown powerfully 
of course not just in the lead-up to Morsi’s removal but afterwards as, under the control of 
General Abdelfatah al-Sisi, Tamarod enthusiastically endorsed the wholesale slaughter of Morsi 
supporters in the massacre at the Raba’a al-Adawiya mosque.  In maximalist political systems 
the goal is to win and the stakes are permanent and often deadly. 
 There are various means of measuring such statements and attitudes.  Collecting the 
public statements of political leaders, political party manifestos, and other textual artifacts of 
the political process can provide a wealth of information on the messages that political parties 
seek to communicate.  The tools of textual analysis can then be applied to measure the 
intention and sentiment of the documents and a general picture of attitudes towards the 
political system can emerge.  However, the work required to collect such information cross-
nationally is prohibitively extensive, and interpreting the contextual signals from such 
documents consistently is very difficult to reliably achieve. 
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 However, in lieu of developing a comprehensive analysis of cross-national political 
communication we may look to certain consistent shibboleths in order to determine whether 
maximalism of the type that I have described is becoming prevalent in the political system, 
putting a democratic transition at risk. 
 Out of these, I argue that the most consistent and reliable is a refusal to accept electoral 
results.  If elections occur and the outcome is unfavorable for a particular political party, in an 
institutionalized political system the parties accept the results and begin mobilizing to achieve a 
better outcome in the next election.  However, if instead political parties immediately seek to 
call into question the results of the election and rhetorically mobilize their supporters to 
overturn it through extra-institutional action, this is a key indicator that the process of 
maximalism that I have described is well underway.  To make such a claim, particularly in the 
context of a popularly-initiated civil resistance transition, is to invoke the rhetoric of the 
movement in order to achieve a particularistic political aim.  It is to call back to civil resistance of 
old and to equate the uncertainty of transition with the control and oppression of the old 
regime.  Therefore, it fundamentally undermines the ability of a democratic politics with a mix 
of cleavage and consensus, as Lipset (1960) described, from consolidating. 
This is not an original contribution – many previous scholars of democratic 
consolidation, particularly Przeworski (1991) have argued similarly that willingness to accept 
unfavorable electoral results is the fundamental underlying norm of democracy.   Thus, in 
essence I am saying simply what democratization scholars have been saying for many years.  
However, in the context of a civil resistance transition, I interpret the significance of such actions 
differently than past scholars.   
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It is important to note as well that this mode of political discourse and action, while 
definitely supportive of democracy, is by no means identical to democracy, conceived of either 
as an institutional political system (Schumpeter’s threshold), or as an idealized mode of politics 
which is perfectly responsive to the citizens (Dahl’s ideal).  Thus, while one might rightly observe 
that it is difficult to imagine a democratic politics suffused with maximalist anti-systemic 
discourse, this is demonstrating my argument through showing the strength of this factor in 
supporting democracy, not simply reducing to a tautology that democracy is difficult to imagine 
absent democracy. 
 The articulation of maximalist, anti-systemic goals is insufficient to indicate maximalism 
as I have described it, of course.  At the very least it is a quite faulty indicator of maximalism.  
Political discourse in many countries, including highly developed democracies, relies on such 
language.  The discourse of the American anti-abortion movement, for instance, is full of the 
language of genocide, and those who allow abortion to continue are frequently painted as 
almost demonic figures who can by no means be trusted with any degree of political power, 
worse than Nazis in the scale of their atrocities. Yet, if pressed, most political leaders from this 
movement or others in developed democracies who employ similar types of rhetoric will argue 
that they themselves do not truly believe the things that they say.  Or at the least they express 
horror when their accusations of genocide are taken literally by their followers.  Thus, for a truly 
reliable view of maximalism, we must go beyond rhetoric and consider political actors’ behavior. 
 What kinds of actions fit into this mold?   How can we know that political actors really 
believe what they are saying?  We can look at a few important indicators.  First, the level of 
political violence is an important and reliable indicator of at least some degree of political 
maximalism.  If political actors, particularly large political actors central to the political system, 
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use violence as a means of achieving the kinds of maximalist goals articulated above, then we 
may safely assume that they are willing to “put their money where their mouth is” and both 
impose and obtain high costs in order to achieve them. 
 Yet the use of violence is by no means the only, or even the primary area in which we 
should look for concrete actions that match this picture of radicalization.  Recall from my 
discussion above that the key way that maximalism relates to the initiation of a transition 
through civil resistance is that the experience of civil resistance, particularly large, successful 
civil resistance, puts the knowledge and tools of nonviolent resistance in the hands of actors 
throughout the political system.  In a larger sense, it reveals the fragility of political orders.   
In the main, this is an extremely positive development.  The success of nonviolent 
resistance makes ordinary people and civil society groups aware that they need not interact 
with those in power with the degree of fear and trembling characteristic of most political orders.  
They know that, when organized, even without weapons ordinary people can achieve major 
concessions and undermine the integrity of oppressive or otherwise lacking political systems.  
This is a powerful mechanism of accountability.  Yet the larger revealed fragility of the political 
system can encourage nonviolent mobilization that destabilizes the establishment of emerging 
political norms and practices. 
This somewhat negative view of nonviolent resistance fits poorly with the extremely 
positive view of popular mobilization prominent in the academic literature on nonviolent action.  
For good reason, scholars of nonviolent action have been hesitant to describe their tools as 
anything but positive empowerment for those suffering under oppression or violence.  Certainly 
one might argue that there are characteristics of nonviolent action that make its use much more 
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likely by those with beneficent, popular, democratizing goals.  For instance, the numbers 
required in order to achieve a successful campaign of nonviolent action tend to be much higher 
than those required for a successful campaign of violent action, meaning that in order to 
succeed the leaders of a campaign of nonviolent action must necessarily adopt programs and 
practices that appeal to a large number of people.  Indeed, such arguments are central to my 
own work in this study.    
Yet, to argue that nonviolent action may be more likely to be taken up by those whose 
goals we find more normatively admirable is by no means to argue that all those who wield the 
nonviolent sword have goals that are civic and democratizing.  Indeed, there are numerous 
examples of movements of a primarily nonviolent character whose goals are deeply anti-
democratic and destructive.  At the very least, such movements may often be particularistic and 
pursue simply the benefit of their own leaders at the expense of the larger public interest. 
For instance, the so-called Yellow Shirt movement in Thailand has, since 2005, pursued 
multiple primarily nonviolent campaigns for power, first against Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra and later against the various iterations of his political movement.  These movements 
have relied on tools easily recognizable to scholars and practitioners of nonviolent action, 
locatable in Gene Sharp’s magisterial listing of 198 tactics of nonviolent action (Sharp, 1973).  
They have occupied buildings, staged marches, organized strikes, etc… and to great effect!  Since 
2006 the Yellow Shirts have ousted three governments and become a major force in Thai 
politics.  Yet it is difficult to argue that their largely nonviolent repertoire has been a positive 
force in Thailand.  Their constant move to the streets to oust rivals from the Red Shirt 
movement has been deeply destructive to the Thai economy, and ultimately to the Thai political 
system, as the constant back and forth of nonviolent action from 2006-2014 ultimately resulted 
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in a lack of popular faith in democracy that supported a successful military coup in 2014 that has 
moved Thailand from an increasingly-robust democracy to a military dictatorship. 
Thus, not just violence but also forms of nonviolent action, when pursued for the 
purpose of these maximalist politics, are deeply problematic and destabilizing to democratic 
transitions.  There are two or three strong empirical indicators that I look for as far as radicalized 
nonviolent actions go. 
The first is electoral boycotts.  An electoral boycott is certainly a form of nonviolent 
action, and perhaps even justified in certain circumstances, yet in the main it is a form of action 
that indicates an unwillingness to play by democratic rules.  Boycotting an election that one 
anticipates not being able to win shows a lack of faith in the democratic process and indicates 
that nonviolent action is being directed not towards improving democracy but rather towards 
undermining it for particularistic ends.  This is particularly the case if there is no reliable 
evidence that the elections are characterized by widespread fraud.  No electoral system is 
perfect – even in highly developed nations such as the United States the rules of the electoral 
game are often stacked in favor of one party or another.  In some cases the stacking of the deck 
may be so extreme that there is simply no credible way that an opposition party interested in 
promoting democracy can in good conscience give even the slightest legitimacy to the process.  
Yet if such extreme circumstances do not appear to hold and yet widespread electoral boycotts 
occur this says less about the nature of the system and more about the nature of the actors.  
Actors are afraid of electoral results and thus seek to avoid humiliation and play for power not 
on the field of democratic institutions but rather in the streets, where their inferior numbers 
may nonetheless be employed with greater strategic effect than at the ballot box. 
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Some scholars examining nonviolent action in particular transitions have argued that 
there is an important difference between tactics that seek to draw people together and 
communicate a message to authorities and those that more directly employ forms of nonviolent 
coercion (Lakier, 2007).  General strikes, for instance, seek to directly pressure decision makers 
to accede to the demands of the group organizing the strike through imposing devastating 
economic costs.  In Nepal since the 2006 overthrow of King Gyanendra, another common tactic 
has been the so-called chakka jam or traffic jam, in which small groups of nonviolent activists 
will blockade roadways or particular urban centers in order to impose economic pressure on 
their political opponents. 
While I am sympathetic to the argument that these types of tactics may be more 
reliable indicators of the kind of maximalist nonviolent action that I am describing here, I am 
skeptical that their reliability would be broadly applicable in a cross-national setting.  Any kind of 
strike, for instance, relies on a certain degree of economic coercion to have any kind of 
influence, yet strikes may be employed for far less than radical goals.  A strike by a particular 
economic sector is almost the definition of a tactic pursued not for maximalist, radicalized goals 
but rather for very specific, sectoral goals.  Similarly, forms of nonviolent intervention such as 
road blockades, while certainly seeking to impose economic costs, are also often a more 
symbolic attempt to achieve high visibility nonviolent action with smaller numbers of people.  In 
the United States, for instance, road blockades have become a fairly common tactic employed 
as civil disobedience. 
Thus I do not consider either of these forms of action to be a reliable indicator of the 
maximalist use of nonviolent action.  Instead, I attempt to blend the idea of maximalist goals 
and action by looking at whether particular actors employ both the maximalist discourse that I 
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have described above and also, at the same time, do in fact seek to put their words into practice 
through any kind of large-scale nonviolent campaign.   
Fortunately, several data sources exist which meld these twin concerns of both rhetoric 
and action.  The Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge, et al., V-Dem Dataset v6, 2016), for 
instance, measures the degree to which anti-system movements are present in the political 
system.  This blends both the idea that such rhetoric is employed in political discourse and that 
it is carried out on the streets.  The Major Episodes of Contention dataset (Moore, et al., 2016) 
collects data on whether maximalist nonviolent campaigns seeking regime change or some 
other form of major systemic change were present in a country in a particular year.  I employ 
these kinds of measures to look at this aspect of radicalization. 
This section has summarized how to move from the more abstract concepts of 
mobilization, holdovers, and radicalization to more direct empirical indicators.  I have even 
suggested some of the specific data sources that I will employ to directly measure these things.  
In the next section I discuss the expected effects of these patterns of political behavior.  What 
are the endpoints of civil resistance transitions? What do regimes look like after a civil resistance 
campaign occurs?  I have mentioned above the four endpoints that I generally argue obtain: a 
new authoritarianism, an elite semi-democracy, a radicalized semi-democracy, and a 
democracy.   
This typology is similar, of course, to many other typologies employed in the 
democratization literature.  I argue that these ideal types are a useful heuristic because of their 
relationship to the particular challenges I have described.  They allow for a parsimonious 
theoretical view of the links between transitional practices and long-term political equilibria.  I 
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focus my descriptions on the more novel categories of elite semi-democracy and fractious semi-
democracy as the general categories of democracy and authoritarianism are more extensively 
fleshed out in other works and I more or less directly appropriate these descriptions. 
The Ends of Civil Resistance Transitions 
 Elite semi-democracy is the result of a civil resistance transition in which transitional 
mobilization is low, the challenge of holdovers is generally resolved through co-optation, and 
maximalism, if it occurs, occurs within the ranks of the elite.   
 In an elite semi-democracy the slogans of the nonviolent revolution are adopted and the 
forms of democracy are generally put in place.  Elections occur and in most cases are likely to 
have an important impact on the distribution of political power.  Elites fear to go too far beyond 
the bounds of democratic practice, lest they once again spark the ire of the people who rose up 
against the old regime. 
 However, while there are thus certain guardrails that prevent the wholesale rapid 
devolution of democracy these guardrails do little to actually ensure that the de jure forms of 
democracy are honored de facto, or that any progress is made towards ensuring that the 
country’s democracy continues to improve in quality, or that the will of the people is faithfully 
represented.   
 Why does this occur?  A lack of mobilization, that is to say a continuation of the popular 
pressure employed by the civil resistance campaign, means that the elites who come into power 
during the transition have no sense that they will be held accountable for their actions by those 
who are best-equipped to monitor them: the people.  Any mechanisms of accountability will 
either be within the elite themselves, or from international sources.  In the first case, any 
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constraining effect of accountability can be managed by using the tools of state power to 
distribute private goods among the elite and thus maintain a comfortable balance of political 
power and resources.   
In addition, because of the widespread co-optation of the transition by old regime elites 
implied by the failure to resolve the challenge of holdovers the new power structures are 
suffused with elites who lack a strong preference for democracy and have often had decades of 
practice in ruling their nation in a top-down manner for their own private benefit.  Those who 
attempt to resist the co-optation of the new democratic regime are generally few in number, 
lack political resources, and find themselves unable to call upon the force of popular resistance 
in order to restore momentum towards the bright democratic future envisioned during the 
struggle against the old regime. 
International sources of accountability, while inconvenient, can be assuaged with the 
general forms of democracy while the overall practice of democracy, so much more difficult to 
reliably observe, can be manipulated to serve the private interests of the elite.  As with the 
history of nonviolent resistance, the impact of international forces may be as a guardrail to 
prevent a wholesale return to a non-democratic political system, but is unlikely to be effective in 
comprehensively pushing such countries to major implementation of higher democratic 
standards absent some major change in mobilization by the people of the country themselves. 
 Absent some domestic mobilization shock, an elite semi-democracy can remain as an 
equilibrium political state for an indefinite period of time.  Norm entrepreneurs among the 
populace find themselves leaders with few or no followers, the political elite maintains itself 
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comfortably in control over the nation, and the international community can do little to directly 
hold them accountable. 
 Elite semi-democratic regimes are likely to destabilize into another regime type under 
two conditions.  First, a major move for power by one political faction of elites may spark 
popular resistance.  An ambitious leader may push against the guardrails, leading to popular 
pushback that destabilizes the elite bargain and may initiate a new political transition.  
Alternately, a continued lack of mobilization over time may lead to a progressive erosion of 
democracy as elites gradually expand their scope of operation and push politics further and 
further away from the democratic ideal.  At a certain point this pushing reaches an extent that it 
is no longer meaningful to even describe the political system as semi-democratic and instead we 
have a form of non-democratic regime. 
 The picture is radically different in fractious semi-democracies.  Fractious semi-
democracies have high mobilization in the wake of the civil resistance campaign.  People truly 
take to heart the destabilizing message of civil resistance: change is possible with even a 
relatively small degree of mobilization if the tools of resistance are employed skillfully and 
strategically.  Yet absent a centralizing non-democratic opponent, particular factions channel 
this resistance into their own narrow interests.   
 The attachment to the power of non-institutionalized resistance results in a move to 
employ these tools almost constantly as various forces jockey for political power.  When 
elections occur they are mainly exercises in which all sides seek to employ various strategies to 
ensure that they alone benefit from the electoral contest.  Each actor knows that the other is 
prepared to employ whatever tools are necessary to gain power and undermine the other’s hold 
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on the political system. Thus, whenever one side does achieve some degree of power they 
attempt to manipulate the rules of the political game to ensure that this power can continue 
indefinitely into the future. Perceiving this, the other side accuses them of attempting to 
establish a new dictatorship and uses their behavior as justification for continued destructive 
resistance. 
 As long as support for the warring political factions remains high and maximalist 
attitudes are widespread throughout the population then fractious semi-democracy can also be 
an indefinite political equilibrium.  However, second and third-order effects of this mode of 
political action are likely to ultimately destabilize the equilibrium.  The economic and social 
instability caused by a failure to establish regularized democratic politics is likely to be extremely 
costly for the average citizen.  Jobs will be scarce, economic development problematic, and the 
constant back and forth of maximalist political contention wearying and ultimately angering.  
Popular opinion may shift away from the actors fighting things out in the political arena towards 
more stable alternatives.   
 It is uncertain which direction the appeal of these alternatives is likely to push the 
political regime.  It is certainly possible that frustration over political dysfunction may lead 
ordinary people to mobilize to encourage greater democratic protections and respect for 
political institutions.  Yet it seems more likely, based on historical experience, that the appeal 
will more generally be for an authoritarian alternative.  People will crave a strong leader who 
can get rid of all these dysfunctional politicians and return the country to stability and 
productivity, and if such a leader can be found, then there may be a serious authoritarian 
reversal (Linz 1978).   
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 While I spend less time discussing democracy or new authoritarianism as endpoints, a 
few relevant words about the path to a return to autocracy bear mentioning.  This seems to be a 
particular issue when it comes to the challenge of holdovers.  Civil resistance implies that when 
the transition begins old regime elites are likely still powerful but fragmented, divided against 
one another by their prospects for power in the new order. If, however, it appears that those 
prospects are universally negative, then the old elites may unite to push for a new 
authoritarianism.  This push may take many diverse forms depending on the particular political 
dynamics of that country, but most of these can be productively categorized as coups d’etat.   
 There is an important caveat here, though, considering the nature of a civil resistance 
transition, coups make be particularly unlikely to succeed.  As numerous historical examples 
have shown, a coup d’etat is singularly difficult to achieve if there is widespread popular 
mobilization against it.  For instance, the general strike launched by the German Socialists was 
responsible for preventing the so-called Kapp Putsch of 1920.  The attempted coup by French 
Algerian generals in 1961 against Charles de Gaulle was similarly thwarted in part by a massive 
nonviolent popular opposition.  More recently, the transition in Burkina Faso was maintained 
against an attempted coup when tens of thousands took to the streets condemning it. Thus, if 
mobilization is extremely high during the transition, even when old elites go the full distance in 
their attempts to derail democratization they are likely to fail. 
 It bears mentioning, of course, that such failures can likely be anticipated by many 
potential coup plotters.  Thus we are unlikely to see large numbers of failed coups in situations 
where the challenge of holdovers has been resolved through widespread lustration.  Instead, we 
are more likely to observe murmurings of potential coups never carried out, attempts to test the 
water by elites soon to be disenfranchised or imprisoned.    
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 Up to this point I have presented the basic definitions of my concepts, my empirical 
puzzle, and my argument for its solution.  In the following sections I widen the scope of my 
inquiry to show the implications of my approach for broader questions of democratization and 
political change, as well as to make a critique of current theories of democratization that focus 
on exogenous structural factors.  My critique shows the theoretical underpinnings of my 
approach and underlines the necessity for theoretical and empirical innovation in the study of 
democratization. 
Defining Regimes, Transitions, and Democracy 
 I have used the terms regime, transition, democracy, democratization, and 
democraticness in the preceding discussion fairly loosely, yet before moving on to it is necessary 
to clarify and restrict the scope of these definitions.  My discussion at this point is fairly 
theoretical.  I discuss my empirical operationalization of these concepts in Chapter 2. 
 The first important concept to define is the political regime.  I define regimes, following 
Geddes and her co-authors (2014), O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and others as the basic set 
of rules and institutions that define who governs in a society and the primary means of political 
access.  Regimes include, but are not limited to, the set of formal written laws that legally set 
out these procedures and identities.  So, for example, both Lebanon’s constitutionally-mandated 
religious power-sharing and Nigeria’s informal alternation of the presidency between north and 
south would be important aspects of their country’s respective regimes. 
 As an interlocking set of formal rules, informal norms, and political institutions political 
regimes function as a means of stabilizing the interaction of political actors as well as acting as 
focal points around which actors’ expectations can converge.  Political regimes at their core are 
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one critically important social structure that is both constituted by the routinized actions of 
political actors and that constitutes the actors that participate within its strictures.  For instance, 
a democratic political regime is constituted by actors such as voters and elected officials. The 
regime does not exist absent these actors performing their routinized functions.  However, its 
social structure as a whole also constitutes the actors within it.  Being a voter is meaningless if 
there is no way to vote and no one to vote for.  
 Where coherent regimes do not exist they will almost always develop fairly rapidly.  
Politics absent a regime is highly inefficient since the lack of routinized interaction limits political 
actors’ ability to predict the future.  Actors with even a minor power advantage in an unstable 
regime environment will seek to elongate their period in power, as well as increase the 
extractive efficiency of their power, through institutionalizing regime arrangements.  On a 
deeper level, Giddens and other social theorists argue that the absence of social routine is a 
powerful source of ontological insecurity that causes psychological distress and that actors will 
thus instinctively seek to resolve (Giddens, 1984, pp. 60-64).  Where political routines are 
absent, actors must attempt to take into account all possible contingencies, since they lack 
consistent rules to shape their expectations.  This task is almost by definition impossible, and 
actors know it is impossible.  Hence, absent a regime political actors will feel deeply vulnerable, 
unable to protect themselves from loss of political position, a state of deep anxiety (Mitzen, 
2006).     
Once new regimes are in place and begin to perform their functions of stabilizing actors 
the same incentives that lead to their fairly rapid establishment will lead to a strong tendency to 
continue through time.  Thus, while there will certainly be exceptions because of various kinds 
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of exogenous shocks, the general pattern will be for regimes to come into place fairly rapidly 
and to stay in place for lengthy periods of time.   
When regimes do break down a polity enters a state of political transition.  This occurs 
when these basic rules and institutions are destabilized and become fundamentally unclear to 
the major political actors.  Routinized politics ceases to operate as it has in the past and politics 
becomes fundamentally abnormal (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).  For the reasons just 
discussed, times of transition tend to be distasteful to political actors and they will tend to 
minimize their duration. 
A transition ends when a new regime has come into place and has endured long enough 
to begin functioning as a regime.  That is to say when a temporary configuration of political 
power-holders and rules for choosing them has persisted long enough that its actions begin to 
become routinized and political actors strategize about the future based around the assumption 
that the regime will continue. 
Measuring this point can be a difficult task, and almost by definition can only be done in 
a consistent cross-national way with post facto knowledge.  I discuss this challenge in some 
detail in Chapter 2. 
There are any number of different axes along which one can classify regimes.  In this 
study the primary axis with which I am concerned is democracy.  Democracy is, of course, a term 
with great normative currency in the current world order, though one whose normative appeal 
has come under challenge in recent years (Cooley, 2015).  Yet its powerful normative appeal 
makes it difficult to entangle as a clear concept to use in social scientific analysis. 
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 In this study I examine democracy as an empirical phenomenon, not a normative ideal.  
Democracy may or may not be the best political system out there, defined however one wishes 
to define best.  Particular systems to which we apply the descriptor democratic need not be 
particularly loved by their citizens or admired by outside observers.   
 It is important to state these caveats so as to appropriately temper the magnitude of my 
claims relative to democracy and democratization.  The normative appeal of democracy can lead 
readers to interpret claims regarding its creation as suspect if they can observe anything less 
than its full idealized picture.  Similarly, claims about the ability of a particular factor to influence 
a country’s democracy may be over-interpreted as implying moves to highly idealized forms of 
politics. 
 Robert Dahl goes so far in addressing this problem as to abandon the term democracy 
for anything short of a highly idealized political system.  Instead, Dahl coined the term polyarchy 
as his preferred term for political systems that approached but nevertheless fell short of the 
normative ideal of democracy (Dahl, 1973). 
 I draw on Dahl in informing my definition of democracy but eschew his use of a separate 
term for the close to the ideal category of political systems as unnecessarily confusing.  Instead, 
I think of democracy in two different senses, which implies two different definitions of the 
attendant terms of democratization and democraticness. 
 The first sense is of democracy as a regulative ideal.  Democracy is an ideal-type political 
system which empirical political systems can more or less approximate.  In defining this ideal I 
follow Dahl in considering democracy to be: “a political system one of the characteristics of 
which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its 
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citizens…considered as political equals” (Dahl, 1973, p. 2).  This definition in turn implies that 
democracies give their citizens unimpaired opportunities to formulate their preferences, signify 
those preferences, and have those preferences weighted equally by the government (Dahl, 
1973). 
 As a regulative ideal, we may consider democracy as something that political systems 
approximate to greater or lesser degree.  The closer a political system comes to this ideal the 
greater its degree of democraticness.  When the political system changes from a form that 
poorly approximates this ideal to one which more closely approximates it we may describe the 
process as democratization. 
Scholars have offered diverse insights as to what specific institutions will move a polity 
closer or further away from this ideal, and suggested several different dimensions of 
democraticness that, while all associated in some way with this underlying sense of equal 
representation, are in other ways orthogonal and even contradictory to one another.  For 
instance, Dahl (1973) divided democratization into two orthogonal dimensions: contestation 
and participation, and future studies have found this two-dimensional structure a useful 
construct (Coppedge, Alvarez, & Maldonado, 2008).  Others have argued that democracy 
composes as many as five dimensions, and possibly more (Coppedge, et al., 2011).  Engaging in-
depth in this important discussion is beyond the scope of this study.  Instead, in Chapter 2 I 
simply adopt the simultaneously most cutting-edge and most well-accepted definitions of the 
various dimensions of democracy.  
In addition to this ideal-type definition of democracy from Dahl I also look at democracy 
from a binary perspective informed by the Schumpeter (1942).  Schumpeter is skeptical of the 
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ability of any political system actually approaching anything like representativeness, the general 
will, or the public good.  Even if such a thing might be possible, Schumpeter is highly doubtful 
that an outside observer could ever actually measure it. 
Because of this skepticism towards the more ideal-type definitions of democracy 
Schumpeter proposes a much more straightforward and limited definition of democracy based 
on political institutional arrangements.  For Schumpeter, democracy is: “that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide 
by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 241).  We may 
thus fairly clearly, and with disagreement only over liminal cases, determine whether a country 
is a democracy.  Democraticness is a binary characteristic that either fully obtains or fully fails to 
obtain for any particular political system at any point in time.  Democratization is the movement 
from one side of the line to the other, and is accomplished wholesale at a single point in time.   
This is, of course, a far cry from Dahl’s regulative ideal of democracy.  It thus provides 
certain advantages and certain disadvantages, and gives scope for different kinds of analysis.  
Schumpeter’s criterion is eminently observable and allows us to fairly easily distinguish between 
democracies and non-democracies.  However, it gives little space for comparing regimes within 
either of these categories.  It also misses several central aspects of what we might describe as 
democratic.  Schumpeter, for instance, provides no space for the exercise of direct democracy 
through methods such as the plebiscite, or for the protection of essential rights and freedoms 
beyond the right to vote.   
Both approaches have drawbacks and advantages.  And so rather than pitting one 
against another I instead employ both in my analysis.  So, in my theoretical discussions I will 
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speak of both approaching Dahl’s ideal and crossing Schumpeter’s threshold.  The contention 
that I will present theoretically in this chapter and provide empirical evidence for in the 
subsequent chapters is that civil resistance at the initiation of a transition and certain patterns 
of behavior during the transition affect both Schumpeter’s threshold and Dahl’s ideal in similar 
ways. 
Having presented my theoretical definitions of regimes, transitions, democracy I now 
move to considering the nature of nonviolent resistance and of political transitions initiated by 
nonviolent resistance.  
Civil Resistance Transitions 
 The highly abstract discussion above raises the question of why look specifically at 
transitions initiated by civil resistance campaigns.  If indeed we can abstract from almost all 
characteristics of a country and the political actors within it, why should one limit the population 
of cases to those initiated through a particular method of political contention? 
 The simple answer, beyond inherent empirical interest, is that the method of contention 
which initiates a political transition is likely to affect my two key dimensions for identifying 
patterns of transitional behavior in consistent ways.  Transitions initiated through civil resistance 
are highly likely to elevate to positions of power those with preferences strongly against the old 
regime and with strong preferences for a new, democratic regime (Ekiert & Kubik, 1999).  The 
power advantages of these people with democratic preferences are then in turn highly likely to 
push the transition towards democracy (McFaul, 2002). Initiating the transition through 
nonviolent resistance is also likely to create a broad-based mandate for radical, democratizing 
change (Bunce, 2003).  In contrast, those with preferences towards retaining the old regime are 
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much more likely to remain in positions of power in transitions initiated through top-down 
liberalization, and the mandate for change is likely to be more moderate. 
 It is crucial to emphasize that this assertion is probabilistic rather than deterministic.  I 
am not arguing that participation in civil resistance is inherently either a necessary or sufficient 
condition for pro-democratic inclinations. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini comes to mind as an 
individual who played a critical leadership role in a primarily nonviolent revolution who 
nonetheless held extremely anti-democratic inclinations. Other leaders may be socialized into 
holding and promoting highly democratic views but depart from those views later in life as new 
socialization and political stimuli push them in different directions. Viktor Orban, who was a 
leader in the Hungarian movement against Communism as a student but as a Prime Minister 
several decades later has rolled back several aspects of Hungary’s democratic system, would be 
a prime example of this tendency. 
 My contention is not ignoring the Khomeinis and Orbans of the world, but rather 
arguing that, on average, for every Khomeini and Orban there will be many more Mandelas, 
Walesas, and others for whom both personal factors and their participation in resistance will be 
far more inclined to promote the democratic character of their country’s political system.  
 One can think of the method of initiating the transition as the final step in setting the 
field of play in which political forces engage during the transitional period. A suite of past 
structural characteristics influence, but do not determine, the method by which the transition is 
initiated. The method by which the transition is initiated then critically shapes these two 
dimensions under which we can examine the behavior of transitional actors.With consistently 
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different starting points, the patterns of behavior likely to be influential will be consistently 
different.  Thus it makes good theoretical sense to examine them separately. 
 I divide the methods of initiating these transitions into three: top-down liberalization, 
violent overthrow, and civil resistance. In the first case, a regime transition occurs because of 
initiative from elites from the old regime. In the second case, a violent clash eliminates the 
power structure of the old regime and brings an entirely new group to power. In the third case, 
nonviolent resistance undermines the structures of power in the old regime, forcing a transition 
to a new regime. 
 This is certainly not the only viable method to divide mechanisms of initiating a 
transition.  Stradiotto and Guo (2010), for instance, divide mechanisms into conversion, 
cooperation, collapse, and foreign intervention. I choose to divide the population of transitions 
this way because the paradigm of nonviolent resistance as a particular method of undermining 
authoritarian regimes has proved to be a powerful predictor of differing patterns of 
democratization outcomes (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005; Johnstad, 2010; Chenoweth & 
Stephan, 2011; Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Garcia-Ponce & Wantchekon, 2017).  My empirical 
examination is thus built on a firm foundation for understanding why different patterns emerge. 
 A general theory of transitional action and democratization could certainly be built 
through analyzing the power position and preferences of different actors in each of these cases.  
In some ways, such work has already been done by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) in regards to 
top-down liberalization.  Yet little or no analysis has been done specifically examining the power 
positions of various actors following transitions initiated by nonviolent resistance. Thus my work 
fills a significant gap in the literature.   
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 This lack of analysis of civil resistance-initiated transitions is surprising considering that 
civil resistance has played a crucial role across much of the major waves of regime transitions for 
the last seventy years.  From the end of authoritarian rule in Portugal and Greece in the 1970s 
to the return of democracy in Latin America in the 1980s, to the massive outpouring of popular 
opposition to authoritarian rule beginning in Eastern Europe and spreading as far as sub-
Saharan Africa in the 1990s, to the Color Revolutions and Arab Spring of the early 21st century, 
nonviolent resistance has been at the center of political change.  Thus, the gap left by prior 
scholar calls for attention. 
However, in another sense, since my approach, while informed by these prior theorists, 
also departs from them in significant ways, I do believe that more could be learned about 
democratization in all three of these contexts through my approach. However, I leave this more 
general theorizing for future work and focus on the least well-understood of these three 
transitional conditions: the civil resistance initiated transition or CRT.   
Having presented my puzzle, theory, and core conceptual definitions I now widen the 
scope of my discussion to take into account some of the theoretical underpinnings of my 
approach. This serves two functions: first to provide theoretical underpinnings for my particular 
focus on transitional patterns of behavior, in particular by defending this focus from accusations 
of endogeneity; and second to offer some thoughts on the wider theoretical implications of my 
approach and its relevance for broader theoretical questions.  
Theoretical Underpinnings: The Structuration of Democracy 
 Understanding why societies move from one form of government to another is a 
fundamental problem in political science.  Indeed, one might put it in this form as one of only 
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two real questions that political science can seek to answer, namely: why do patterns of 
authority change, and why do they stay the same?  Almost every research question in our field 
can be summarized within these categories. 
 At this level of abstraction, these questions are universal.  Continuity and change in 
patterns of authority can be examined across time and in societies as simple as hunter-gatherers 
and as complex as postmodern postindustrial democratic polities. Yet considering the 
temporality of our discipline, going back generously around a century and a half or so – despite 
the claims of a longer lineage going back to figures like Thucydides and Machiavelli – our 
interest in continuity and change has been preoccupied with the rise and fall of democracy. Of 
these two questions, the second has typically been less scrutinized.  The decline of democracy, 
admirably addressed in the work of Linz and Stepan, among others, was applied primarily 
historically, in an attempt to understand grand historical trends such as the rise of Nazism in 
Weimar Germany and the rise of Fascism in Republican Italy.13   
 The study of democracy’s rise – democratization – on the other hand, has remained 
fundamental to political science. From a disciplinary perspective, democratization has centrality 
because of its place as one of the primary instances of large-scale change in political systems.  
Ideologically, democratization is also a core concern of the liberal world order constituted by the 
United States and the international institutions put in place following the Second World War.   
 Democratization may be examined from two basic lenses, depending on whether one is 
interested in it as a political science problem or as an ideological concern of the neo-liberal 
                                                          
13 Though if we are indeed, as many argue, in an age of “democratic decline,” the breakdown of 
democracy may be on the verge of a revival in political science research.  See Burrows and Stephan 2014, 
Haggard and Kaufman 2016, and Ulfelder 2010. 
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world order.  The political scientist looks for patterns, structures, and markers that one may 
clearly identify and say: “Here, democratization.  Here, autocracy.” Democratization is a puzzle 
that can be solved by identifying facilitating conditions, a particular class or economic structure, 
political resources available to the new actors, etc…  The picture is generalized, abstract, broad. 
 As a concern of the neo-liberal world order, democratization is a series of technical 
challenges for the order’s international and domestic allies to overcome. It is highly specific, 
highly contingent, a series of interlocking, institutional, social, and political constructions that 
must be carefully fine-tuned to their particular situation.   
 Rarely do the two meet.  Even the branches of political science that share the focus on 
specificity, perhaps best captured in Robert Bates’ discussion of Area Studies (Bates, 1997) 
typically focus on specificities that remain beyond the control of the policymaker. They are not 
the generalized abstraction of political science in its purest form, they are in fact highly specific 
and concrete, but they remain beyond manipulation for those with an ideological concern for 
democratic improvement.  Democratization arises because of particular cultural or historical 
traditions, again a particular arrangement of society, this time stated not as a general rule but 
rather as a particularly contingent historical reality.   
 This broad structural picture is appealing for its parsimony, for its cleanness, for its 
predictability. It is bolstered most powerfully by the raft of statistical and econometric 
techniques that well-trained political scientists can easily deploy to interpret their particular 
situation. In its earlier stages, this analysis employed simpler techniques – witness Lipset’s 
simple cross-tabulations to demonstrate the link between economic development and 
democracy (Lipset, 1959).  More recently, of course, multivariate regression in its various 
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permutations has become the norm.  Highly significant relationships, predicting a shift from 
autocracy to democracy, or a general improvement in a country’s level of democracy, are 
attractive and typically publishable findings.   
 But there is a dirty secret hidden in most of our statistical models that undermines the 
viability of this structural picture. Despite an ever-growing raft of statistically significant 
predictors of democratization, our ability to predict is still woefully limited.   
 This lack of predictive power is particularly surprising considering the highly-developed 
state of the democratization literature. Building from early scholars such as Lipset (1959), who 
was one of the first to draw a strong link between socio-economic development and 
democratization, a wealth of different factors have been found to be significant predictors of 
moves towards greater democracy. These include economic factors such as GDP per capita 
(Barro, 1999), the level of inequality (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006), and the mobility of capital 
(Boix, 2003); cultural factors such as the legacy of British colonialism (Bernhard, Reenock, & 
Nordstrom, 2004) or the Muslim percentage of the population (Fish, 2002); and international 
factors such as the democraticness of a country’s region (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006), its economic 
and political linkage to the West (Levitsky & Way, 2010), or a global process of democratic 
socialization (Harrison & Mitchell, 2014).   
Considering the many puzzle pieces these studies give us separately, we might expect 
that when putting them together a more or less complete predictive picture might emerge.  Yet 
this is far from the case. As Teorell says, in one of the most comprehensive looks at various 
approaches to democratization: “even the broadest and most inclusive statistical models 
perform dismally poorly in trying to predict short-term development of democracy” (Teorell, 
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2010, p. 158).14  In quantitative research, that simple indicator of a model’s explanatory power, 
the r-squared, is frequently quite low, suggesting that there is more going on there than even 
eclectically-aggregated models can explain. 15 And even robust findings from a single scholar are 
often quite difficult for future scholars to replicate.16 
 Qualitative studies of democratization do not have formal measures of model fit, of 
course.  Yet a similar logic applies.  Few of our qualitative theories of democratization have 
weathered the test of time, suggesting that their “out of sample” explanatory power is limited.  
For example, as I referenced above, the core model of the “transitology” school exemplified by 
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s (1986) book faced significant critique for its failure to accurately 
account for the wave of democratic transitions beginning in 1989 (Carothers, 2002; Fatton, 
1999).  Classic qualitative accounts of democratization such as Barrington Moore’s Social Origins 
of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966), while providing insights into their particular cases, have 
failed to serve as generalizable theory applicable to later generations of democratic transitions 
(Skocpol, 1973; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992, pp. 22-25). 
It is one of my core arguments that the reason our structural models have failed to 
explain this fundamental political phenomenon is that their picture of political behavior is 
                                                          
14 Teorell does argue that long-term ability to predict is more reliable, but even here the correlation 
between predicted and observed levels of democracy still leaves quite significant residuals unexplained, 
see Teorell 2010, p. 159. 
15 See, for example Fish 2002 (r2 ranges from 0.51 to 0.55 in an n of 149), Przeworski et al 2000 (r2 ranges 
from 0.05 to 0.19), or Stradiotto and Guo 2010 (r2 ranges from 0.42 to 0.53 in an n of 57).  Many other 
influential papers on democratization do not report goodness of fit measures at all (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006, Gleditsch and Ward 2006, Pevehouse 2002).    
16 For example, while Boix’s 2003 book Democracy and Redistribution finds a strong relationship between 
low levels of economic inequality and democratization, as measured by a country’s Gini coefficient, later 
studies by Dutt and Mitra (2008), Houle (2009), and Teorell (2010) were unable to replicate this 
relationship. 
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flawed. Looking at temporally prior characteristics of societies and from them deducing a causal 
path to political outcomes will always disappoint us in the end.  To make this argument I delve 
first into social theory, and from there into statistics.  But first, a few words about the 
importance of explanatory and predictive power. 
 It could be argued that ultimately explanatory and predictive power in a statistical sense 
is not the goal of this kind of quantitative social science.  That instead what we are trying to 
demonstrate is simply that one factor has a kind of relationship with a second factor, say 
economic development with democracy.  As long as we can show, through demonstrating a 
robust statistically significant relationship, that such a relationship exists, then we have 
demonstrated something interesting that helps us understand a particular phenomenon. 
 This might be the case, but truly arguing that limited explanatory power is not 
problematic begins to strain credibility when stated so directly.  As social scientists, we can seek 
various kinds of knowledge.  Our knowledge can be predictive, seeking to answer the when 
question of the timing of  a particular phenomenon, or explanatory, seeking to answer the why 
question about the preconditions of a past occurrence, or how questions of the process by 
which phenomena develop.  Quantitative research by its nature is largely limited to the when 
and the why questions, and for both of these, the full explanatory power of our model is key.  If 
we have a significant predictor yet its effect size is marginal and its ability to increase our 
predictive power limited then it is difficult to argue, in a real sense, what we have accomplished 
in demonstrating its relationship.  In essence, what we do when we ignore explanatory power is 
a sort of jargon-based con game, claiming more than we can actually reasonably claim for the 
potential benefits of our research, either scientifically (in understanding a phenomenon) or 
practically (offering advice for those who directly interact with the phenomenon). 
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 Regarding social theory, our structural theories of democratization rely on the 
assumption that particular characteristics of social or political systems affect patterns of 
changing authority relationships in consistent ways. The link between economic development 
and democracy is the best-articulated here, but many other factors could also be brought in.  
Yet the coherence of this theory rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding of human 
behavior. It unproblematically assumes structures directly act upon political agents, constraining 
and shaping their action. Yet advances in social theory from Giddens (1984) and others 
fundamentally dispute this picture. The picture of temporally prior structure shoving 
temporarily posterior agents into a particular path-dependent course of action fails to recognize 
the duality of agency and structure; that agents themselves reproduce the social and political 
structures in which they are embedded.  
 Of course, this is not to say that structure is insignificant, nor that agency comes 
temporally or causally prior to structure. To assert that individuals, even elites, have complete 
freedom of action to reshape their political structures would be as naïve as assuming that 
structures act directly on agents. Mutual constitution of intersubjective political realities means 
instead that structures continue in time because the agents embedded within them often do 
not see any other way of acting.  Structures create equilibria outside of which rational agents 
either rationally do not want to move or simply cognitively cannot imagine moving.17  Hence the 
reason that major changes in social structures are so infrequent.   
 Yet the relationship between structure and individual action is always mediated by 
social construction and human knowledgeability, by agents’ “motives and reasons” (Giddens, 
1984; p. 310).  Mutual processes of constitution create the structure even as the structure 
                                                          
17 See Giddens 1984, pp. 174-79 for a good discussion of this. 
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constrains.  Thus the effects of structure by definition cannot be deterministic.  Structural 
impacts rely on consistent perception of their meaning across time and space.  Such consistent 
perceptions often obtain but frequently do not.  Individuals, political groups, and even whole 
countries go off the equilibrium path in ways that cannot be explained simply by looking at their 
starting conditions.   
 There is a positivist workaround to the problem that economic, social, and political 
structures do not actually empirically behave in the way that our models imply.  This is perhaps 
best articulated in Milton Friedman’s essay on positive economics (Friedman, 1953), in which 
Friedman, through a famous analogy of mobile foliage in trees, argues powerfully that the 
assumptions of theory are irrelevant to its utility.  The only key factor is the explanatory power 
of the theory in predicting outcomes. In economics the model is Homo Economicus, the 
completely amoral profit-maximizing executive, who may have never existed but upon whose 
mythical behavior we may build relatively reliable predictions of aggregate economic behavior.  
Similarly, we may ignore the ways things actually are when it comes to the structural influence 
of democratization as long as our theories built around structural factors generate clear and 
reliable predictions of when and how democratization will occur. 
 But such predictive capacity is sorely lacking when it comes to democratization theory, 
as I articulated above. Even if we can find significant relationships, the significance of these 
relationships fails to provide us with strong explanatory and predictive power for when 
democratization is likely to occur. Thus, Friedman’s positivism will not save the fully structural 
picture of democratization. 
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 Democratization is, of course, a rare event, which makes predicting it on its face a 
difficult task.  Yet, far from saving the structural argument for democratization it instead 
reinforces the fact that something is missing from a purely structural democratization story.  
Structural factors are largely time invariant, or at the most their rate of change tends to be fairly 
slow and even.  On its face it is thus unsurprising that it should be difficult to comprehensively 
explain a rare occurrence on the basis of independent variables with such limited variation.  If 
we are to satisfactorily explain it then we must add more than structural factors. 
 Przeworski and his co-authors take on this approach in their well-known book 
(Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000).  They show that the established link between 
socio-economic development and democratization has empirical problems, and when carefully 
examining the data it is difficult to actually find a linear relationship between the risk of 
democratization and the level of modernization.  The correlation between the two can be 
explained much more satisfyingly by arguing that economic development, rather than pushing a 
particular country towards a rare occurrence, instead helps maintain a democratic equilibrium 
once it comes into place.  Democratization itself, they argue, emerges randomly with regard to 
structural variables such as economic development (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 
2000, p. 89). Or, in the terms I am using here, structural factors do little to explain 
democratization; explanations rooted in human agency are an essential part of the story. 
 In this chapter I propose an alternative to the structural picture, built on social theory 
but seeking to engage the rigor and explanatory power of statistics.  Social structures are 
intersubjectively reproduced by individuals in society.  They are neither strange outside forces 
constraining action, nor are they fully pliable to the whims of individual will.  Marx said it best: 
“[Humans] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please” (Marx, 1978, p. 
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595).  Our structural explanations ultimately fail because they do not take into account the 
power of human agency and reflexivity to shape outcomes, particularly in times in which some 
stimulus has destabilized the processes of social construction that supported the political order.  
It is not only structures, but also the choices within those structures, that critically shape 
democratization. 
Where Things Flow: Choosing a Point of Analysis 
 The key point in analyzing the causes of democracy is choosing a moment from which 
things flow naturally.  What I mean by this is simple, and can be illustrated by looking at a very 
straightforward statistical example - the basic equation for a linear regression – which I present 
in archetypal fashion in equation 1 below. 
1) Y = βX + ε 
 From the simplest correlation to the most complex regression models this basic 
relationship is what we are talking about: y as a function of x with some random variance.  The 
moment from which things flow naturally is in the equal sign.  This is something unique to social 
science.  In natural sciences, the equal sign is less of an assumption, though Humean 
epistemology might argue that ultimately even natural sciences are ultimately simply assuming 
a natural flow.  In social science, this assumption of flow is much more inescapable.  Our 
independent variables almost never directly shove our dependent variables.  Instead, we 
theorize about often quite complex and involved chains of causation that flow naturally from 
our independent variables.  Any deviations from the natural flow fall in the error term.   
 The structural view implicitly assumes that our models can capture the world through 
this point.  We even push our models to focus as far back as possible so as to not catch 
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ourselves at a later point in this natural flow.  Hence the overwhelming concern throughout 
social science with endogeneity.  We are hesitant to use independent variables whose impact on 
our dependent variable may be fully explained by temporally prior independent variables.  On 
its face this is, of course, a perfectly valid methodological concern.  If we are to tell meaningful 
stories about causation it will do us little good to start in the middle of a naturally flowing story.   
 Yet when it comes to democratization we are not dealing with a naturally flowing story.  
The independent variables employed in our statistical models operate at second, third, and even 
more distant degrees of remove, and the movement at almost every step is problematic when 
examined directly.  Consider, for example, one well known factor argued to impact 
democratization: the number of other democracies in a particular country’s region.18  Several 
studies have shown such a relationship (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; Brinks & Coppedge, 2006). 
What is the underlying story for why this relationship obtains?   
Gleditsch and Ward (2006) argue that democratic neighbors increase the likelihood of a 
democratic transition because democratization is a struggle over power and networks of power 
and influence transcend national borders. When we see higher numbers of neighboring 
democracies, elites and institutions in these democracies will provide support to pro-democratic 
opposition movements in countries within their regions that remain non-democratic. This 
support will then be sufficient to tip the balance of power within the remaining non-
democracies such that democratic transitions will be initiated and new democratic regimes will 
come to power. Other diffusion models rely on a similar set of mechanisms, for instance 
                                                          
18 See as well Haggard and Kauffman’s (2012) critique of theories of distributive conflict and 
democratization which highlights how the multiple steps argued by these theories to explain a link 
between inequality and democratization fail to obtain when looking qualitatively at actual cases. 
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assuming that actors within political regimes receive some kind of benefits when their regime 
closely matches that of their neighbors (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006). 
 This broad relationship has been statistically demonstrated.  Yet, as the authors often 
admit, they cannot actually test the mechanisms through which they claim their relationship 
obtains (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006, p. 467). The diffusion model assumes, first, that democratic 
governments, including new democratic governments, will seek to encourage similar democratic 
changes in their neighbors. Second, that pro-democratic partners within their neighbors exist to 
receive their assistance. Third, that such efforts to encourage democratic changes will 
successfully increase the political capacity of these nascent democratizers.  Fourth, that the 
increase in political capacity will be sufficient to motivate pro-democratizers to in some way 
challenge the status quo.  Fifth, that this challenge will be successful in bringing the pro-
democratizers to power.  Sixth, that once in power the pro-democratizers will actually seek to 
put in place a new democratic regime. Seventh, that they will succeed in doing so. 
 To simply accept the impact of diffusion on democratization, we must act as though we 
can assume that all of the steps unproblematically flow naturally from the impetus of a greater 
number of democratic neighbors. Yet, as will be clear to any scholar of democratization once the 
steps are laid out, not one of them can be so assumed. Take for example the idea that 
democracies seek to encourage democratic change in their neighbors. The most cursory glance 
through the history of US foreign policy towards its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors will 
show that such democratic support has been at best part of a much wider range of strategies 
towards the governments of these countries.  The US, despite its high valuation of democracy at 
home, has energetically supported non-democratic regimes in many of its neighbors when such 
support was perceived to be in American national interest. Even when ostensibly seeking to 
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encourage democracy, its support has often been directed not towards a full-fledged 
democratization but rather towards a more limited form of democracy still dominated by a 
small elite (Robinson, 1996). Similar critiques could be leveled at all of the other assumed steps 
in the naturally flowing story of democratic diffusion. 
The response, of course, is that these theories are probabilistic, and the fact that a 
statistically significant relationship obtains between the percentage of democratic neighbors 
and a country’s level of democracy means that we can unproblematically treat each of these 
steps as at least probabilistically being pushed in a particular direction. This is true, but it returns 
us to the critique that I have focused on thus far: our models’ levels of explanatory power.  The 
fact that explanatory power remains low is a powerful indication that, in fact, there is a lot going 
on in each of these probabilistic steps that remains to be examined, opening up significant room 
for new kinds of research.    
 One approach to addressing this issue is to problematize the error term. We assume 
that variation from omitted variables of a similar structural nature has not been accounted for.  
If it were possible to build a full structural model then perhaps democratization would be fully 
explained. The eclectic approach of Teorell (2010) and others generally takes this approach, 
including a vast number of structural covariates of democratization to build a relatively 
comprehensive structural model.  This effort at completeness is definitely an improvement over 
limited structural models, but remains limited in its explanatory power.19 
                                                          
19 Building such complex “garbage can” models also raises methodological questions, as including so many 
variables in  a regression model reduces the likelihood that one can truly understand how any one 
variable’s departure from the assumptions of one’s estimation strategy affects the results (Achen, 2002; 
Achen, 2005). 
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 I propose that instead of problematizing the error term we problematize the equal sign, 
the natural flow from structure to agency, from a high GDP per capita, strong ties with the West, 
low percentage of Muslims, or whatever the preferred structural explanation, to a certain 
likelihood or level of future democracy. Structures may shape, but the shape that they create is 
one that is sustained and shaped through future agential choices. In each of the steps between 
independent variable and dependent variable there is unexplained variation, there are points at 
which, for the natural flow to occur, particular actors must make particular choices that are by 
no means fully determined or even meaningfully determined by the observable structural 
factors. 
 How can one determine this is true and avoid the deadly accusation of endogeneity?  I 
make two key assertions. The first is that the structural story fully eliminating the effects of 
agency on its own is itself a much higher empirical bar than scholarship often makes it.  It is in 
fact something quite difficult to demonstrate that the choices of political elites and ordinary 
people in times of political transition can be fully or even just satisfactorily explained by their 
structural preconditions. Certainly no model of democratization that currently exists can 
demonstrate anything close to this level of certainty.   
 The attractiveness of exogeneity has masked this particular limitation.  We need not 
deal with our failure to fully explain as long as we can convincingly argue that our favored 
explanation robustly and significantly explains part of the variation we are interested in. As long 
as the robustness of that partial explanation can be maintained through a battery of tests and is 
not vulnerable to accusations of endogeneity, then our potential for publication is safe. No 
model is ever perfect and we are all comfortable with some degree of error. 
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 Yet this interest in exogeneity is not the best possible attempt at scholarly scientific 
explanation of the phenomenon of democratization, as shown by the failures to explain 
variation in democratization that I discussed above. So why the focus on exogeneity?  Perhaps 
because of professional convenience driven by the incentive structure of the field.  It is easier to 
build reliable statistical models using factors that are very clearly and distinctly exogenous. It is 
easier to focus on structure.  But ultimately structure will not aid us because, when it comes to 
democratization, outcomes do not flow from structure. Instead, the shaping influence of 
structure allows for multiple potential paths whose outcomes are defined by individual and 
group strategic choices. 
My second assertion is that methods for determining whether particular choices impact 
democratization are already quite simply built into our methods of statistical testing, and thus 
can be easily tested by employing current statistical methods, as long as the researcher is 
careful to employ tests of adequate robustness and not simply run the model and leave it at 
that.   
 Consider the following.  Assume that democratization can be explained through a 
combination of structural preconditions (Xs) and particular patterns of political behavior (Xa).  
Those structural preconditions both make the ultimate end goal of democratization more likely, 
but also perhaps impact, but do not necessarily create, particular patterns of behavior. We 
conceptualize the level of democracy, as before, in simple linear regression terms.  
2) Y = βsXs + βaXa +  ε 
If Xs and Xa are independent of one another, yet we only include Xs in our model, then Xa 
will fall into the error term, our residuals will increase, and the model’s goodness of fit will 
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decrease.  However, if Xa is not independent of Xs, and is in fact fully determined by Xs, then 
including it will make the distinct causal impact of the two variables impossible for the model to 
determine. The standard errors for the coefficients will become infinitely large, making βs and βa 
impossible to estimate.  We will be unable to perform the regression. 
If, on the other hand, Xa is partially but not fully determined by Xs, with a significant 
degree of correlation between the two, then the size of the standard errors will increase, but 
not become infinitely large, and our estimates of βs and βa will be possible but unreliable, subject 
to change based on minor fluctuations in sample composition, and unlikely to be robust to out-
of-sample validation. 
From this very brief discussion it is quite clear that what we are discussing is an example 
of mediation, a situation in which one independent variable both affects the dependent variable 
directly and also affects it separately through the another variable, which additionally has its 
own independent effect on the dependent variable.  While modeling such a relationship is 
somewhat more complex than a simple regression model in which one can assume complete 
independence of all the independent variables, it is by no means an insurmountable statistical 
problem and indeed lends itself quite easily to some particular statistical fixes.  
In Figure 1.1 I reproduce a diagram from Baron and Kenny’s (1986) text on mediating 
relationships, substituting the terms from this discussion in the appropriate places in the 
diagram, to illustrate how to conceptually model the relationship I am discussing.    
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Figure 1.1: Diagram of Mediation Relationships 
 
Baron and Kenny (1986, p. 1177) recommend three steps to evaluate the presence of a 
theorized mediating relationship: regressing the mediator on the independent variable, 
regressing the dependent variable on the independent variable, and regressing the dependent 
variable on both the independent variable and on the mediator; estimating separate coefficients 
in each equation. If the independent variable affects the mediator in the first equation, the 
independent variable affects the dependent variable in the second equation, the mediator 
affects the dependent variable in the third equation, and the effect size of the independent 
variable is smaller in the third equation than in the first, then a mediating relationship is 
present. 
The key problem to address to ensure that a mediator variable is contributing 
independently to the dependent variable and not simply proxying for the effects of a more 
remote causal variable is simply the familiar problem of multicollinearity.  If the natural flow 
story is completely empirically true, then we should observe perfect collinearity between 
structural factors and political choices during democratization periods.  Few would argue that 
such an outcome is likely since, as I discuss above, most structural theories of democratization, 
particularly those that employ quantitative methods, are probabilistic rather than deterministic.  
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The question is whether the inclusion of a particular variable can meaningfully improve this 
probabilistic story. 
Thus the task becomes determining the degree of multicollinearity between the set of 
structural variables and the set of agential choices.20 If patterns of political behavior are 
determined by structural conditions to a degree that their impact is not meaningful we should 
observe a high degree of correlation between these variables, and models that include both will 
fail standard multicollinearity tests. Adding variables that capture these patterns of behavior will 
have only minimal impact on measures of model fit (since very little unexplained variation is 
being explained by these variables), standard errors will increase significantly for both structural 
and agential variables, and it will thus become increasingly difficult to determine the coefficients 
for both structural and agential variables. 
Testing for the presence and effects of multicollinearity, for instance through measuring 
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) or conditioning numbers of one’s independent variables, is a 
practice that scholars in various fields that employ regression modeling understand well, as is 
determining a model’s goodness of fit. Doing such testing to a degree of statistical robustness 
demands more work than simply looking for low p-values, but is by no means an unanswerable 
empirical question. Therefore, if including the term for a democratizing pattern of behavior 
improves model fit, controlling for all plausible observable structural indicators, and does not 
significantly indicate a multicollinearity problem, we have at least plausible evidence that these 
                                                          
20 As Farrar and Glauber (1967) remind us, building a relatively complete multivariate regression model of 
any complex empirical phenomenon will almost by necessity involve including independent variables that 
are correlated with one another.  Thus diagnosing multicollinearity is not a question of examining its 
presence or absence but rather capturing its degree and its impact on one’s model. 
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particular patterns have an impact on democratization, independent of their limited correlation 
with favorable structural preconditions. 
 Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that patterns of behavior that facilitate 
democratization are being explained by unobserved temporally prior patterns of structural 
factors that fully determine their outcome. Yet I do not believe this to be an empirically 
reasonable standard. Showing that patterns of behavior explain additional variation when 
controlling for observable confounders, especially when the field of democratization is so well-
developed (and thus has such a long list of potential confounders), is strong evidence. Similarly 
strong evidence cannot be marshalled by structural models without showing very high levels of 
variation being explained by structural factors. 
 Neither an approach limited to exogenous structural factors, nor an approach 
incorporating mediating patterns of behavior, can approach the level of internal validity able to 
be captured through an experimental approach to causal inference involving complete 
randomization of treatment. There will always be some degree of error, some degree of 
imperfection, in observational approaches. However, because of the nature of democratization, 
we are unable to address the empirical puzzle in question using truly experimental methods.   
Thus we must use the best possible observational statistical methods to approximate 
experimental conditions. 
   In addition, statistical methods exist for showing the plausibility of omitted variable bias.  
The careful researcher can employ sensitivity testing to ensure that, if their results are being 
driven by the ever-elusive omitted variable, that variable must truly be a phenomenal and highly 
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correlated factor with democratization, something, once again, highly unlikely in such a well-
developed field. 
 So much for the general principle of agential patterns being a potentially important 
factor in explaining outcomes, and the kind of evidence that would be necessary to show their 
importance.   
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have presented the puzzle of Civil Resistance Transitions, and outlined 
my theory for how to address that puzzle. Then, beginning with first principles of social theory 
and the basic questions of political science, I have sketched out the parameters of the task that I 
have set for myself, the broad contribution to the understanding of democratization that I 
believe my focus on patterns of behavior can add, the nature and effects of nonviolent 
resistance, and the challenges implied by that nature and effects.   
 At this point, thus, the question becomes an empirical one.  How can I demonstrate 
indeed that my approach has scholarly benefits and that the specific patterns of behavior that I 
have articulated do in fact have the effects that I have argued?   
 The first step is statistical, one which I have already articulated to some degree earlier in 
this chapter. If I can show a substantive and robust impact of patterns of behavior on the 
predictive power of a structural model of democratization, then it will be some degree of 
evidence that there is additional explanation inherent in patterns of behavior beyond the 
degree to which such patterns of behavior are themselves determined by structure. Thus, 
statistical testing will involve building a model of democratization in CRTs, populating the model 
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first with some of the most important structural variables, and then adding variables that 
capture the patterns of behavior that I am describing. 
 I have already indicated how to build such independent variables based on the empirical 
manifestations of the underlying behavioral patterns. In the subsequent chapter I go into the 
specific details of operationalization, and present the results of my statistical findings. 
 The statistical tests strongly support the picture that I have painted of behavioral 
patterns having powerful independent impacts on democratization. However, as with any kind 
of statistical testing, particularly absent strict experimental conditions, these tests can only give 
us a sense of correlations, not truly get as causation. In order to build a richer picture of the 
impact of these patterns of behavior I thus also include three detailed case studies of various 
transitions from authoritarian rule sparked by civil resistance. 
 The case studies follow a rough approximation of a most different case analysis, in that I 
selected them in part on the basis of their extreme differences. They occurred at different time 
periods, in different regions, and following radically different forms of nonviolent resistance 
movements. However, my most different analysis is not a strict comparative case study, as the 
three cases also vary in terms of my dependent variable of regime type. The three cases ended 
as a democracy, and two other regime types, the elite semi-democracy and fractious semi-
democracy.   
 The utility of the most different selection is thus not to make a causal argument on the 
basis of their outcomes but rather to demonstrate how the impact of these patterns of behavior 
obtains empirically in particular cases despite radically different political, social, and cultural 
environments. How well do the cases match the ideal types that my theory has articulated here?  
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If the match is good, despite radically different circumstances, then I consider that strong 
evidence that the general empirical picture that I have articulated here is a good match for the 
population of CRTs as a whole. 
 However, before I turn to the case studies, I move to test the core statistical assertion 
that I have made in this chapter. 
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Chapter 2: Testing the Three Behavioral Patterns Quantitatively 
  
In this chapter I move from abstract theoretical discussion of the nature of political 
change and nonviolent resistance, or the divide between structure and agency, into empirically 
testing my theory.   
 I have described three challenges based on my model of civil resistance transitions from 
authoritarian rule, and have offered some initial reflections on operationalizing those 
challenges.  I have also suggested the standards by which to judge whether these challenges are 
indeed important in understanding democratization after civil resistance. I must show not only 
that the impact of these challenges as operationalized in accordance with my theory has a 
statistically significant impact on democratization but that the effect sizes are meaningful 
enough to distinguish my model’s predictions from the predictions of a purely structural model 
and that the inclusion of my variables improves the predictive power of the model relative to 
the structural model. Only if all of these statistical thresholds can be met can we say that my 
approach offers something meaningful for the study of democratization generally and the 
specific example of the question of CRTs. 
 I begin the chapter by describing my data sources, including how I chose my population 
of CRTs and how I operationalize maximalism, mobilization, and holdovers, my structural control 
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variables, and my dependent variable of democratization.  I then run several different models 
that test the impact of my independent variables.   
 First, I test the core contention that civil resistance transitions are more democratizing 
than other forms of transition. As I outlined in the previous chapter, this is a finding that has 
been widely replicated in the literature.  My tests here extend and expand this earlier work in a 
number of ways.  First, I incorporate a definition of transition, and particularly transitional 
endpoints, that is more theoretically developed than that employed by previous scholars such as 
Celestino and Gleditsch (2013).  Second, I compare measures of model fit between structural 
models and models including the civil resistance variable, providing an additional test of the 
additional explanatory impact of civil resistance. Third, I compare all forms of transition, not 
only political change in the aftermath of violent or nonviolent resistance, as in Chenoweth and 
Stephan (2011), or transitions to democracy alone, as in Bayer, Bethke, and Lambach (2016) and 
Bethke and Pinckney (2016). Performing this test is central to demonstrating that civil resistance 
transitions are a distinct population that deserve their own unique examination. I then select 
the population of civil resistance transitions and test the impact of my three patterns of 
behavior in these transitions. 
 The results strongly support three out of my four hypotheses.  I validate the impact of 
civil resistance on democratic transitions, and find evidence that mobilization and maximalism 
both powerfully affect democratic prospects in CRTs, significantly predicting greater democracy 
and increasing the predictive power of a simple structural model. The evidence for the challenge 
of holdovers is more mixed. 
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Operationalizing Concepts 
 My primary unit of analysis in my tests below is a political transition, defined as the 
period between the breakdown of one political regime and the establishment of a new regime.  
I discuss how I identify the beginnings and ends of transitions below. 
I define a civil resistance transition (CRT) as a political transition in which a civil 
resistance campaign played a crucial role in breaking down the prior regime. Had the civil 
resistance campaign not occurred then either regime breakdown would have been highly 
unlikely to occur or its dynamics would have been so radically different that it would be 
unrecognizable relative to the transition that occurred in part because of the civil resistance 
campaign.  
Civil resistance need not be the only factor, or even the only necessary factor in 
initiating a transition for me to classify it as a CRT. For one thing, to demonstrate such a strong 
condition would be exceedingly empirically difficult, perhaps impossible, absent a deep 
familiarity with each individual case that even many country experts could only disingenuously 
claim.   
 This point relates to the issue of “natural flow” I discuss in the previous chapter.  A sole 
necessary condition implies that everything up to the outcome “flows naturally” from this 
condition, or that we can assume such a flow unproblematically. Yet to demonstrate such 
natural flow is ultimately impossible.  We can only argue for the importance of a condition and 
then appeal to plausibility.   
 For example, one of the cases I will examine in a later chapter is the 2006 overthrow of 
King Gyanendra of Nepal in the so-called “Jana Andolan II” or “Second People’s Movement.”  
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The Jana Andolan II approximates the ideal-type of a CRT.  An autocrat stepped down after 
millions of his people took to the streets to demand his ouster. His resignation initiated a major 
transformation in the political and social institutions of the country. This seems to be a clear 
example of a CRT. 
 Yet arguing that civil resistance was the only necessary factor in explaining the transition 
will immediately become problematic. The civil resistance campaign came at the end of a ten-
year civil war by Maoist revolutionaries. The civil war degraded state capacity and undermined 
the king’s legitimacy. Furthermore, the civil resistance campaign was partially led by old elites 
who had been disenfranchised by the king’s recent moves to consolidate power. It was also 
aided by the defection of the regime’s former ally and regular Nepali eminence grise: the 
government of India. A careful observer could make a plausible argument that all of these 
factors were necessary for the outcome of the Nepali transition. 
 A critical scholar could easily apply a similar analysis to any transition we might care to 
categorize as a CRT, if we are attempting to justify a strong set of inclusion criteria. Thus we 
might quickly find ourselves with no cases remaining to analyze.   
 It is important to note that such elimination of cases upon close inspection is not unique 
to civil resistance transitions. Almost any strict classification that attempts a high standard of 
empirical necessity will quickly run into problems if the investigators are intellectually honest.  
Because of these difficulties, the lower standard of crucial but not sole contributing factor is 
both much more useful and ultimately more intellectually defensible.   
 One can still, of course, attack whether civil resistance was indeed crucial to regime 
breakdown in a case. But in that case we are on much more solid empirical ground, and can 
 82 
 
have meaningful discussions about the plausibility of alternative scenarios.  Such discussion is 
particularly warranted in cases in which civil resistance movements took place but their impact 
is unclear.  In the cases that I examine in depth this is perhaps most prominent in Brazil, where 
scholars have argued that the primary impetus for change came from the military hierarchy, not 
from the nonviolent resistance from below (Stepan, 1989).  I take on that question in some 
detail in that chapter and so do not address it here.   
 If civil resistance has been crucial to initiating a transition then the political dynamics of 
transition approximate the theoretical model that I have described in the previous chapter even 
if other factors have played an important role in initiating the transition. We should still observe 
a balance of power in favor of more pro-democratic figures, higher levels of popular 
mobilization and political awareness, and the dispersion of skills and knowledge of nonviolent 
resistance techniques amongst political elites and throughout the populace. In other words, all 
of the factors that I have argued shove civil resistance transitions in a democratizing direction 
should be present.  All of these factors should flow fairly naturally from a crucial role for civil 
resistance, regardless of other precipitating factors. Hence, in identifying CRTs I rely on this 
definition of crucial contribution but not necessarily sole major contribution to transition 
initiation. 
 My population of cases, both of transitions as a whole and then of CRTs, comes from 
combining two well-respected data sources: the data on non-democratic regimes and their 
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types of failure produced by Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz (2014) and the 
NAVCO 2.1 dataset produced by Erica Chenoweth and Christopher Shay.21   
 The Geddes data includes every instance of authoritarian regime breakdown. It has a 
crucial advantage over other data sources such as Polity IV because measures the duration of 
individual regimes, defined as “the rules that: (1) identify the group from which leaders can 
come; and (2) determine who influences leadership choice and policy” (Geddes, Wright, & 
Frantz, 2014, p. 314).  Transitions from one authoritarian regime to another are captured in the 
data, even if the level of democracy remained more or less unchanged from before the 
transition to after the transition. For instance the Cuban Revolution in 1959 or the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979, in both of which one authoritarian regime was replaced by another, are 
both captured in the data as transitions from one regime to another rather than continuous 
periods of non-democracy. 
 I first take the entire population of authoritarian regime breakdown from 1945 through 
2011 in the Geddes data.22 I add to this population all of the transitions from colonial rule to 
independence during this time period. The Geddes data does not include these transitions since 
it only collects data on states with formal independence and sovereignty, however, I argue that 
they are appropriate to include.  Colonial rule was an important form of non-democratic rule for 
almost the first half of the period that I am including, and there is no inherent theoretical reason 
why we should expect colonial rule to depart from the general models of transition from 
                                                          
21 NAVCO 2.1 is a revised and expanded version of the NAVCO 2.0 dataset initially produced by 
Chenoweth and Lewis (2013). 
22 The Geddes data only goes through 2010.  I personally coded the data forward through 2015 to capture 
any additional regime breakdowns.  I detail this process as well as providing justification for any additional 
regime breakdown codings in the statistical appendix.  
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authoritarian rule that I have previously described.  This process leads to a total population of 
331 transitions. 
 From this population I then determined which cases were CRTs. My first cut at this was 
to identify all country-years with ongoing nonviolent resistance campaigns in NAVCO 2.1 that 
correlate with a year of authoritarian regime breakdown in the Geddes data. I then checked 
each of these cases individually through an examination of the country-specific scholarly 
literature to ensure that it met my inclusion criteria. I also added a small number of cases 
discovered through independent research and through examining the cases included in Pinckney 
(2014) and Bethke and Pinckney (2016). 
I performed at least a cursory examination of each CRT to ensure that it warrants 
inclusion.  To make this determination I looked for several factors. 
1. Scope. Was the civil resistance campaign of a size and ubiquity that it would have 
been almost impossible to ignore? Larger campaigns that were spread more widely 
across the country are more likely to have had a crucial impact on the subsequent 
process of political development. I treated campaigns that took place coterminous 
with regime transitions but were small or concentrated solely in isolated pockets of 
the country with more skepticism, and possibly as cases that did not warrant 
inclusion. 
2. Other triggering factors. As I describe above, the existence of other crucial factors in 
explaining a transition do not mean that a transition is excluded from the population 
of CRTs. However, if in reviewing the secondary literature on a case where a civil 
resistance movement took place I routinely find the civil resistance campaign 
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ignored, or its significance downplayed by scholars and other observers, then I 
treated its inclusion with greater skepticism.  
3. Elapsed time. If regime breakdown occurred coterminous with, or in the immediate 
aftermath of, major civil resistance activity then I considered the case a more likely 
candidate for inclusion. If a long period of time elapsed between major nonviolent 
resistance activities and the regime change then I considered the case more 
skeptically. 
4. Counterfactual plausibility. This is the most powerful criterion even if it is also the 
most abstract. Can one make a plausible case that the trajectory of regime 
breakdown would have occurred in the same or a similar way absent the civil 
resistance campaign? If so, then the case is likely not suitable for inclusion as a CRT. 
If however, the historical case for regime change is difficult to plausibly imagine 
absent the civil resistance campaign then the case is likely a CRT. 
Different observers might come to different conclusions on the inclusion of a few liminal 
cases, however, I am confident that in most cases a fair examination of the evidence would 
come to similar conclusions to mine. 
 This process of data collection and checking left me in the end with a total population of 
78 CRTs from 1945 until 2011.  I chose to set my examination to this period for practical rather 
than theoretical reasons.  My theory of CRTs is broad and I have no reason to expect that it 
would not apply in times prior to WWII.  However, finding the kinds of fine-grained data that are 
consistent cross-nationally and could be reliably used for this kind of analysis is difficult when 
one moves back past WWII.   
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 In addition, the number of likely cases that I could add by moving the period of 
examination further back in time is small.  The NAVCO 1.0 dataset, which collected data on 
nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns back to 1900, includes less than 10 nonviolent 
campaigns from around the world prior to 1945, of which only a few led to regime change.   
This may not be an entirely empirical phenomenon, but rather due to the limited 
availability of data sources. Newspaper coverage, for example, is severely limited for many parts 
of the world when one goes back so far in time. Qualitative research continues to uncover more 
and more examples of powerful nonviolent resistance from around the world from well before 
this time period.23  As scholars continue to give attention to these historic struggles, our history 
of both civil resistance and civil resistance transitions will continue to be improved.  However, 
for the purposes of consistent cross-national quantitative testing, I am limited by the availability 
of reliable data sources, many of which only go back to 1945, if indeed they go back that far. 
 I extended the population up to 2011 in order to make the population as broad and 
diverse as possible, given the above constraints, and in particular to include the recent “Arab 
Spring” transitions. While a few CRTs have taken place in the years since 2011, for instance in 
Burkina Faso (Pinckney 2014), and possibly by the end of this project in Venezuela, the Arab 
Spring of 2011 is the most recent major example of political transition following civil resistance, 
hence I found it crucial to include these cases. 
                                                          
23 For example, see the many examples of nonviolent resistance in liberation struggles described in 
Bartkowski 2013. 
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 These 78 cases come from every region of the world and have diverse backgrounds and 
precipitating conditions. This is not a European story, a Latin American story, or an African story, 
but a global story.  Figure 2.1 shows all the countries with at least one CRT. 
Figure 2.1: Countries with Civil Resistance Transitions initiated from 1945-2011. 
 
 Multiple transitions can and have occurred in single countries, such as Madagascar or 
Zambia. I do not exclude transitions from countries that have previously appeared in the data, 
but instead control for non-independence of observations through using robust standard errors 
clustered by country. 
 The beginning of a transition is fairly easy to identify. I do so primarily by relying on the 
pre-existing definition from Geddes and her co-authors (2014, pp. 317-18). Transitions occur 
when a regime, that is, the system of rules and rule-makers currently in place for determining 
the authoritative allocation of values, ceases to function. Rules are destabilized and uncertain 
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for a time before re-stabilizing, typically in a different form or at least with different players at 
the helm. 
Regimes break down for any number of reasons, and their breakdown can come in 
many different forms. Even within the category of civil resistance transitions there are any 
number of different modalities of regime breakdown, in accordance with the varying 
mechanisms whereby nonviolent resistance can achieve its goals. Gene Sharp’s fourfold 
categorization of the mechanisms of success for nonviolent resistance is helpful to illustrate this 
point (Sharp, 1973; 2005). Sharp argued that nonviolent resistance can achieve success in four 
distinct ways, depending on the tactics used by the resisters and the situation’s political 
dynamics.   
In Sharp’s first method, conversion, the actions of the nonviolent resistance group so 
touch the heart and mind of the opponent that they adopt the perspective of the resister and 
willingly grant their demands. In the second, accommodation, while the opponent is not directly 
coerced, they “see the writing on the wall” choose to seek conciliation with the nonviolent 
resister.  In the third, nonviolent coercion, the prospect of escalating costs from nonviolent 
resistance forces the opponent against their will to give in. In the fourth, disintegration, the 
effects of nonviolent resistance are such that the structures of support available to the 
opponent collapse and their ability to continue fighting the nonviolent resister is eliminated. 
 Any or all of these mechanisms may become operative in the process of a regime 
breakdown. Therefore, the general category of civil resistance transitions may contain diverse 
sets of empirical manifestations.   
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 Consider, for example, the “Bulldozer Revolution” in Serbia in 2000.24 A sustained 
campaign of nonviolent resistance first played a role in motivating Serbian President Slobodan 
Milosevic to hold an early presidential election and in uniting the opposition behind a single 
opponent to Milosevic. The nonviolent resistance movement, spearheaded by the youth 
movement Otpor, anticipated that Milosevic would attempt to steal the election. When he did 
so they organized mass demonstrations that descended on Belgrade and shut the city down 
until Milosevic agreed to cede power. Milosevic did so after only a few days, agreeing to abide 
by the outcome of the election. In this case, one can see the impact of nonviolent resistance 
through both the mechanisms of accommodation and nonviolent coercion, with some degree of 
disintegration, at work.  Milosevic came to an agreement with the opposition on the basis of the 
ability of the nonviolent resistance movement to continue to impose costs on him through the 
mass demonstrations and the signals that this resistance showed about the likely prospects 
should he attempt to violently suppress the movement. 
 Now, compare the “Bulldozer Revolution” to the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan a few 
years later.25 There are some similarities across the two cases: in both, a stolen election 
motivated protests against an authoritarian regime. However, while in Serbia Milosevic 
negotiated his way out of power through accommodation in Kyrgyzstan the protests reached 
such a ubiquity and size that security forces refused to repress them, the instruments of 
government broke down, and the president fled the country as his system of control no longer 
                                                          
24 For discussion of this case see Binnendijk and Marovic 2006, Bujosevic and Radovanovic 2003, Bunce 
and Wolchik 2011, and Vejvoa 2009. 
25 For discussion of this case see Bunce and Wolchik 2011, Marat 2006, and Radnitz 2010. 
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functioned. In this case little to no accommodation took place, and even nonviolent coercion 
was minimal.  The opponent regime simply disintegrated. 
 Similar comparisons could be made across any number of CRTs. This demonstrates the 
theoretical and empirical justification for lumping together the diverse set of transitions that any 
careful observer will note are contained in my set of CRTs. Nonviolent resistance effects political 
change in a variety of ways, many of which depart from the archetypal image of masses on the 
streets demanding the downfall of the regime. It often involves long negotiation processes, or 
appropriation of authoritarian institutions, or the conversion or accommodation of former 
regime actors that then break down the coherence of the opponent regime coalition. What all 
these cases share is a crucial role played by nonviolent resistance in initiating regime change. 
 How do I operationalize the ends of these transitions? This is a crucial empirical 
question because it determines the point at which I measure my dependent variable of 
democratization. The question of transitional endpoints flows naturally, of course, from the 
question of transitional beginnings, but in order to frame the discussion it is important first to 
briefly discuss how I operationalize democracy. 
 Definitions of democracy are highly variable and contested. As I describe in the previous 
chapter, on a theoretical level I rely on both a threshold institutional notion of democracy  
based on the work of Schumpeter (1942), Przeworski (2000), and others that focuses on free 
and fair elections, and an ideal-type more normative notion of democracy based on the work of 
Robert Dahl (1973). A regime is democratic in a binary sense if it crosses Schumpeter’s 
threshold. It is democratic in a continuous sense to the degree that it approximates Dahl’s ideal 
of a political system perfectly and equally responsive to its citizens.  
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 There are, of course, several datasets that attempt to empirically capture democracy in 
both the binary and continuous sense. Perhaps the best-known of these is the Polity dataset, 
currently in its fourth iteration, which collects various aspects of democracy and 
authoritarianness and aggregates them linearly into a single score ranging from -10 to 10 
(Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016). The creation of Polity was a crucial step forward in the study 
of democracy, and its contribution should not be understated. However, as data collection has 
advanced its utility has declined and several theoretical and empirical issues have surfaced, 
particularly with its top-level aggregated score – the measure most commonly used in research 
(Gleditsch & Ward, 1997; Treier & Jackman, 2008). 
 Several other measures, such as those generated by Freedom House or the Unified 
Democracy Scores, all have their strengths and weaknesses which I will not go into here.  The 
strongest measure of democracy that exists, and that which most closely approximates my 
theoretical goal of capturing a polity’s degree of distance from the Dahlian ideal, is the 
Polyarchy score created by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project.   
 V-Dem has a number of strengths over other common data sources on democracy.  The 
first is in its data collection process.  Instead of relying on undergraduate or graduate student 
coders, whose knowledge of cases may be uneven, V-Dem generates its data on the basis of 
either factual information from publicly available documents or subjective codings from multiple 
country experts.  Each variable is coded by five experts, and their individual scores are then 
aggregated into a single score using Bayesian Item Response Theory methods.26  This gives both 
a better sense of the underlying dimension of each indicator and also a confidence interval in 
                                                          
26 For details on the V-Dem Methodology see Coppedge et al 2017. 
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addition to the individual point estimate.  The indicators that country experts are asked to code 
are also highly specific and in most cases fairly easy for a knowledgeable observer to empirically 
verify, reducing the scope for potential bias.  Almost all indicators are measured at the country-
year level. 
 The second strength is in how individual indicators are then aggregated into a 
conception of the broader concept of democracy.  The creators of V-Dem, following some of the 
best theoretical work on democracy (Coppedge, et al., 2011), recognize that the underlying 
Dahlian ideal of democracy incorporates a number of different dimensions that may be 
orthogonal to one another.  Thus they first aggregate different indicators into these orthogonal 
dimensions.  Finally these dimensions are aggregated into to top-level overall index of 
democracy, the “polyarchy” score.   
 Polyarchy scores range in theory from 0 to 1, but recognizing the ideal-type nature of 
these endpoints never fully approach them.  In the entire V-Dem dataset the polyarchy score 
ranges from 0.009 to 0.949. Since the polyarchy score is the most comprehensive, complex, 
well-coded attempt to capture the Dahlian ideal of democracy, I use it as my dependent variable 
to measure democracy at the conclusion of a transition. 
 This brings us back to the question of how we can know if we are at a transition’s 
conclusion.  The bluntest approach is to arbitrarily assume that transitions cannot go on forever 
into the future, and so if we pick a point relatively distant in time from the initiation of the 
transition then we can reliably proxy for the level of democracy at the end of the transition.  
However, there are strong theoretical reasons for being suspect of such an approach.  
Qualitative scholars will point out the vast differences in time between empirical markers of 
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transitional endpoints across different cases.  For example, while in Brazil a new constitution 
was ratified and promulgated in 1988, only three years after their transition in 1985, in Nepal a 
new constitution was not ratified and promulgated until 2015, almost ten years after the Second 
People’s Movement overthrew the Nepali monarchy and initiated the transition. 
 However, it could be the case that such distinctions are not substantive when discussing 
the aggregate level of democracy in a country and so would not significantly impact the results 
of the kind of analysis I perform in this chapter.  One way to tell if this is the case is to look at the 
variation in the change in the level of democracy in countries at fixed points in time after their 
transitions.  Do we see a global trend of a certain temporal point at which variation begins to 
decline to a level where it is no longer meaningful? 
 Figure 2.2 below shows the average absolute change in the polyarchy score of CRT 
countries at various points in time after a nonviolent resistance campaign initiates a CRT.  As the 
line in the figure shows, there is a sharp decline in the average amount of change over the first 
two years following a CRT.  After that point the mean change in polyarchy on an annual basis 
stabilizes at an average of around 0.02.   
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Figure 2.2: Annual Absolute Change in Polyarchy after a Civil Resistance Campaign 
 
 The most meaningful point in time to select might be two years after the transition.  
However, while to do so might be more or less accurate in the aggregate it poorly captures a 
great deal of variation in transitions that occurred over longer periods.  To illustrate, in Figure 
2.3 I show the change in polyarchy scores for three different countries over a ten-year period 
following a successful civil resistance campaign.  As the widely divergent lines show, there is no 
clear cut-off point where variation in polyarchy scores levels out, indicating an end to transition 
and stabilization of new political institutions.  Picking an arbitrary point after the initiation of the 
transition will not be a reliable means of measuring the dependent variable of democratization. 
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Figure 2.3: Absolute Change in Polyarchy in Iran, Ukraine, and Haiti after Civil Resistance 
 
Scholars of democratization have suggested several empirical markers that could be 
applicable here.  These tend to be defined as either the point at which the democratization 
process is complete or when democratic consolidation has occurred.  The most influential of 
these come from Linz and Stepan, who define democratization as complete when the first 
election for the executive occurs that is relatively free and fair (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 1).27  
They then subsequently argue that the process of democratic consolidation is complete when 
democracy has become “the only game in town” behaviorally, attitudinally, and constitutionally 
(Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 5).  
                                                          
27 I am simplifying Linz and Stepan’s definition for the sake of brevity.  They also include several caveats 
related to the de facto authority of the elected government, etc…  For all of the details on Linz and 
Stepan’s definition, see Linz and Stepan 1996, p1. 
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 The first of these definitions can be easily empirically applied across a global sample of 
cases.  Any number of different data sources collect information on the occurrence of elections 
and offer informed opinions on their relative freedom and fairness.28 
 However, this institutional measure fails to capture the fact that the radically different 
nature of different transitions gives these formal institutional measures of democratization 
different significance regarding the underlying question of the establishment of a new political 
regime.  In addition, these measures are democratization-specific, and offer little insight into the 
mirrored question of how we may measure the end of a transition that concludes in a non-
democratic regime. 
 The measure of the “only game in town” better captures the end of a political transition 
based on how we have defined a political regime, though it might be a bit too high of a standard 
to truly be reliable. If a political regime is the set of rules and rule-makers that are reliably 
expected by other actors to define how values are authoritatively allocated, then one can 
consider a new regime to be in place when its “game,” while perhaps not the “only” one major 
actors consider, is at least the predominate game that most actors reliably expect to follow most 
of the time. This definition would apply, of course, no matter which “game” actors are playing: 
the “game” of full-fledged democratic politics, authoritarian politics, or some quasi-democratic 
hybrid of the two.  The key thing is that the rules of the game have stabilized into a fairly reliable 
pattern. 
                                                          
28 Though, as Schedler Invalid source specified. points out, the evaluation of “freedom and fairness” is 
shot through with many challenges as the powerful seek to break various points in the “chain of 
democratic choice.” Even here consistent cross-national evaluation is difficult. 
 97 
 
 This is, in my view, the most empirically meaningful way to examine the question of 
transitional outcomes.  We are not strictly interested in the regime type at a fixed moment in 
time, but instead in the characteristics of the political games that fairly reliably continue into the 
future.   
Previous democratization scholars have used the term “consolidation” to describe this 
process.  While there is some merit in the term, I avoid it because of its inherent fuzziness.  How 
can we reliably know when a democracy is fully “consolidated?”  Debates about this question 
have led some scholars as far as arguing that is either impossible or nearly impossible to specify 
when a democratic regime has truly “consolidated” (O'Donnell, 1996).   
 How can we measure these endpoints in a way that is theoretically satisfying and 
empirically useful?  The best way is by measuring the level of democracy not at a fixed number 
of years subsequent to the beginning of the transition, nor at a specific institutional milestone, 
but rather when we observe fluctuation in regular measures of the characteristics of the political 
system declining below some predefined threshold. In doing so we are measuring the 
characteristics of the political system when they have empirically begun to institutionalize, or to 
reproduce themselves reliably into the future. 
 I make no assumption about the indefinite continuation of these institutions, as is 
implied to some degree by the problematic term “consolidation.” My sole assumption is that by 
measuring the dependent variable in this way I am capturing a new equilibrium point in the 
political game. New stimuli may disturb this equilibrium point in the future, but for now I leave 
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that question to other research and the insights of scholars of democratic consolidation.29 My 
research question is concerned with the endpoints of civil resistance transitions. I incorporate 
enough stability in my operationalization of the subsequent regime so as to make the distinction 
between transition and new regime meaningful, but am agnostic in this project about the 
ultimate question of the subsequent regime’s stability. 
 Since my dependent variable is democracy, as measured by the polyarchy score, it 
makes the most sense to measure at the point at which the polyarchy score ceases to 
dramatically fluctuate.  My primary definition of “dramatic” fluctuation is one country-specific 
standard deviation.  This definition allows for some country-specific contingency in what 
“counts” as meaningful change in the polyarchy score, while still remaining fairly consistent 
across countries.30  I also run robustness checks defining a “dramatic” fluctuation as a change of 
either 0.1 or 0.05 in the polyarchy score.  Table 2.1 below shows the correlation matrix between 
these three different measures of transitional endpoints.  The three measures are highly 
correlated, and changing the definition of the transitional endpoint does not significantly affect 
the analysis that I perform in subsequent sections of this chapter.31     
  
                                                          
29 For example, Svolik Invalid source specified. examines the effects of economic factors such as 
recessions on the likelihood of democratic breakdowns. 
30 These standard deviations range from 0.016 to 0.396.   
31 I report results using the two alternative measures of transitional endpoints in the statistical appendix.  
I also report statistics on the difference in polyarchy scores at the end of transitions as defined by these 
different measures.  In the large majority of transitions the difference in final polyarchy scores across 
endpoint definitions is minimal. 
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Table 2.1: Correlation between Measures of Transitional Endpoints 
 
Measure 1 (SD) Measure 2 (0.1) Measure 3 (0.05) 
Measure 1 (SD) 1 0.806891 0.679508 
Measure 2 (0.1) 0.806891 1 0.759186 
Measure 3 (0.05) 0.679508 0.759186 1 
 Having operationalized the beginning and ends of transitions, my dependent variable, 
and the point at which I measure it, the next step is to operationalize my independent and 
control variables. 
 Two out of my three independent variables capture latent, underlying dimensions of a 
political system.  Mobilization, for instance, can take any number of different forms.  The 
empirical indications of these different forms can be observed, but not the underlying 
dimension of mobilization.  The same is true of maximalism.  I am not arguing that any individual 
political action significantly shoves CRTs either towards or away from democracy, but instead 
that an array of empirical political behaviors when considered together constitute a pattern that 
both constitutes and empirically proxies for an underlying characteristic of the political system.   
 The holdovers challenge is easier to directly observe.  Simply stated, what government 
policies are put in place against members of the old regime?  Are they allowed to continue as 
members of the political elite or do they face expulsion from public office and possibly 
prosecution and punishment?  
 For these reasons, when operationalizing mobilization and maximalism, rather than rely 
on a single empirical indicator, I use primary factor analysis to capture the underlying dimension 
of both  these phenomena.  Factor analysis uses the patterns of covariance between different 
empirical indicators to describe the underlying dimensionalities that they share.   
 100 
 
 In the previous chapter I have laid out the kinds of data that would be useful in 
informing such factors.  For mobilization, measures of popular engagement and participation of 
both institutional and non-institutional forms are the primary indicators.  Fortunately some such 
measures are included in the V-Dem dataset, while others are available from other data sources. 
I use two variables from V-Dem and one measure from the Phoenix Historical Event Data 
produced by the Cline Center at the University of Illinois to inform my mobilization factor 
(Althaus, Bajjalieh, Carter, Peyton, & Shalmon, 2017). 
 The first indicator measures the degree of popular involvement in civil society activity in 
a country in a year.  The coding of this variable involved asking the expert coders to characterize 
a country’s level of public involvement in civil society on a four point scale ranging from a 
characterization of “most associations are state-sponsored…participation is not purely 
voluntary” at one end to “there are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to 
be at least occasionally active in one of them” at the other end (Coppedge, et al., 2017, p. 246).   
The second measures the degree of public deliberation.  As with the above measure, 
country experts coded this variable based on an ordinal characterization of a country in a year.  
Codings could range on a six-point scale from values equivalent to “public deliberation is never 
allowed” to “large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major 
policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets.  
Grass roots deliberation is common and unconstrained” (Coppedge, et al., 2017, pp. 202-203)   
I chose these measures for a few key reasons.  First, for validity of inference issues it 
was crucial to choose indicators from V-Dem that were not part of the aggregation process for 
creating the polyarchy score, since this would amount to using a variable to predict itself.  V-
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Dem includes other measures that could plausibly included in a mobilization factor, but these 
almost are almost all included in one of the indices that V-Dem’s creators then use to construct 
the polyarchy score.   
Next, these measures specifically capture the actions of the masses of ordinary people, 
not the political decisions of elites.  As described in the previous chapter, the transitional 
mobilization challenge involves both elite decision-making and popular response to that 
decision-making. The patterns of behavior that I am arguing are important go far beyond the 
choices of individual leaders in favor of democracy and speak to wider patterns of action. This is 
important to show that what I am measuring is not simply a proxy for elite theories of 
democratization (Higley & Burton, 2006).   
These measures also speak to the more positive aspects of nonviolent resistance that 
Sharp argues for (1973). High scores on these measures give evidence that following a successful 
nonviolent resistance campaign ordinary people have taken to heart the lessons of the efficacy 
of nonviolence and become involved in shaping the transition’s direction, encouraging greater 
accountability from leaders.    
The two measures from V-Dem capture more institutional forms of mobilization. The 
measure from Phoenix captures more traditionally-considered nonviolent resistance. It is a sum 
of the number of “protest” events in a country in a year, according to the CAMEO ontology 
(Schrodt, Gerner, YIlmaz, & Hermreck, 2008), with adjustments for temporal and geographic 
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reporting bias.32  This is a broad set of events that includes sub-categories such as “rally or 
demonstrate,” and “conduct strike or boycott.” 
 When run through principal factor analysis these three measures combine to create a 
single factor above the common standard of an eigenvalue greater than one, strongly suggesting 
that their covariance can be best explained in terms of a single underlying dimension. Table 2.2 
below shows the factor loading of the indicators, averaged across the five Amelia imputations. 
As the table shows, the Phoenix measure loads weakest onto the factor.   
Table 2.2: Mobilization Factor Component Loading 
Variable Factor Loading 
Public Deliberation 0.791795 
Civil Society Participation 0.792332 
Protest Events 0.045711 
 The maximalism factor similarly uses some variables from V-Dem as well as one from 
the Polity IV dataset to generate its factor score. Two measures relate to elections, as I argued 
was most useful in the prior chapter. The first measures the degree to which political actors 
engage in electoral boycotts.   This is a four-level ordinal variable that ranges from “no parties or 
candidates boycotted the elections” to “all opposition parties and candidates boycotted the 
elections” and is then transformed into a continuous variable using V-Dem’s ordinal interval 
response theory method (Coppedge, et al., 2017, pp. 96-97). The second measures the degree 
to which electoral results are accepted, and is also a four-level ordinal variable transformed into 
a continuous variable through interval response theory methods. The variable’s original values 
ranged from “no candidates accepted the results of the election” to “all parties and candidates 
                                                          
32 I describe the details of this adjustment process, as well as provide greater detail on the Phoenix Data, 
in the statistical appendix.  I also run robustness checks replacing this data with an annual count of 
protests and strikes from the Banks Cross-National Time Series, with substantively similar results. 
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accepted the results” (Coppedge, et al., 2017, p. 107)  The third measures the degree to which 
“anti-system” movements, defined as “any movement – peaceful or armed – that is based in the 
country (not abroad) and is organized in opposition to the current political system” are present 
in the political system, and has original values that range from “anti-system movements are 
practically non-existent” to “there is a very high level of anti-system movement activity, posing a 
real and present threat to the regime” (Coppedge, et al., 2017, p. 247).   
I also include a measure from the Polity IV dataset based off of their “regulation of 
participation” or parreg variable. In Polity’s codebook, this variable is presented as ordinal with 
five possible levels, capturing a political system’s place along the spectrum of “unregulated” to 
“regulated.”  Regulation of participation can capture any number of diverse aspects of the 
political system, and is not precisely what I am intending to describe in my maximalism factor.  
Thus I do not use directly use the Polity variable.  However, one level of this variable is intended 
to capture whether a political system is “sectarian,” that is, according to the Polity IV codebook, 
a political system where “political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and 
intransigent posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less regularly 
between intense factionalism and government favoritism” (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016, p. 
26).  This description closely approximates what I am describing with a political system 
characterized by maximalism, so I created a binary transformation of the parreg variable 
capturing whether a country was considered to be “sectarian” in a year. 
 As with the mobilization factor, principal factor analysis of these indicators generated 
only a single factor with an eigenvalue greater than one.   Table 2.3 below shows the loading of 
the indicators. 
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Table 2.3: Maximalism Factor Component Loading 
Variable Factor Loading 
Election Acceptance 0.579966 
Electoral Boycotts 0.650137 
Anti-System Movements 0.347952 
Sectarian Political Participation 0.05568 
 For the holdovers challenge, since pre-existing data sources did not exactly capture the 
challenge as I am describing it, I relied on my own more direct coding of the various aspects of 
the challenge.  My first source was the transitional justice database (TJDB) (Olsen, Payne, & 
Reiter, 2010).  The TJDB contains data on transitional justice trials, truth commissions, 
amnesties, reparations, and lustration policies in 167 countries from 1970 until 2007.  The vast 
majority of the CRTs in my dataset (62 cases) fall into this time frame.  If TJDB did not record any 
of their mechanisms as taking place around the period of the CRT then I coded the case as 
having no policies against members of the former regime.  If TJDB mentioned any one of their 
transitional justice mechanisms as being present I examined the scholarly literature on the case 
to determine precise codings of the challenge.  If a case was in a country or time period not 
covered by the TJDB I began the research with scholarly sources on the case.  Based on these 
sources I coded three aspects of the new regime’s treatment of members of the old regime: the 
severity, scope, and degree of differentiation in punishment.   In all three cases I used a four-
level ordinal coding, ranging from “none” to “high.” Table 2.4 below shows my coding scheme.  
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Table 2.4: Index of Lustration Policies 
 
Severity 
None (0) No policies against members of the old regime 
Low (1) Penalties involve only public shame or temporary loss of political position 
Medium (2) Penalties are severe but not extreme: short prison sentences or political bans 
High (3) Penalties for are extremely costly: extensive prison sentences, death, etc… 
 
Scope 
None (0) No policies against members of the old regime 
Low (1) Penalties limited to small group of people (less than 100) 
Medium (2) Penalties imposed on several hundred people 
High (3) Penalties extend to large group of people (thousands or more) 
 
Differentiation 
None (0) No policies against members of the old regime 
Low (1) Penalties carefully imposed only for the most severe violations 
Medium (2) Penalties are imposed fairly broadly, based on cursory investigation 
High (3) Penalties are imposed indiscriminately, based on only tenuous connections 
I then combined these individual scores additively into an index that could range from 0 
to 9 and empirically ranged across my cases from 0 to 8.  As described in the previous chapter, I 
expect that middling values of this variable would be the most conducive to democratization.  
Hence I normalized the variable by first subtracting two from the scores above zero so that each 
interval between values was equal, then subtracting the mean from all values and re-scaling 
based on the standard deviation.  I then include both the index and a squared transformation of 
the index in my regression models. 
Finally, of course, due to the issues of endogeneity I discussed in the previous chapter, it 
is insufficient to only put these behavioral patterns into a regression model and see whether 
their relationship with the polyarchy score is significant.  I must show that these behavioral 
patterns are a meaningful addition to the pre-existing structural model of democratization.  
Therefore, it is important to include structural variables not only to “control” for them but in 
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order to show the explanatory impact of these variables over and above the explanatory power 
of the structural model. 
The first key aspect of the structural model to consider is modernization.  This is the 
most consistent and influential structural explanation of democratization.  Scholars have 
employed various operationalizations of modernization.  The most common has been GDP per 
capita (Lipset, 1959; Dahl, 1973; Barro, 1999).  However, as Teorell (2010, pp. 164-165) has 
argued, relying on GDP per capita alone is an imperfect proxy for modernization, since the 
theoretical arguments for modernization’s impact on democracy account not only for economic 
growth but for a larger package of social changes.  These include greater urbanization, a move 
away from subsistence agriculture, and increases in education. However, dropping GDP per 
capita in favor of a different indicator is also a problematic way of dealing with this problem, 
since economic growth is an important part of the modernization “package.”  And including 
multiple indicators of modernization in a model raises problems of multicollinearity and 
reductions in degrees of freedom. 
Because of these challenges, I follow Teorell’s (2010) lead in building a single factor that 
captures the underlying dimension of modernization through several empirical indicators.  I 
constructed the factor using four different aspects of modernization that have been commonly 
employed by past scholars: GDP per capita, the infant mortality rate, the degree of urbanization, 
and the average number of years of education for children older than 15.33  When run through 
principal factor analysis, these four measures yield a single factor with an eigenvalue above one.  
                                                          
33 See the statistical appendix for the sources and coding details of these component variables. 
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I keep this factor as my measure of modernization.  Table 2.5 below contains the factor loadings 
of the four variables in the final factor, averaged across the five Amelia imputations. 
Table 2.5: Modernization Factor 
Variable Factor Loading 
GDP per capita (Logged) 0.804074 
Urbanization 0.804613 
Education 0.864839 
Infant Mortality 0.847989 
International explanations of democratization are also an influential part of the 
structural model, hence I seek to account for two important mechanisms: regional diffusion and 
linkage with the West.  I measure regional diffusion using the percentage of democracies in a 
country’s geographic region, as defined by Haber and Menaldo (2011).  I measure Western 
linkage using two different measures, informed by prior studies on this subject.  The first is the 
annual flow of exports and imports for a country from the United States, United Kingdom, 
Canada, Australia, and the Euro Area, as measured by the IMF, divided by GDP.  The second is 
the INGO network country score (INCS), developed by Hughes and her co-authors (2009), and 
later expanded by Paxton and her co-authors (2015). 
The INCS is a theoretical innovation built on the common practice of using an absolute 
count of a country’s membership in INGOs (Murdie, 2009; Landman, 2005).  This absolute count 
has become a fairly common way of measuring a country’s degree of linkage to the Western-
dominated global system.  However, as Hughes and her co-authors point out, the absolute 
count is misleading.  Frequency of INGO membership does not act as a country attribute, 
directly affecting a country’s politics.  Instead, the global network of INGO linkages and a 
country’s position in that network are the key thing that affects a country’s actions.  Thus, it is 
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more theoretically satisfying to measure a country’s position in this network rather than its 
absolute number of memberships, since a country’s memberships will have different salience 
depending on where the country falls in the network (Hughes, Peterson, Harrison, & Paxton, 
2009, pp. 1716-1719). 
Because of this, in constructing the INCS Hughes and her co-authors take the countries 
common memberships in INGOs to construct a model of the INGO network.  They then assign 
country scores using the Bonacich measure of eigenvector network centrality (Bonacich, 1972).  
This is a measure not just of a country’s connections but how closely they are linked to other 
highly linked countries.   
In their extension of the original INCS scores, Paxton and her co-authors collect this data 
at roughly five-year intervals from 1950 to 2008 (Paxton, Hughes, & Reith, 2015).  I take the 
scores reported in the INCS and then filled in the missing years using linear interpolation for 
years between 1950 and 2008 and linear extrapolation for years from 1945-1949 and from 
2009-2015.34     
Finally, I also control for the level of democracy in the old regime that preceded the CRT.  
This is important to control for because, as in almost any political phenomenon, the best 
predictor of the future value is almost always the past value.  Past democratic experience has 
been shown to be a significant predictor of the likelihood of democratization in other research 
(cite), and therefore is important to consider.  I use the average polyarchy score over the five 
years preceding the transition as my primary operationalization of the past level of democracy. 
                                                          
34 Since these scores change fairly slowly in most cases, I consider this linear imputation process to be the 
most reasonable method of imputing these missing scores.  I also ran robustness checks in which I used 
the Amelia II program, described below, to impute the missing scores. 
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Scholars caution against “garbage can” or “kitchen sink” regression models in which 
every potential confounder is “thrown in” to see what happens (Achen, 2005).  Achen suggests 
that the complexities of truly understanding one’s data necessitates that scholars keep close to 
a “rule of three,” employing no more than three independent variables in any model (Achen, 
2002).  Beyond this rule he argues the complexities of basic data analysis become so complex 
that the findings generated are likely to be spurious and unstable.  Yet, of course, in such a 
complex phenomenon as democratization it is critical to capture as much of the variation as 
possible, and account for many influential prior explanations.  The variables I have selected here 
capture the most distinctive and influential structural explanations of democratization, and so in 
my primary tests they are the only control variables that I include.  However, in order to show 
that my results are not spurious to some influential omitted variable I also run many additional 
models in which additional control variables are included.  Table 2.6 includes the full list of 
potential confounding variables that I include, most of which come theoretically from Teorell’s 
2010 study of democratization and empirically from many different data sources.  I describe 
each of these data sources, as well as the specific ways I transform the variables to fit my 
purposes, in the statistical appendix. 
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Table 2.6: Control Variable Operationalization and Sources 
Primary Controls 
Variable Operationalization Data Sources 
Modernization 
GDP per capita, Infant Mortality, Urbanization, 
Education 
V-Dem 
Democratic 
Neighbors 
Percentage of Democracies in Country's Region 
Haber and Menaldo 
(2011) 
Western 
Linkage 
Imports and exports to Western countries 
divided by GDP, INGO network centrality 
IMF DoT data, Paxton 
et al INCS scores 
Previous 
Democracy 
Polyarchy score average from five years before 
transition 
V-Dem 
Secondary Controls 
Geographic 
Area 
Land area in square kilometers (logged) 
Haber and Menaldo 
(2011) 
Inequality Gini coefficient 
World Income 
Inequality Database 
Muslim 
Population 
Percentage of Muslims 
Maoz and Henderson 
(2013) 
Oil and Gas 
Dependence 
Annual oil and gas revenue 
Haber and Menaldo 
(2011) 
British 
Colonialism 
Binary measure of past British colonialism 
ICOW Colonial History 
Dataset 
Establishing causality through observational testing is a difficult task.  Absent the strict 
conditions of experimental science, any finding may be suspect.  Even meeting all of the 
traditional measures of statistical significance, effect size, and model fit are subject to concerns 
of data validity and massaged results.  The single reported highly significant statistical result 
means little if it is merely the visible tip of an iceberg of negative findings.  This is the 
phenomenon of p-hacking, something increasingly recognized as a problem in many different 
scientific fields (Head, Holman, Lanfear, Kahn, & Jennions, 2015; Ioannidis, 2005).  Observational 
studies are particularly vulnerable to p-hacking to it since the population one can examine is 
more fluid and the parameters for defining independent and dependent variables more 
dependent on the choices of the researcher. 
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I address the potential problem of p-hacking by using a several different statistical 
models to establish the plausibility of my approach, and transparently presenting the results of 
all of these varied tests.  With each attendant positive result it becomes less and less plausible 
to argue that my findings are the result of p-hacking or statistical artifacts from the data.  I am 
also transparent about statistical tests that do not generate positive results, providing the 
skeptical reader with the full spectrum of results run from many different kinds of models and 
with different tweaks on the operationalization of my study population and model variables. 
My first set of tests are simple OLS linear regression models.  These models measure the 
effects of maximalism, mobilization, and holdovers during a CRT on the level of democracy at 
the conclusion of the transition.  I run OLS models with a variety of different controls and the 
different operationalizations of my variables that I have discussed in this chapter. 
My second set of tests are logistic regression models.  In these models I transform my 
dependent variable from the linear polyarchy score into a binary score intended to capture a 
country passing over the “democratic threshold.”  To perform this transformation I relied on the 
traditional quantitative democratic threshold of a polity score of 6 or higher.  I ran an OLS model 
regressing the polity score on the polyarchy score then used the predictions of that model to 
define a polyarchy score equivalent to a polity score of 6.  In the full V-Dem and Polity datasets, 
this came to roughly a value of 0.624.  Thus, I then coded every polyarchy score equal to or 
above this value as democracies, and all those below it as non-democracies. 
These two sets of tests are the core of my analysis as they most directly test the core 
theoretical set-up of my question: the shape of the regime that comes into power following a 
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CRT.  However, to provide additional support for the general picture that I am painting, I also 
run an additional set of tests that measures a slightly different but related question. 
In this set of tests I run linear and logit models that shift the unit of observation from 
the country to the country-year on a population of country-years for a ten-year period following 
the initiation of a CRT.  The major benefit of these tests is that the ten-fold increase in sample 
size implied by shifting to this unit of observation gives me much greater statistical power. 
However, shifting to country-years also comes with some significant methodological downsides.  
The most important of these is autocorrelation.  Even more so than transitions in the same 
country, country-years that are part of the same transition and post-transition regime lack 
independence.  And of course, as I described in the previous chapter, testing several years of 
observations from the new regime begins to get into a slightly different research question 
related to regime stability rather than regime characteristics at the initiation of a new regime.  
Nevertheless, despite these weaknesses, I do believe that the country-year models provide 
some insights, as long as these caveats are appropriately taken into account. 
I considered incorporating tests using simultaneous equations to address the concerns 
over endogeneity in my independent variables, however, after an examination of the 
econometrics literature I determined that this would not be an appropriate test (Mills & 
Patterson, 2006; Hausman, 1983).  A simultaneous equations model is intended to address a 
situation in which some of the independent variables are caused by the dependent variable, 
creating a correlation between the independent variable and the error term of the regression 
model.  In my case, however, I am not dealing with endogeneity in this sense, but rather 
endogeneity in the sense of my independent variables being part of a larger system of causation 
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– steps along the way from remote causal variables to a future dependent variable.  Thus, the 
relationship I am modeling is not one of simultaneity but rather mediation, as I discuss in the 
previous chapter. 
To test whether this mediating relationship obtains thus does not involve simultaneous 
equations but rather tests for mediation.  The first set of tests I employ are those suggested by 
Baron and Kenny (1986) in their seminal article on the topic, and which I discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
I also perform tests using propensity score matching, reporting the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) in my tests of the impact of civil resistance on post-transition 
democracy.  For my tests of the patterns of transitional behavior is use Bia and Mattei’s (2008) 
extension of dose-response function estimation using a generalized propensity score as 
developed by Hirano and Imbens (2004) since my independent variables are continuous.   
Finally, for many of my variables missing data is a major issue.  Many of these transitions 
have occurred in developing countries where data for several of my variables is infrequently 
collected.  This means that, for models that include the full suite of control variables, the 
number of observations that can be employed drops precipitously, potentially biasing the 
coefficients.  To address this problem, I employ the Amelia II multiple imputation algorithm 
developed by James Honaker and his co-authors (2011).  Amelia II uses the data present in an 
incomplete time-series cross-sectional dataset and creates multiple “complete” datasets will all 
of the missing data filled in.35  I then perform tests on each of the imputed datasets and average 
                                                          
35 For an in-depth description of Amelia II’s methodology and use in TSCS data, see Honaker and King 
2010.  For my tests I ran the Amelia II algorithm with country-specific intercepts assumed. 
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the coefficients, standard errors, and p-values across the different tests.  Amelia II is an 
increasingly common tool employed by social scientists to address missing data problems.    
In the next section I describe the data through descriptive statistics for my main 
independent, dependent, and control variables before moving on to reporting the results of my 
statistical testing.   
Describing The Data and Testing CRTs and Non-CRTs 
 Table 2.7 contains summary statistics on all of the variables used in the subsequent 
analysis, including both values in the original dataset and the average values from the imputed 
datasets after the Amelia procedure.36   
As I described above, my population of CRTs begins in 1945 at the end of the Second 
World War.  The first case in the data is the overthrow of Jorge Ubico in Guatemala, while the 
last cases are the successful Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen in 2011.  There 
is a high degree of temporal and geographic dispersion across cases, with examples of anti-
colonial struggles, campaigns against military juntas, single-party regimes, and personalistic 
tinpot dictators.   
                                                          
36 The Amelia procedure is computationally intensive, particularly when one adds country-specific 
intercepts and time-dependencies to one’s data, as I did.  Hence, I was only able to run my core 
independent, dependent, and control variables through the Amelia process.  I did not include the other 
control variables: the logged geographic area, Muslim percentage of the population, Gini coefficient, 
British colonialism, and prior military regime, in the Amelia process, hence some data is missing and the 
total number of observations in models that include these measures is limited. 
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Table 2.7: Summary Statistics for Original and Amelia Imputed Data 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Polyarchy (Original) 326 0.343301 0.2212 0.023517 0.901669 
Polyarchy (Amelia) 328 0.341899 0.221185 0.022356 0.901669 
Polarchy Binary (Original) 328 0.137195 0.344579 0 1 
Polyarchy Binary (Amelia) 328 0.131098 0.338023 0 1 
Mobilization (Original) 329 0.108216 0.715746 -1.85695 1.67953 
Mobilization (Amelia) 329 0.108766 0.714546 -1.85695 1.67953 
Maximalism (Original) 98 0.142905 0.760559 -1.11934 2.215734 
Maximalism (Amelia) 329 0.077375 0.703872 -1.79078 2.36524 
Index of Lustration Policies37 78 0 1 -0.77948 2.762232 
Modernization (Original) 240 -0.33919 0.93038 -2.06277 1.864894 
Modernization (Amelia) 331 -0.2772 0.857837 -2.38851 1.829107 
Trade Linkage (Original) 206 0.0182 0.072832 0 0.598078 
Trade Linkage (Amelia) 331 0.028254 0.105009 0 1.500097 
Democratic Neighbors 
(Original) 
278 0.196887 0.202052 0 1 
Democratic Neighbors (Amelia) 331 0.203807 0.196115 0 1 
Prior Level of Democracy 
(Original) 
305 0.229303 0.1313 0.016965 0.681619 
Prior Level of Democracy 
(Amelia) 
331 0.231211 0.136478 0 0.727188 
INCS Score (Original) 328 0.207968 0.195723 0 0.835663 
INCS Score (Amelia) 328 0.207968 0.195723 0 0.835663 
Area in Square Kilometers 
(logged) 
331 12.31735 1.64418 5.697093 16.65459 
Muslim Percentage of 
Population 
329 0.303588 0.380605 0 1 
Gini Coefficient 172 40.75188 10.22475 15.6 68.87 
British Colonialism 331 0.241692 0.428757 0 1 
Prior Military Regime 331 0.190332 0.393158 0 1 
 As a shrewd scholar of democratization would expect, the cases cluster temporally and 
geographically.  The majority of cases in the 1950s and 60s are decolonization struggles in Africa.  
In the 1980s there are a wave of movements in Latin America, and in 1989 the breakdown of the 
Communist bloc in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union make up the single largest wave of 
                                                          
37 Since I hand-coded this variable for each of the CRTs based on my own original research there was no 
need to run this variable through the Amelia procedure.  These are the summary statistics after centering 
the variable, as described previously. 
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cases.  There is a second “African wave” in the 1990s, then the handful of “Color Revolutions” in 
the early 2000s, and finally the Arab Spring in 2011.   
 As with the phenomenon of large civil resistance campaigns more broadly, there is a 
marked increase in cases over time.  The increase peaks in the 1990s and declines thereafter.  As 
Chenoweth has shown, while the frequency of nonviolent resistance campaigns has continued 
to increase in the first two decades of the 21st century their success rates have declined from 
previous peaks (Chenoweth, 2015), so it is unsurprising that we should find a declining number 
of regime changes following civil resistance campaigns after the year 2000. 
 By definition, as I have stated above, all of these cases took place in non-democracies.  
Therefore the peak level of polyarchy prior to the transition is necessarily circumscribed.  Taking 
this into account, the mean level of polyarchy is 0.23, and the median slightly smaller.  In other 
words, the regimes in which civil resistance campaigns are succeeding in sparking regime change 
are highly undemocratic.   
 CRTs do have a strong positive effect on the level of democracy in the country.  In the 
year following the end of a CRT the average level of polyarchy jumps to 0.53, a significant 
increase considering the range of the variable.  However, this is a mean level that falls well short 
of well-functioning democracy, or even a democracy at all.  There is also significant variation in 
these scores, with the standard deviation roughly 0.23.  Democratization after civil resistance is 
clearly phenomenon with a significant degree of variation.   
 A simple cross-tabulation of mean polyarchy scores at transitional endpoints shows a 
strong positive effect on the level of polyarchy from a transition being initiated by nonviolent 
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resistance.  In all of the incidents of authoritarian regime failure recorded by Geddes and her co-
authors that are not CRTs the average level of polyarchy at the end of the regime transition is 
0.28, highly undemocratic, validating the finding that most authoritarian regime breakdowns do 
not result in democracy but instead result in the establishment of a new non-democratic 
regime. 
Table 2.8: Cross-Tabulation of Transitional Endpoint Polyarchy in CRTs and Non-CRTs 
 
N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Polyarchy (Non-CRTs) 250 0.283483 0.183775 0.022356 0.810285 
Polyarchy (CRTs) 78 0.529128 0.227945 0.083536 0.901669 
 Looking at the distribution of polyarchy scores at transitional endpoints both for CRTs 
and non-CRTs gives us more information to explain this difference in means.  As shown in Figure 
2.4, in both sets of transitions there is a fair amount of variation.  The variation in CRTs is fairly 
normally distributed, with the modal outcome being a polyarchy score around 0.6, and fairly 
even numbers of transitions ending either higher or lower than this mid-range value.  In terms 
of the distribution of outcomes, a CRT has a roughly even change of being on either the 
democratic or non-democratic side at the end of a transition. 
 In contrast, non-CRTs have an extreme left-skew, with the modal outcome being a 
polyarchy score of 0.2.  The frequency of polyarchy scores drops precipitously from this point, 
with few cases exceeding the democratic threshold around 0.6 and almost none moving any 
higher.     
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of End of Transition Polyarchy Scores in CRTs and non-CRTs. 
 
 There are some important differences between the two populations.  CRTs have a 
slightly higher level of modernization and a higher percentage of democratic neighbors.  Their 
level of connection to the West is not significantly different, nor is their past level of democracy.  
In fact, CRTs tend to occur in slightly less democratic contexts.  However, because of these 
differences it will be important to control for these differences when testing the impact of CRTs 
on future levels of polyarchy. 
 First, I test the linear effect of a transition being a CRT on the level of polyarchy at the 
end of the transition. Table 2.9 below reports the results of this test in Model 1.  The indicator of 
a civil resistance transition is highly significant, with an effect size of roughly 0.17, large 
considering the limited range of the dependent variable.38  To give some sense of comparison, 
                                                          
38 Because the variable is binomial the marginal effect is equivalent to the beta coefficient. 
 119 
 
the effect of having a transition initiated by civil resistance is roughly equivalent to having a 
country increase the percentage of its democratic neighbors by 96%.  Including the CRT measure 
also increases the model’s r squared by roughly 9% over a purely structural model, indicating 
increased explanatory power.39   
Table 2.9: Effects of Civil Resistance on Post-Transition Democracy 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
OLS OLS Logistic Logistic 
Civil Resistance Transition .17082*** 
 
2.2028*** 
 
 
(.02386) 
 
(.47958) 
 Modernization .08080*** .09486*** 1.4973*** 1.6077*** 
 
(.01486) (.01822) (.31306) (.29455) 
Democratic Neighbors .17754*** .19510*** .55276 .66815 
 
(.04580) (.05557) (.87733) (.85527) 
Trade Linkage -.00222 -.03200 1.1303 .54561 
 
(.03674) (.04999) (.97453) (1.1905) 
INGO Network Centrality .01669 .15342* -.02848 1.5979 
 
(.05833) (.06833) (.89497) (.88859) 
Previous Polyarchy Level .47595*** .41672*** 4.2547** 2.9237* 
 
(.08035) (.08564) (1.3874) (1.4375) 
Constant .17431*** .20168*** -4.4709*** -3.6343*** 
 
(.02980) (.03495) (.60959) (.54579) 
N 325 325 325 325 
r2/Pseudo r2 .54690 .46266 .41199 .32344 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 Three of the five control variables function as expected.  The measures of Western 
linkage are more inconsistent, with both the trade linkage and INCS scores changing significance 
and sign across different models.   
                                                          
39 VIF testing shows no problematic multicollinearity between the independent variables.  The highest VIF 
for one of the variables is around 3, well below the standard point of concern at 10.  Examination of a 
residuals against fitted values (RVF) plot shows no visible pattern of heteroskedasticity.  I show a 
representative example of the RVF plot from one Amelia imputation in the statistical appendix. 
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The graph on the left side of figure 2.5 below plots the marginal effect of civil resistance 
transitions on the predicted level of democracy with all of the control variables held at their 
means.   
Figure 2.5: Effects of Civil Resistance on Predicted Democracy 
 
 The effect of a CRT is also robust to looking at democracy in a binary fashion.  Model 3 in 
table 2.9 reports the coefficients and standard errors from a logit model using my binary 
transformation of the polyarchy score at the end of a transition.  Initiating a transition through 
civil resistance significantly increases the odds of a country being a democracy at the end of the 
transition, relative to other kinds of transitions and controlling for the major explanations of 
democratization.  The graph on the right side of Figure 2.5 plots the effects of civil resistance 
transitions on the predicted likelihood of passing the democratic threshold, as above with all 
control variables held at their means.   
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 Next, I shift the unit of analysis to the individual country-year following the initiation of 
a transition.  As described above, these results should be interpreted differently than models 
with transitions as the units of analysis. The country-year unit of analysis almost certainly 
involves a degree of autocorrelation, and so pooling country-years may lead to suspect results.  
To partially address issues of autocorrelation, in these tests I include the polyarchy score lagged 
one year as an independent variable.   In these tests my key independent variable is whether a 
country-year came after the initiation of a civil resistance transition. All of my other 
independent variables are the same as in Models 1-4, except in this case they are lagged one 
year, instead of the values at the beginning of the transition. Model 5 in Table 2.10 reports the 
results of these tests. 
Table 2.10: Country-Year Tests of Civil Resistance Impact  
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
OLS OLS Logistic Logistic 
Civil Resistance Transition .00810*   .73225*   
 
(.00403) 
 
(.33477) 
 Modernization .00319 .00331 -.12079 -.15841 
 
(.00204) (.00207) (.35611) (.34884) 
Trade Linkage .00161 .00084 2.0946 2.0929 
 
(.01306) (.01376) (1.7717) (1.8774) 
INGO Network Centrality .02919*** .03293*** 1.6079 2.2343* 
 
(.00851) (.00845) (1.0349) (1.0244) 
Democratic Neighbors .02523*** .02408*** -.87474 -.96939 
 
(.00676) (.00661) (.78595) (.76748) 
Lagged Polyarchy Score .94593*** .95224*** 31.977*** 32.178*** 
 
(.00913) (.00716) (4.1470) (3.9316) 
Constant .00765* .00700* -20.392*** -20.338*** 
  (.00303) (.00293) (2.5196) (2.4118) 
n 2597 2597 2597 2597 
r2/Pseudo r2 .94582 .94565 .82380 .82069 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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 As expected, autocorrelation dominates the results, with by far the greatest degree of 
variation being explained by the lagged polyarchy score.  However, even in this case the variable 
for a civil resistance transition remains significant, though the effect size is significantly reduced 
because of the different unit of analysis.40 
 Finally, I use propensity score matching to attempt to control for the potential that the 
higher rates of democracy in CRTs are being explained by a greater propensity for democracy in 
the population of CRTs.  Matching procedures attempt to capture the causal impact of a 
particular treatment by compiling a balanced sample where groups are as comparable as 
possible.  After assembling the balanced samples, the researcher can then simply measure the 
difference between the mean values of the treated and untreated groups, commonly referred 
to as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).  I matched transitions using the same 
set of control variables included in my models above: modernization, trade linkage, INGO 
network centrality, the percentage of democratic neighbors, and the lagged polyarchy score.   I 
use kernel matching to produce the matched samples. 
 Far from eliminating the effects of civil resistance on post-transition democracy the 
matching procedure actually suggests that the OLS models are significantly understating the 
effect of civil resistance. The ATT of the CRT variable averages roughly 0.23 across the five 
Amelia imputations, with the lowest value of a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval on the 
point estimate well above zero. In Figure 2.6 below I show point estimates and confidence 
                                                          
40 The results for all of the independent variables are inconsistent in this model.  Including a second lagged 
polyarchy score reduces the significant of the civil resistance transition variable to p < 0.1, and including a 
third lagged polyarchy score makes the coefficient insignificant (though still positive). 
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intervals for the ATT in each of the five Amelia imputations, as well as in the non-Amelia 
imputed data (marked on the graph as imputation 0). 
Figure 2.6: ATT of Civil Resistance Transitions on Post-Transition Democracy across Amelia 
Imputations 
 
Testing the Challenges of Civil Resistance Transitions 
 Next, I move from confirming the general finding in the literature on the superior 
democratizing effect of civil resistance to testing my specific hypotheses on the three patterns 
of behavior that I expect will lead to higher levels of democracy at the end of the transition: 
mobilization, maximalism, and holdovers.   
 As I describe in Chapter 1, I expect that higher levels of mobilization, lower levels of 
maximalism, and middling levels of holdovers policy will have two main effects.  First, they will 
move countries closer to Dahl’s ideal. The patterns of behavior in response to each challenge 
will push a country’s political system closer or farther away from a political system that is 
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equally responsive to all of its citizens.  In some cases this means that countries will approach 
close to Dahl’s democratic ideal.  In others it means that formerly autocratic countries will move 
into slightly more representative anocratic or partially democratic systems.  Yet on average the 
shifts will be more towards democracy.   
 Second, a related but distinct effect will be a greater likelihood of moving across 
Schumpeter’s “democratic threshold,” moving from a non-democratic to a democratic regime 
considered in simple binary fashion.  For some countries this implies only a minor shift, say in 
moving from unfair to fair elections.  For others it implies large changes in political institutions, 
moving from highly authoritarian systems to at least minimally democratic ones.   
 Visual inspection of the data shows the first suggestive support of at least some of these 
relationships.  Figure 2.6 presents a scatterplot of mobilization scores against maximalism 
scores, with the points distinguished by color on the basis of whether they passed the 
democratic threshold at the end of the transition.  There is a clear pattern, with all of the 
democracies clustered in the upper left quadrant of the graph, with high mobilization scores and 
low maximalism scores.  The non-democracies are more dispersed, but tend to fall towards the 
lower right side of the graph, with high maximalism scores and low mobilization scores. 
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Figure 2.7: Mobilization and Maximalism Scores Separated by EOT Democracy 
 
 In Model 9 below, I present my primary test of these relationships.  As the model shows, 
higher scores on the mobilization factor and lower scores on the radicalization factor are highly 
significant predictors of increased levels of democracy in CRTs.  In addition, as can be seen by 
comparing Model 9, which includes these variables with Model 10, which does not, including 
these factors significantly increases model fit.  In the logistic regression model, the mobilization 
factor falls just below conventional standards of statistical significance, but its closeness to this 
standard (p = 0.050103) is still highly suggestive, and well below the less strenuous p < 0.1 
standard of significance. 
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Table 2.11: Main Tests of Transitional Patterns on EOT Democracy 
  Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 
OLS OLS Logistic Logistic 
Mobilization .14435***   2.2555   
 
(.02242) 
 
(1.1419) 
 Maximalism -.11034*** 
 
-3.0250** 
 
 
(.02138) 
 
(1.0928) 
 Lustration Index .02547 
 
.42057 
 
 
(.02415) 
 
(.79802) 
 Lustration Index -.01236 
 
-.18544 
 (Squared) (.01731) 
 
(.38592) 
 Modernization .08702*** .16506*** 1.8806** 1.9695*** 
 
(.02206) (.02404) (.64926) (.51772) 
Trade Linkage -.03504 .28123 2.3979 6.3503 
 
(.13677) (.18583) (3.7604) (3.0970) 
Democratic Neighbors .12801 .13194 .83879 1.0702 
 
(.08972) (.11502) (1.7782) (1.4412) 
INGO Network Centrality -.12019 -.08031 -2.6348 -.02656 
 
(.08120) (.10362) (2.2987) (1.3685) 
Previous Polyarchy Level .10419 .15572 1.9569 1.4111 
 
(.09765) (.15376) (3.6602) (3.2517) 
Constant .38526*** .44059*** -3.8988* -2.1057* 
  (.04074) (.04991) (1.7311) (1.0345) 
n 78 78 78 78 
r2/Pseudo r2 .74790 .49902 .58692 .36000 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 Figure 2.8 below shows the predicted effects of moving from one end of the 
mobilization and maximalism factors to the other, with all variables held at their means.  Moving 
from one extreme of the variable to the other predicts sizable differences in polyarchy at the 
end of transition, for both variables roughly a difference in polyarchy score of 0.4.  Considering 
the polyarchy score only ranges from 0 to 1 this difference is important. 
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Figure 2.8: Predicted Levels of Democracy across Mobilization and Maximalism Scores 
 
Figure 2.8 shows the same predicted value plot for the ILP.  There is some evidence of 
the curvilinear relationship predicted by the theory, as the predicted values roughly follow this 
pattern.  However, as evidenced by the wide confidence interval, particularly at high values of 
the variable, the variable lacks significance and so its predictive power is uncertain. 
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Figure 2.9: Predicted Levels of Democracy across ILP Values 
 
I performed several tests to address the potential of multicollinearity.  First, I examined 
the VIF scores for each of my independent variables.  VIFs for all of the variables are well below 
the standard rule of thumb of a VIF of 10 for problematic multicollinearity.  Second, I examined 
the condition numbers for each model.  As with the VIF, the numbers are well below standard 
rules of thumb for problematic multicollinearity. 41 
 When multicollinearity is present to a significant degree in a dataset, the effect is an 
increase in the size of the standard errors, making it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis 
for any one variable.  Hence multicollinearity is much more likely to generate “false negatives” 
instead of  “false positives.” The fact that both of these behavioral pattern variables and 
                                                          
41 I report these numbers, as well as tests for heteroskedasticity in the residuals of all OLS models in the 
statistical appendix.   
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structural variables are, for the most part, significant, suggests multicollinearity is not affecting 
the results. 
 The results are also fundamentally similar if run on the unimputed data, though there is 
some slight variation due to the significant number of observations dropped due to missing 
data. The coefficients for mobilization and radicalization also remain significant and of a similar 
size when included in a model including my whole suite of various potential confounders, as well 
as a version of this model run through a stepwise deletion process.  I report the results of all of 
these alternative models in the statistical appendix. 
I run one additional “hard test” to ensure my results are robust.  One advantage of 
Varieties of Democracy dataset is that, in addition to point estimates for each of its indexes it 
reports low and high values of a 95% confidence interval for each variable.  In Table 2.12 below I 
re-run my primary tests with the values of my dependent variable set at the low end of the 
confidence interval for the half of the observations predicted to be most democratic and set at 
the high end of the confidence interval for the lower half of observations. In essence, I am 
making it significantly less likely I will be able to reject the null by shifting the values of the 
dependent variable as far away from my expected relationship as is reasonable. 
 Even having imposed this heavy penalty, the relationship between my key independent 
variables and the level of polyarchy at the conclusion of the transition remains robust in the OLS 
models, with both mobilization and maximalism still highly significant and adding to the r2 of the 
structural model.  In the logistic regression models, imposing this penalty eliminates the 
significance of both the mobilization and maximalism variables, with p values for both now 
falling between 0.1 and 0.2.  This shows the threshold effect is not as robust as the linear effect 
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of mobilization and maximalism, however, the extreme difficulty of passing this test gives me 
confidence this does not fundamentally undermine the other logistic model results.  The size 
and signs of the coefficients remain consistent. 
Table 2.12: Hard Test Models 
  Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
 
OLS OLS Logistic Logistic 
Mobilization .11685*** .96775   
 
(.02459) 
 
(.70679) 
 Maximalism -.07458** 
 
-1.1609 
 
 
(.02342) 
 
(.67965) 
 Lustration Index .01978 
 
.42387 
 
 
(.02515) 
 
(.50169) 
 Lustration Index -.00808 
 
-.16562 
 (Squared) (.01661) 
 
(.30127) 
 Modernization .08896*** .14728*** 1.3464* 1.7550*** 
 
(.02361) (.02247) (.55994) (.49383) 
Trade Linkage -.09111 .15858 4.8412 7.2277* 
 
(.13317) (.15780) (3.7985) (3.2078) 
Democratic Neighbors .13098 .13182 2.5512 2.5246 
 
(.09240) (.10507) (1.7204) (1.5125) 
INGO Network Centrality -.15234 -.12389 -2.0978 -1.0286 
 
(.08461) (.09241) (1.6047) (1.3246) 
Previous Polyarchy Level .10191 .14871 2.5357 1.8317 
 
(.10701) (.13438) (2.9959) (3.6074) 
Constant .41235*** .45707*** -3.1450* -2.6111** 
 
(.04190) (.04501) (1.4619) (.98370) 
n 78 78 78 78 
r2/Pseudo r2 .64391 .46593 .41848 .33682 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Next, I run country-year models looking at the ten-year period following the end of a 
CRT. As in my tests of the impact of a CRT relative to a non-CRT I use one-year lagged control 
variables, and include the one year lagged polyarchy score to control for autocorrelation. The 
values for mobilization, maximalism, and the ILP are the same as those used in my main models. 
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As with my first set of country-year models, autocorrelation accounts for the vast 
majority of variation, with the lagged polyarchy score the most significant and substantial 
coefficient in every model. However, the mobilization and maximalism variables still play an 
important explanatory role.  In the OLS models, the mobilization variable is the most highly 
significant predictor behind the lagged polyarchy score.  While the maximalism variable does not 
reach the p < 0.05 level of significance, its level of significance is still suggestive (p = 0.086). In 
the logistic regression model the only statistically significant variable is the lagged polyarchy 
score.  However, the mobilization and maximalism variables are the closest to statistical 
significance of any of the other variables. The maximalism factor’s p-value is very close to 
significance (p = 0. 0576), while the mobilization variable’s p-value is below 0.2. 
  
 132 
 
Table 2.13: Country-Year Tests of Behavioral Pattern Impact 
  Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
 
OLS OLS Logistic Logistic 
Mobilization .02723**   1.9661   
 
(.00883) 
 
(1.5781) 
 Maximalism -.01382 
 
-2.7663 
 
 
(.00666) 
 
(1.1872) 
 Lustration Index -.00231 
 
.79625 
 
 
(.00458) 
 
(.87298) 
 Lustration Index .00269 
 
-.61900 
 (Squared) (.00278) 
 
(.97896) 
 Modernization -.00436 .00473 -1.0461 -.32533 
 
(.00740) (.00492) (1.0501) (.64391) 
Trade Linkage -.01484 -.01269 4.1408 7.9179 
 
(.01151) (.00985) (5.3829) (6.2716) 
INGO Network Centrality .05086* .02254 3.5594 1.2995 
 
(.02239) (.01247) (3.0590) (1.8059) 
Democratic Neighbors .03001 .00376 1.8487 1.0633 
 
(.02366) (.00927) (3.6936) (1.9391) 
Lagged Polyarchy Score .89740*** .97153*** 31.376*** 39.485*** 
 
(.02459) (.01197) (8.0108) (7.4454) 
Constant .01006 .00950 -21.790*** -24.764*** 
  (.01075) (.00737) (4.4292) (4.4806) 
n 426 746 426 746 
r2/Pseudo r2 .94381 .96071 .86736 .85846 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 Finally, I tested a dose-response model with propensity score matching for each of my 
three independent variables using Hirano and Imbens’s procedure for incorporating matching 
with a continuous treatment (Hirano & Imbens, 2004).  As in the more common method of 
propensity score matching with a binary treatment Hirano and Imbens’s procedure adjusts for 
imbalance in covariates at different levels of the independent variable, producing a generalized 
propensity score (GPS) which can then attenuate the bias caused by imbalanced covariates.   As 
in the propensity score matching I performed above I generated the GPS using the same set of 
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control variables incorporated in my main predictive models: modernization, trade linkage, 
INGO network centrality, the percentage of democratic neighbors, and the pre-transition 
polyarchy level. Figure 2.9 below shows the predicted values of the polyarchy score based on 
the dose-response model.  As is readily apparent, the predictions are very close to those 
generated by the OLS models, with some minor perturbation due to imbalance in the covariates 
at different levels of mobilization and maximalism. 
Figure 2.10: Dose-Response Model with Propensity Score Matching 
 
 
Discussion 
 In this chapter I have quantitatively tested both the core contention that civil resistance 
systematically pushes political transitions towards democracy, validating my focus on CRTs, and 
the impact of my three theorized patterns of political behavior on the levels of democracy at the 
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conclusion of the political transition, as well as the likelihood of crossing the democratic 
threshold. 
 The data strongly support the uniqueness of CRTs when it comes to democratization.  As 
expected, civil resistance at the initiation of a political transition highly biases the transition 
towards concluding in a democracy, controlling for plausible alternative explanations.  This 
validates the current literature on civil resistance and democratization, providing one of the 
most rigorous tests of this relationship currently performed.  As shown in Model 1, civil 
resistance initiating a political transition increases a country’s polyarchy score at the end of the 
transition by 0.17, or 17% of the entire range of variation in the polyarchy score.  Among 
democracies in 2016, this difference would be roughly equivalent to the difference between 
Sweden (0.908) and Senegal (0.726).  Among non-democracies in 2016, this is roughly the 
difference in polyarchy score between Syria (0.148) and Zimbabwe (0.325).  Clearly, the effect 
size is far from trivial.   
 Civil resistance is not the only factor that significantly affects countries’ levels of post-
transition democracy.  The country’s level of modernization, past history of democracy, and 
democratic neighborhood are all highly significant predictors of its future level of democracy.  
The measures of Western linkage, both in terms of trade and INGO network centrality, are less 
robust predictors, significantly predicting democracy in some models but not in others.  Yet, 
while some of these structural factors matter, their predictive accuracy and model fit is 
improved by adding civil resistance to the picture. 
 Within the population of civil resistance transitions, there is strong evidence to support 
the impact of two out of my three theorized patterns of behavior.  Both high levels of public 
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mobilization and low levels of maximalism during the transitional period exert a strong and 
consistent effect on the level of democracy at the end of the transition, and a slightly less robust 
but still substantive impact on the likelihood of crossing the democratic threshold.  An increase 
in transitional mobilization of one standard deviation increases the predicted post-transition 
polyarchy score by roughly 0.1, while a similar increase in maximalism decreases the predicted 
post-transition polyarchy score by roughly 0.08. 
 The effects of holdovers policy did not prove to be significant in any of the models, 
either linearly or curvilinearly.  Thus I am unable to reject the null when it comes to lustration.  
While some effect may be present in specific cases, and the general shape of the data is 
suggestive of some curvilinear relationship with post-transition democracy, the quantitative 
evidence is simply not strong enough to show a relationship.   
 This is not to positively argue holdovers policies are do not exert important effects, or 
even that there may be some broadly generalizable relationship between holdovers policies and 
post-transition democracy.  Any number of factors may be affecting the reliability of my data 
when it comes to this variable.  In particular, one concern would be the generalizability of the 
TJDB data to the broader question of holdovers policy.  The TJDB is explicitly concerned with 
events falling into the archetypal categories of transitional justice, and may not include 
sufficient data on other potential holdovers policies.  The years in which I relied on the TJDB the 
data may suffer from left-skewing.  The mean value of the centered ILP index during the TJDB 
period (1970-2007) is -0.083, while the mean value of the index for cases outside of this period 
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is 0.297.42 Re-coding cases during the TJDB period to take a broader view of holdovers policy 
into account might yield some fruitful data on this question. 
 Having performed my quantitative testing and shown the significance of two out of my 
three patterns of behavior for democratization, I now turn from broad trends and relationships 
to my specific narratives of cases.  
 
  
                                                          
42 Difference in means significant at the p < 0.1 level in a one-tailed t-test. 
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Introduction to Case Study Chapters 
The Case Selection Process 
 The three chapters that follow present case studies of political dynamics in transitions 
following civil resistance movements.   
 My goal in these chapters is not to perform a strict comparison in order to tease out 
causal impact but rather to examine the dynamics of my three transitional challenges in 
particular historical environments.  Having shown quantitatively that a correlation exists 
between at least two of these challenges and post-transition democracy, do we observe that 
relationship obtaining in actual cases?  What are the observable impacts of each particular 
challenge in specific historical cases?  In other words, through the case studies I am not seeking 
to establish a causal effect but rather to examine a set of causal mechanisms (Gerring, 2004). 
 In selecting the cases in which to perform this analysis I closely follow Lieberman’s 
(2005) nested analysis research design.  Lieberman argues that scholars who apply a single logic 
of inference to qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis such as King, Keohane and 
Verba (1994) are not appropriately leveraging the strengths of these distinct research methods.  
Instead of treating qualitative analysis as statistics with an insufficient number of cases, or 
quantitative analysis as comparative case study research with insufficient time to examine each 
case in depth, scholars should instead draw on what each of these approaches can offer to the 
other. 
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 Lieberman suggests that scholars who wish to engage in this double-leveraging should 
use the following process: first, perform a large-n analysis to examine the robustness of one’s 
theoretical model. If the model proves to be robust, then the scholar then selects a certain 
number of cases that are well-predicted by the model for intensive case study analysis.  The 
purpose of this analysis is to show that “the start, end, and intermediate steps of the 
model…explain the behavior of real world actors” (Lieberman, 2005, p. 442).  If the small-n 
analysis generally confirms the theorized mechanisms then the scholar may conclude their 
analysis and make a convincing argument that their hypotheses have been supported.  If either 
the large-n or small-n analysis fails to produce robust results the scholar can return to an earlier 
step in the process, continuing to do so recursively until they either find satisfactory results or 
determine that their initial theoretical insight was flawed.   
 To illustrate this process, in Figure 3.1 I reproduce a simplified version of Figure 1 from 
Lieberman’s article presenting the logic of Nested Analysis.43 Since my large-n analysis has 
produced satisfactory results for at least two of my key independent variables I follow the left-
hand path to Model-testing Small-N Analysis (SNA), assessing whether the SNA fits the model, 
and if not, the reasons for the poor fit.  
  
                                                          
43 I omit the complete path of Model-Building Small-N Analysis as displayed in Lieberman’s original figure 
since it is less relevant for this discussion. 
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Figure 3.1: The Nested Analysis Approach (Lieberman, 2005, p. 437) 
 
 In addition to the criterion that cases in model-testing small-N analysis be well-predicted 
by the model, Lieberman also argues that scholars should select cases that show a wide degree 
of variation in the model’s independent variables in order to demonstrate that the model’s 
mechanisms operate in a wide number of different contexts, insofar as such variation can be 
incorporated with the general costs and benefits of conducting qualitative analysis (Lieberman, 
2005, p. 444).   For my analysis, this meant selecting cases where mobilization, maximalism, and 
holdovers policy varied. 
 In addition to predicting general levels of democracy my theory also offers specific 
predictions about the character of the political regimes that will follow the particular 
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constellation of values on my independent variables: “fractious semi-democracy” through high 
mobilization, high maximalism, and an integrative or lustrated holdovers policy; and “elite semi-
democracy” through low mobilization, low maximalism, and a co-opted holdovers policy. If my 
cases exhibit the characteristics of these regime sub-types then this is strong evidence not just 
for the general link between the patterns I have described and democracy overall but the 
specific transitional pathways that I have argued for. 
 Following a similar logic as Lieberman’s suggestion to select cases with different values 
of the key independent variables, I also selected cases that varied widely in structural factors 
that may not be built into my model but would plausibly bound the external validity of my 
theory.  So I was, for instance, careful to select cases that came from different regions of the 
world, which occurred in different time periods, and which had radically different prior regime 
types.   
This is not an attempt to establish causality through a formal most different case 
selection research design, as defined in Millian terms, since such an analysis would require 
similar values on the dependent variable and on a single independent variable (Mill, 1967; 
Przeworksi & Teune, 1970).  The external validity of my causal argument comes from the large-n 
analysis performed in the prior chapter.  Instead, the logic of choosing cases that differ from one 
another so radically is to demonstrate that the model’s internal validity is not limited to an 
easily-identifiable sub-category of cases.   
A number of potential cases in my 78 CRTs fit these criteria.  I selected three to illustrate 
three out of the four endpoints described in Chapter 1: The Second People’s Movement in Nepal 
in 2006 as an example of the path to fractious semi-democracy, the Movement for Multiparty 
 141 
 
Democracy in Zambia as an example of the path to elite semi-democracy, and the Diretas Ja 
movement against military rule in Brazil as an example of the path to democracy. 
The Qualitative Research Process 
In each case I conducted fieldwork in the country in question to serve as the core of my 
analysis.  The fieldwork consisted of interviews with key political decision-makers during both 
the civil resistance movement that sparked the transition, as well as the transition itself.  I also 
interviewed journalists, academics, and other close observers of the events surrounding the 
transition.  I conducted a total of 128 interviews over roughly three months of fieldwork.  
The interviews were semi-structured and roughly an hour in length, with some going as 
long as two hours and others as brief as thirty minutes.  I include the questionnaire that 
structured the interviews in the appendices.  I followed the advice of Leech (2002) and Berry 
(2002) in how I structured both the interview itself and the overall design of the fieldwork.  In 
the total population of interviewees I sought to cross all of the relevant political and social 
cleavages so as to triangulate as complete a picture of the dynamics of the transition as 
possible.  For instance, in Nepal I conducted interviews with political leaders from all of the 
major parties: the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) 
(CPN-UML), the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Center) CPN-MC, parties representing the 
Madhesi community from Southern Nepal, and members of the monarchical government under 
former King Gyanendra. 
In the interviews I focused first on building rapport with the interviewees, asking them 
questions about their background and personal connection to the transitional events. The bulk 
of the interview consisted largely of so-called grand tour questions in which I invited the 
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interviewee to give me an overview of what they considered to be the important events of the 
movement leading up to the transition and the transition itself. I would then typically follow up 
a grand tour question with a set of fairly informal prompts, picking up on significant aspects of 
their answer to the grand tour question and asking them to elaborate.44 I kept my own direction 
of the interview to a minimum, allowing the interviewee to offer any comments they thought 
relevant and appropriate.45 
In all three cases the events in question remain politically relevant and often 
controversial, particularly in Nepal, where contemporary politics is deeply shaped by the 
transitional patterns of behavior I am describing.  Thus, in consultation with the Institutional 
Review Board for the protection of human subjects at the University of Denver, I chose to keep 
the information presented in the interviews de-linked from the identities of the interviewees.  
While I do present a list of the names and positions of the people I and my research assistants 
interviewed in the appendices, I do not connect this list in any way with specific claims and 
quotes made in the text of the case studies. 
For all three cases the first step in my argument is to show that the cases in fact fit the 
basic values on the variables that I have assigned to them as above.  I then give historical 
context to each case, laying out the historical antecedents to the transitions that I am interested 
in.  I then give a detailed account of the events of the transition itself, process-tracing the steps 
whereby these countries arrived at their respective regime endpoints.  I then conclude each 
                                                          
44 In Nepal and Zambia I conducted all of the interviews personally.  In Brazil, I hired a team of Brazilian 
graduate students as research assistants who conducted the interviews on my behalf and translated them 
from Portuguese to English. 
45 Some additional sources that informed my interview research methodology were McCracken Invalid 
source specified. and Spradley (1979). 
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chapter with analysis, evaluating the impact of my proposed pathway argument and considering 
potential alternative explanations. 
  
 144 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Nepal’s Second People’s Movement and Fractious Semi-
Democracy 
 In this chapter I outline the dynamics of transition in Nepal beginning from the 
successful civil resistance campaign of 2006 against the regime of King Gyanendra Shah.  I argue 
that Nepal currently represents a case of fractious semi-democracy.  In fractious semi-
democracies, the challenges of mobilization and holdovers are resolved more or less 
successfully.  In regards to mobilization, civil resistance continues to characterize a transition 
and place pressure on new political leaders to implement a fully democratic regime.  In regards 
to holdovers, the middle road of integration punishes some former regime elites for their past 
abuses and restricts them from participation in the new regime.  However, the new government 
does not pursue a full-fledged purge of old regime elites.  Instead, most old regime elites are 
integrated into the new system.  The challenge that fractious semi-democracies fail to resolve is 
the challenge of maximalism.  Instead of moving to normalized democratic politics, new political 
forces instead use the tools of civil resistance for their own narrow, winner-take-all ends.  There 
is widespread defection from the rules of the game, leading to a failure of democracy to become 
institutionalized.   
 Fractious semi-democracy is itself a regime, and can become a long-term equilibrium 
outcome, particularly if no one political force is strong enough on its own to establish solid 
control over the political system.  However, it is a sub-optimal equilibrium for the public as a 
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whole.  Back and forth battles for political control typically lead to a failure in service delivery, 
economic development, and other outcome legitimacy aspects of governance.  This sub-
optimality makes it ultimately an unstable equilibrium.  If service delivery and economic growth 
cannot be delivered, widespread public disillusion with democracy can empower various non-
democratic claimants to the throne. 
 Few close observers would dispute that Nepal’s politics since 2006 has been fractious.  
Nepal’s political parties have fought vigorously for control of the center, with agreements made 
and broken in rapid succession and political alliances shifting rapidly on the basis of short-term 
political incentives.  Since 2006 there have been ten Prime Ministers (as of the date of this 
writing in mid-2017), none of whose governments have lasted more than two years.  Since in 
the same time period there have only been two elections, in 2008 and 2013, the primary 
method of turnover has not been electoral.  Instead political parties have relied on the 
nonviolent defection of disruptive civil resistance tactics such as general strikes and road 
blockades to put pressure to achieve their objectives and destabilize their opponents. 
 Nepal is also firmly semi-democratic.  This status is prominently displayed in respected 
scholarly indices on democracy.  The V-Dem dataset has rated Nepal in the range of 0.3 to 0.6 
since 2006, with similar middle range rankings coming from the Polity dataset (Marshall, Gurr, & 
Jaggers, 2016) and the Unified Democracy Scores (Pemstein, Meserve, & Melton, 2010).  Figure 
3.2 displays these indices over time graphically.46 
                                                          
46 All indices re-scaled to 0 to 1 for comparability. 
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Figure 3.2: Nepal’s Democracy Index Scores
 
 This opinion was widely shared among the political and civil society elites I interviewed 
during my research.  In each interview I asked interviewees to rate Nepal’s current level of 
democracy, with the options: “completely democratic, mostly democratic, just a little 
democratic, or not democratic at all.”  While respondents answered ranged across this 
spectrum, the vast majority either chose the “mostly democratic” or “just a little democratic” 
options.  See Figure 3.3 below for the distribution of answers.   
Figure 3.3: Perspective on Nepal’s Level of Democracy From Political Elite Interviewees 
  
Complete
Mostly
Just a Little
Not at All
No Answer
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 Typically, interviewees responded to this question by arguing that Nepal’s constitution 
was highly democratic, and the official forms of politics reflected democratic norms, but that 
this democracy was only “cosmetic” or “formal” in nature and that the substantive functioning 
of democracy fell well below what one could reasonably describe as democracy. 
 Nepal’s transition largely confirms my theory, but with some important caveats.  First, 
the transition displays a close interaction between the patterns of mobilization and maximalism.  
While mobilization on an absolute level remained high, as predicted by my theory, the character 
and shape of this mobilization was influential.  While mobilization remained high the 
mobilization was in large part captured by political parties, while independent civil society 
groups largely demobilized.   
 Thus the case certainly confirms the importance of the challenge of mobilization, but 
suggests that mobilization, to maintain its democratizing pressure, must be matched with a 
certain degree of autonomy.  If mobilization is simply a tool deployed by political elites, then it is 
unlikely to have a full democratizing effect. 
 The challenge of holdovers also shows some degree of co-optation.  While there was a 
public commission that made recommendations on punishments for certain particularly harsh 
abusers of human rights under the monarchy, the recommendations of this commission were 
never fulfilled.  Any move towards transitional justice has also been powerfully resisted by 
Nepal’s new political leaders, in large part because many of Nepal’s new political leaders are the 
same as Nepal’s old political leaders.  Prominent political figures such as Sher Bahadur Deuba 
and K.P. Oli were complicit in the king’s regime, and likely. 
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 Thus Nepal matches up to my theory in the following way: mobilization (but not 
independent mobilization), integration (but leaning towards co-optation), and clear maximalism.  
Nepal is a “fractious semi-democracy,” but with definite elements of the “elite semi-democracy” 
as well.   
 The resolution of these strategic challenges did take place during the transition, and was 
by no means predetermined by Nepal’s political or social structure.  Nor was it fully the product 
of elite consensus or lack of consensus.  Instead, the shape of popular mobilization and pressure 
played a critical role in shaping Nepal’s transition. 
 In the remainder of this chapter I first give an overview of the major events of Nepal’s 
transition since 2006.  I then discuss and dismiss alternative explanations for Nepal’s current 
political situation and conclude by reiterating the contribution of my theory. 
Background of the  “Jana Andolan II” 
 Certain historical context is central to understanding Nepal’s 2006 transition.  The very 
name of the movement that initiated the transition, the “Jana Andolan II” or “Second People’s 
Movement,” indicates that this movement did not arise in a vacuum, absent a tradition of civil 
resistance and popular mobilization.  The 2006 Second People’s Movement was a direct 
descendant of Nepal’s “First People’s Movement” in 1990, itself a direct descendant of an even 
earlier popular mobilization in the 1940s and early 1950s for democratic rights.   
 Nepal’s modern politics, commonly marked by my interviewees as beginning with the 
end of the oligarchic Rana Regime in 1951, was characterized by a series of back and forth 
struggles between Nepal’s traditional monarchy and a series of emergent political forces: 
initially the Nepali Congress Party, then the Communist movement, and finally the Maoist 
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revolutionaries of the 1990s.  Brief periods of democratic breakthrough in the 1950s and 1990s 
were rapidly undermined by the resurgent power of a monarchy unwilling to limit itself to a 
mere ceremonial role and, in the latter case, by the outbreak of civil war. 
 The second democratic breakthrough, in 1990, critically shaped the events of 2006 and 
thus deserves some closer scrutiny.  The Nepali Congress, Nepal’s traditional democratic party, 
had attempted violent uprisings against the monarchy several times in the 1970s and 1980s, but 
had failed to successfully undermine the monarchy.  In 1990 they attempted a different 
strategic path, joining forces with Nepal’s Communist movement in a nonviolent struggle, 
commonly referred to in Nepal as a “Jana Andolan,” or people’s movement.  The mass 
mobilization of this movement successfully pressured King Birendra Shah to end the system of 
direct monarchical rule, known as the Panchayat system, and allow the writing of a new 
constitution that would reduce his role to that of a ceremonial monarch. 
 Opinions on the new regime initiated in 1990 vary within Nepal’s political elites.  Many 
of them, particularly members of the Nepali Congress, are quite positive about this period of 
Nepal’s history.  While inequality and other social and economic problems were prominent, they 
argue that the country was fundamentally on a positive, pro-democratic path, and, had it been 
given sufficient time, would have fully democratized.  Critics, particularly those from the far left, 
argue that the regime was fundamentally flawed from the beginning.  Maintaining the monarch 
in a central position and constitutionally enshrining Nepal’s identity as a unitary Hindu state 
meant that the government could never be fully democratic but would always be shot through 
with degrees of feudalism.  Economic, regional, and ethnic inequality remained major issues 
that democracy left unresolved, and corruption at the center was pervasive.  
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 Nepal is an ethnically diverse country.  The 2011 government census reported 125 
different caste and ethnic identity groups (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2014).47  At the most 
aggregated level, most political elites I spoke to divide Nepal into three major identity groups: 
hill-based Brahmin-Chettris, Madheshis, and Indigenous groups (also referred to as Adivasi or 
Janajati groups), each of which accounts for roughly a third of Nepal’s population.48  Of these 
three groups, the Brahmin-Chettri have dominated Nepal’s politics and society for almost all its 
history.  This has been the case both for periods of domination by the monarchy and during 
periods of ostensible democracy.  The Panchayat system of 1960-1990 was dominated by 
Chettris, while the 1990 democratic system was dominated by Brahmins.   
 Until 2006, Brahmin-Chettri dominance took place under a backdrop of an ostensible 
single Nepali identity.49  First the monarch and then the democratic system strongly argued that 
Nepal was as much a single ethnic unit as a political unit, and discouraged or persecuted the use 
of languages and customs other than those of the Brahmin-Chettri elite. 
                                                          
47 Even this number may dramatically understate the number of identity groups in Nepal.  Nepal’s Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) reported that actual responses to the 2011 census question on ethnic/caste 
identity amounted to over 1,200 distinct identity groups.  The CBS then parsed these actual responses 
down into 125 categories.  Their report does not specific the methodology used to make these 
determinations (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2014, pp. 1-2) 
48 Brahmins and Chhetris are the highest caste groups in the traditional caste hierarchy of Nepal.  The 
term “Madheshi” encompasses a diverse group of ethnic and linguistic groups that are native to Nepal’s 
southern plains.  This region is commonly referred to as “Madhesh,” a term meaning “Middle Country” 
and also as “The Tarai,” a term which is roughly equivalent to “plains” or “lowlands” in English.  The 
Nepalese Central Bureau of Statistics makes these divides somewhat differently, splitting the Nepalese 
population into nine categories: “(1) The caste-origin Hill groups, (2) Hill Adibasi/Janajati groups, (3) Hill 
Dalit, (4) Madhesi caste-origin groups (Level 1), (5) Madhesi caste origin groups (Level 2), (6) Madhesi 
caste-origin low caste groups or Dalits (Level 3), (7) Tarai (Madhesi) Adibasi/Janajati, (8) Musalman or 
Muslims, and (9) other cultural groups” (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2014, p. 3) 
49 Terminology can be somewhat confusing when it comes to distinguishing the Nepali ethnolinguistic 
identity and the national identity of citizens of Nepal.  I follow the convention common in Nepal of using 
“Nepali” to refer to members of the ethnolinguistic group that speaks the language commonly referred to 
as “Nepali,” “Gorkha,” or “Khaskura” and the term “Nepalese” to refer to a citizen of the country of Nepal 
of no particular ethnolinguistic identity group. 
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 In part it was this domination by the Brahmin-Chettri elite which inspired certain 
factions of Nepal’s far left, led by the ideologues Mohan Vaidya, Baburam Bhattarai, and Pushpa 
Kamal Dahal (or Prachanda, as he later became known), to issue a list of 40 demands to the 
Nepalese government in February 1996.  The demands were far more than even a sympathetic 
government could have granted, and thus soon afterwards the leftists left Kathmandu to begin a 
Maoist-style insurrection against the government, initiating Nepal’s ten-year civil war. 
 For five years of war Nepal remained a fairly robust, though flawed democracy.  
However, in 2001 and early 2002 a series of events led to the unraveling of Nepal’s democracy 
and the establishment of a quasi and then full-fledged dictatorship under Nepal’s monarch.  The 
process began with the assassination under mysterious circumstances of King Birendra, along 
with much of the royal family, in 2001.  One of the few surviving royals, the King’s brother 
Gyanendra, ascended to the throne promising to take a harder line against the Maoists and 
expressing skepticism over his brother’s openness to democratic reform. 
 In 2002 the democratically elected parliament was dissolved, and the King began 
appointing Prime Ministers.  Meanwhile he rapidly increased the intensity of the conflict against 
the Maoists, leading to a spike in casualties as the two sides clashed with increasing violence.  
See Figure 3.4 for a breakdown of the casualties of the conflict over time.50   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
50 Figure reproduced from Do and Iyer 2010 using casualty data collected by the Informal Sector Service 
Center (INSEC) www.insec.org. 
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Figure 3.4: Casualties in Nepal’s Civil War, 1996-2006 (Do & Iyer, 2010, p. 737) 
 
 The quasi-democratic elements of this monarchical regime came to an end in February 
2005 when the king dismissed the final prime minister and began ruling by decree, arguing that 
such direct rule was necessary to bring an end to the conflict with the Maoists. 
 The king’s coup in 2005 echoed the actions of his father, King Mahendra, in 1960.  
However, as many interviewees observed, the situation was no longer amenable to such 
interference.  The king’s move was deeply unpopular and served as a major mobilizational 
moment.  The political parties, particularly the Nepali Congress, had been leading protests and 
other civil resistance actions against the monarchy for some time.  Yet their campaign had 
remained quite limited in size, dominated almost entirely by long-time party cadres.  The public 
at large was deeply skeptical of the political parties’ leadership, with many viewing them as 
corrupt and ineffective.  However, when the king assumed direct power in 2005, no longer even 
maintaining an appearance of democratic rule, opposition spread rapidly throughout society.  In 
particular, a widely-respected community of civil society and human rights activists began to 
condemn the king’s move and take action against it. 
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 One of the largest civil society groups to mobilize against the king was the Citizens’ 
Movement for Democracy and Peace (CMDP).  Led by former civil servant Devendra Raj Pandey 
and human rights activist Krishna Pahadi, the CMDP began organizing civil disobedience actions 
against the king’s curfews and other restrictions on civil liberties.  Even their initial events were 
met with a massive mobilization response, as ordinary Nepalese citizens joined forces with these 
activists.  The activists leant their support to the struggling political parties, inviting political 
leaders to attend their events and hear what the people had to say. 
 A second critical impact of the king’s coup in 2005 was to firmly push together the 
mainstream political parties and the Maoist rebels.  The major political parties, joined under the 
mantle of the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA), wanted the Maoists’ support in Nepal’s rural districts 
to bring pressure against the king.  The Maoists, on the other hand, had reached a clear point of 
military stalemate with the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA).  The RNA was unable to dislodge the 
Maoists from their rural strongholds but the Maoists lacked the manpower and equipment to 
directly engage the RNA.  Thus for several years Maoist leaders had opened negotiations, both 
with the palace and the political parties, to seek some form of political settlement.  The King’s 
coup eliminated the possibility of a Maoist accommodation with the palace and instead drove 
the Maoists and the SPA into each other’s arms. 
 The two sides reached an agreement in November of 2005, the so-called Twelve Point 
Agreement, signed in Delhi under the watchful and approving eye of the Indian government.  
Under the agreement, both sides acknowledged the monarchy as the primary obstacle to 
Nepal’s political development and agreed to work together to eliminate it.  The Maoists agreed 
to give up arms and to accept the principle of multi-party democracy.  The SPA, which had 
previously been fighting simply for the restoration of the previous democratically-elected 
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parliament and wanted to maintain a system of constitutional monarchy, agreed to the Maoists’ 
core demand for a constituent assembly that would move Nepal away from monarchy and 
towards a Republican system. 
 With the Maoists, the political parties, and civil society all in alignment against the king, 
Gyanendra found himself with few allies.  Mobilization swelled through late 2005 and early 
2006, peaking in April 2006, when a general strike in the Kathmandu valley planned by the 
political parties achieved a success wilder than even the most optimistic political leaders had 
anticipated.  Millions of residents of Kathmandu created a miles-long procession around 
Kathmandu’s ring road, shutting down the city.  Meanwhile, throughout the country Maoist 
cadres blockaded roads and shut down district administration centers. 
 At the last gasp, the King ordered the army to suppress the protests with deadly force.  
However, the army refused to obey the order, arguing that the size of the protests would 
prevent them from doing so.  Fearing an imminent popular assault on the palace itself, 
Gyanendra agreed to give over power to the former parliament, and left the palace on April 24, 
2006.  
From “Jana Andolan” to Fractious Semi-Democracy 
 In this section I trace ten years of the development of Nepal’s current political regime, 
beginning from the king’s removal from power in 2006 and concluding in late 2016 with the 
political struggle over amending Nepal’s new constitution.  I structure my narrative roughly 
chronologically, but focus on my three key challenges of mobilization, maximalism, and 
holdovers. 
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 Contestation between major political forces was intense from the transition’s beginning.  
Indeed, the major parties participating in the Jana Andolan were in disagreement over whether 
the king’s restoration of the old parliament was in fact the victory they had been hoping for.  
The Maoists, whose mobilizational potential played a critical role in the movement’s success, 
wanted a more direct and immediate push for a constituent assembly, rather than the 
restoration of one of the institutions they had waged their initial struggle against. 
 Several of my interviewees critiqued the ad hoc or even anti-democratic nature of the 
new regime under Prime Minister G.P. Koirala.  The parliament that Koirala headed up had been 
elected in 1999 with a maximum five year mandate, long expired by April of 2006.  Its leading 
members were the same Kathmandu elites who had been deeply critiqued for corruption and 
lack of effective service delivery in the 1990s.  Could putting this same group of people in power 
truly be the outcome of such a massive popular uprising? 
 The long-term goals of the movement itself had been somewhat unclear, as many of my 
interviewees reported.  Ordinary people wanted the restoration of freedom and peace with the 
Maoists.  This simple two-point agenda was the common rallying cry.  However, political elites 
interpreted the movement as legitimating their own particular goals of restructuring the 
Nepalese state.   In particular, leaders in the Maoist movement saw the Jana Andolan as a 
powerful legitimation of their long-term goals of a Communist People’s Democracy.  Leaders of 
Madheshi and other minority groups saw the mandate of the movement as ending 
discrimination against their people and the political dominance of hill-based Brahmin-Chettris.  
And the old-time democrats of the Nepali Congress saw it as legitimating their own vision of 
representative multi-party democracy with themselves in a privileged position. 
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 These divergent visions were bound to conflict.  Yet the modality of their conflict was by 
no means predetermined.  Instead early crucial actions initiated a repeating pattern of 
radicalized, winner-take-all conflict based on short-term political expediency rather than long-
term national interest. As several interviewees reported, the restoration of the parliament, and 
particularly the introduction of Maoists as parliamentarians, despite their never having been 
elected, were prominent examples.  Developing rule of law or even consistent rules of the 
political game was downplayed in favor of a focus on accommodating the interests of the de 
facto politically powerful. 
 Mobilization by civil society also began to suffer early on in the transition.  Initially, the 
leaders of the CMDP, one of the most powerful forces behind the Jana Andolan, had intended to 
keep their movement in existence, arguing that it was necessary to keep the political parties 
accountable.  Yet declining numbers, fractures over policy disagreements, and departures from 
the movement to join political parties led to the decline of CMDP’s independent voice.  
 One demand of the movement had been accountability for the king and others who had 
been complicit in the abuses of the period of direct monarchical rule, particularly violence 
towards the peaceful protesters of the Jana Andolan II.  There were moves early on in the 
transition to address this problem, and a commission was formed under the guidance of 
respected elder Judge Krishna Jung Rayamajhi.  The commission made several 
recommendations for prosecution of those figures from the old government who were 
particularly complicit in human rights abuses.  However, the interim government refused to take 
up the recommendations of the Rayamahji Commission, and to date no government has made 
the commission’s recommendations public. 
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 Since the recommendations have not been made public, most of my interviewees could 
only speculate about the reasons why the commission’s report was so completely disregarded. 
However, nearly all were in consensus that the report implicated figures who remained integral 
to Nepal’s contemporary political environment. Nearly all of the major figures of Nepal’s 
democratic movement, including the current Prime Minister and head of the Nepali Congress, 
Sher Bahadur Deuba, had served in the increasingly authoritarian regime of King Gyanendra.  
Had prosecutions begun, the Nepalese political elite were concerned about where they might 
end. 
 In addition to the Rayamajhi Commission, whose work was actually completed, the 
political parties had made several commitments in their various agreements to investigate the 
abuses of the past.  The twelfth point of the 2005 12-point agreement was a commitment by the 
SPA and the Maoists to investigate any “inappropriate conduct…among the parties in the past,” 
and “take action over the guilty one” (Nepal Ministry of Peace and Reconciliation, 2005, p. 5).  
More specifically, the later Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Maoists and the 
government of Nepal committed Nepal’s political parties to establishing a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and Commission to Investigate Disappearances.  Yet multiple 
governments delayed the creation of both of these commissions throughout the transition and 
today, despite the fact that they have finally been created, they have remained understaffed 
and have in large part failed to hold conflict parties accountable (Jeffery, 2017). 
 Civil society figures I interviewed condemned this failure of accountability and 
environment of impunity.  Criticism in Nepal’s media has also been extensive.51  Yet no non-
partisan mobilization against the continued political role of old regime figures or for 
                                                          
51 See for example: Bandi 2017, Bhandari 2016 , Kapur 2017, Himalayan Times 2017. 
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prosecutions of severe human rights abuses of sufficient size and scope to change the political 
incentives against impunity has been forthcoming.   
The landmark achievement of the first year of the transition was undoubtedly the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, signed by Interim Prime Minister G.P. Koirala and 
Maoist Leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal. This agreement formally ended Nepal’s civil war and 
incorporated the Maoists into the interim parliament.  It also marked the achievement of the 
second of the Jana Andolan’s key goals: a formal end to Nepal’s ten-year civil war.   
 The agreement is lofty in its rhetoric and aspirations.  Beyond its direct provisions for 
ending violence against one another, it also obligates its parties, among many other things, to 
restructure the state to end caste, ethnic, language, cultural, religious, and regional 
discrimination (Article 3.5), implement “scientific” land reform (Article 3.7), and make Nepal 
“advanced and economically prosperous in a just manner within a short span of time” (Article 
3.12).     
 Regarding the actual provisions related to conflict, the agreement sets up the 
cantonment system for housing and providing for the Maoist ex-combatants, with UN 
monitoring of weapons storage, and commits both sides to refraining from an extensive list of 
conflict-related activities.  These include, of course, direct military activities such as “setting up 
ambush” (Article 5.1.1e) and “Aerial attacks or bombings” (Article 5.1.1h), but range beyond 
these to encompass “acts rendering…mental pressure on any individuals” (Article 5.1.1c).   
 The agreement’s lofty goals may have doomed it from the start, but regardless of 
whether one makes such a deterministic claim, that the agreement was almost immediately 
broken is without doubt.  In particular, while their People’s Liberation Army moved into the 
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cantonments, the Maoists moved quickly to establish an alternative quasi-military wing through 
its youth organization, the Young Communist League (YCL).  The YCL quickly became the 
enforcers of Maoist control in their traditional rural strongholds. 
 The growth of the YCL reinforced the conception for the mainstream political parties 
that the Maoists’ move to accept multi-party politics was purely tactical, and that if given the 
chance they would still attempt to capture the state and use the organs of state power to 
establish a single-party dictatorship.  These fears came even more to the fore after the first 
constituent assembly elections were held and the Maoists emerged as the largest party. 
 So, from its beginning the Nepalese transition was characterized by a number of 
practices that would stymie Nepal’s democratic development: a demobilized civil society despite 
its important role in the 2006 Jana Andolan, a lack of trust and confrontational, winner-take-all 
politics from the political parties, and impunity for those from the king’s dictatorship (and the 
Maoist rebellion) who were accused of severe human rights abuses. 
 Into this context came a second earthquake in Nepalese politics: the Madheshi 
movement of 2007.52  Madheshi activists, long a peripheral force in Nepalese politics, had 
played a prominent role in the 2006 people’s movement.  As many of my Madheshi 
interviewees reported, the goals of ending discrimination against and political disempowerment 
of Madheshis were by no means separate or distinct from the 2006 movement.  Indeed, it was 
the hope of a “New Nepal” free of regional discrimination that had been a central force in 
mobilizing Madheshis to participate. 
                                                          
52 For an excellent overview of the background and dynamics of the 2007 Madheshi Movement, see 
Hachchethu 2007.  
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 The view was not accidental.  As a mobilizing tactic, the ten-year Maoist rebellion had 
long since abandoned a purely abstract Marxist vision of class struggle and instead argued that 
in the Nepalese context a People’s Republic would require empowerment of Nepal’s oppressed 
ethnic and caste groups, including the Madheshis.  Many prominent Madheshi political figures, 
including future Madheshi movement leader Upendra Yadav, joined the Maoist rebellion for 
these reasons.  Thus, when the Maoists joined forces with the political parties in the 2006 
movement, Madheshi figures considered it natural that their own demands for greater political 
empowerment, particularly federalism, would be met. 
 However, major political parties, particularly the Nepali Congress, resisted any moves 
towards federalism.  Thus, in the interim constitution, federalism made no appearance 
whatsoever, and the electoral system failed to meet Madheshi demands for greater 
representation.  When the government released the interim constitution, making the 
abandonment of federalism clear, widespread protests broke out across the Tarai region.   
 Madheshi activists and politicians are quick to point to this movement as a direct and 
logical consequence of the 2006 movement.  They point to the 2006 movement as focused on 
achieving democracy that for the first time would truly represent the interests of all Nepalese, 
not just the pahadi elites. 53  The ouster of the king – perhaps the ultimate symbol of hilly high-
caste domination – was only a step along the road, not the ultimate goal.  Thus, the interim 
constitution, from their perspective, was a step backwards, a setback for the goals of the 
movement that had brought millions of Nepalese citizens to the streets.   
                                                          
53 Pahadi is a Nepali term that literally translates as “hilly person,” and is commonly used in Nepal to refer 
to people whose ethnic background is from the Himalayan foothills. 
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 Mobilization of the movement was rapidly accelerated by a heavy-handed response to 
the initial protests by the government and pahadi residents of the Tarai.  In particular, on the 
16th of January, 2007, supporters of the Madheshi social and political pressure group the 
Madheshi Jana Adhikar Forum (MJF) clashed with a group of Maoist cadres in the town of 
Lahan.  The clashes led to the death of a young Madheshi activist named Ramesh Kumar 
Mahato.  Mahato’s killing sparked a wave of popular resentment across the Tarai region and 
mobilization in the Madheshi movement exploded. 
 The Madheshi movement, like the 2006 movement itself, is a powerful example of the 
influence of ordinary people trumping the intentions of elites.  The 2007 Madhesh movement 
was not planned.  Upendra Yadav and the MJF, along with some radical militant groups, had 
held small actions against the interim constitution, but they themselves were caught by surprise 
by the sudden wave of popular support for the cause of federalism and Madheshi 
empowerment that swept across their region.  Protests and strikes were widespread, and, 
perhaps most importantly for the role of the Madheshis in the remainder of the transition, the 
Madheshi movement succeeded in shutting down the supply routes from India to Kathmandu. 
 The geography of Nepal, a landlocked country with the world’s highest mountain range 
on its northern border, gives Madhesh this natural advantage over the rest of the country.  
Nepalese society is almost entirely dependent on critical imports from India, particularly for fuel 
but also for basic foodstuffs.54  And every single one of the routes for these critical imports to 
reach the power center of Nepal in the Kathmandu valley runs through Madhesh.  When 
mobilized the Madheshis have the capacity to starve the Nepalese political elite into submission. 
                                                          
54 India is Nepal’s largest trading partner by far, accounting for over 60% of both Nepal’s imports and 
exports in 2015, and a trade deficit between the two countries of roughly 3.6 billion dollars (World 
Integrated Trade Solution, 2017). 
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 This vulnerability has created no little resentment against the Madheshis on the part of 
those same Kathmandu elites.  Few incidents during the transition evoked more heated emotion 
from my interviewees than the Madheshi (and later Indian) blockades of the road and rail lines 
from India to the hilly and mountainous regions of Nepal.  One interviewee in particular spoke 
alternately wistfully and defiantly about plans for a coming Chinese rail line to Kathmandu, 
Pokhara, and Lumpini that would allow Nepal to import basic commodities from China and 
bypass India and Madhesh entirely. 
 Despite its negative emotional resonance the tactic was effective.  The Nepalese 
government engaged in a gradual set of concessions, with interim Prime Minister G.P. Koirala 
promising federalism in a speech at the end of January, the interim parliament amending the 
interim constitution to promise federalism in April, and a series of agreements later in the year 
between pahadi elites and Madheshi leaders later in the year cementing these moves.   
 The Madheshi movement catapulted a new set of elites into public prominence, most 
importantly MJF leader Upendra Yadav. Thus when Nepal finally held its twice-delayed elections 
to the constituent assembly, tasked with writing a new constitution, Madheshi parties had an 
unexpectedly strong showing, capturing 45 out of a total of 601 seats. 
 While Madheshi gains were a major surprise in the election, the biggest shock was the 
overwhelming victory of the Maoists.  NC and UML political figures had comfortably assumed 
they would resume their pre-transition position as the first and second parties in Nepalese 
politics, with the Maoists a comfortable distance behind.  In contrast, CPN (Maoist) had a 
commanding electoral victory across the country, capturing 220 out of the 601 seats and 
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becoming the largest party in the interim legislature – larger than the Nepali Congress and the 
CPN-UML combined. 
 To what can we attribute the Maoists’ surprising victory?  Scholars and my interviewees 
had different interpretations of this electoral outcome.  Maoists viewed the election of 2008 as 
a vindication of their long struggle in the jungle and in the streets in 2006. They argued that the 
people had clearly shown their preference for the Maoist agenda of federalism, greater ethnic 
representation, and dismantling of the traditional structures of Nepalese politics, with the 
ultimate goal – sometimes  stated, sometimes left unstated – of a one-party Communist state.  
On the negative side, members of other political parties and independent civil society observers 
pointed to widespread voter intimidation and fraud in many parts of the country. While the PLA 
ostensibly remained in its cantonments, not threatening its former supporters or victims, the 
YCL was out in full force.   
 Other parties also engaged in election-related violence, with the heaviest clashes taking 
place between Nepali Congress and CPN-UML cadres in the Dhading district west of Kathmandu.  
The general pattern was one of tit-for-tat violence, with no individual political party solely 
responsible for the violence.55 In addition, many more radical Madheshi groups rejected the 
election outright, and attempted to depress voter turnout and delegitimize the electoral process 
through both violent and nonviolent intimidation. Some groups attempted to enforce bandhs 
(general strikes) in various Tarai districts, while others detonated small improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) (Cooper, 2008). 
                                                          
55 For more detail on the election violence and the general dynamics of the 2008 election see 
International Crisis Group 2008. 
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 The truth behind the Maoists’ victory is likely somewhere in the middle between 
genuine support for the Maoists and intimidation by the growing force of the YCL.  International 
election observers judged that the election was free and fair, and while some instances of 
intimidation did occur, they were not crucial to the outcome.56  Many of my interviewees argued 
that most Nepalese voters were interested not so much in the particular platform the Maoists 
espoused, but simply in the possibility for change.  The country wanted to see fresh faces in 
Kathmandu, and CPN (Maoist) seemed to be the easiest way to get them. 
 Whatever the reasons, the Maoists’ victory in 2008, followed soon thereafter by the 
accession of Maoist leader and former guerrilla near-legend Prachanda to the Prime 
Ministership of Nepal sent a shockwave through Nepalese politics, and heightened the fear and 
uncertainty on the part of the traditional democratic parties that the Maoists would take 
advantage of their electoral advantage to seize the state and ultimately unravel the democratic 
system. 
 Before moving on to the (first) Prachanda government, though, it bears mentioning that 
the election of the constituent assembly was, on its own, a historic achievement, and in many 
ways marked the final culmination not just of the 2006 movement but of Nepal’s long 
democratic tradition since the early 20th century.  The demand for a constituent assembly to 
write a people’s constitution for Nepal had been first articulated by the Nepali Congress in its 
armed uprising against the Rana regime in the 1940s.  King Tribhuvan had promised to meet the 
demand, but the promise remained unfulfilled when his son Mahendra ended Nepal’s first 
democratic regime and instituted the Panchayat system.  The 1990 movement against the 
                                                          
56 See reports by the Carter Center (2008), which deployed 62 election observers, and the Asian Network 
for Free Elections (ANFREL), which deployed over 100 election observers (Cooper, 2008).  
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monarchy had made great strides, but had given up the idea of a constituent assembly in 
exchange for concessions from the monarchy, establishing the constitutional monarchical 
system of the 1990s.  The Maoist rebellion, in turn, had made the demand for a constituent 
assembly a central plank of their long armed struggle.  Now, finally, the Nepalese people would 
have their own elected representatives determining their future political institutions. 
 The first action by the constituent assembly was equally historic, as they voted almost 
unanimously to formally abolish Nepal’s monarchy, which had technically only been suspended 
since King Gyanendra bowed to the second people’s movement two years before, and make 
Nepal a republic.  They also voted to eliminate Hinduism as the state religion and instead make 
Nepal formally a secular state.   
 These are historic achievements, representing fundamental change of a type and degree 
rarely seen even in the course of democratic transitions.  Many questioned them at the time, 
and many do still today.  Public polling in the months leading up to the 2008 election found that 
49 percent of Nepal’s population still supported at least some role for the monarchy at the time, 
and even more (59%) supported the idea of a Hindu state (Sharma & Sen, 2008, p. v).  The vote 
to eliminate the monarchy was also wreathed in controversy and intrigue, as a vote meant to 
take place immediately upon the opening of the first session was delayed and delayed until a 
late hour of the evening.  Several interviewees sympathetic to the monarchy pointed to these 
dynamics as evidence of underhandedness on the part of political leaders attempting to push 
through major changes they knew were not the will of the Nepalese people. 
 With the monarchy abolished and Hinduism no longer in its pride of place as the official 
state religion (though still in a place of great privilege – the president now presides over formal 
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Hindu ceremonies), the constituent assembly set about its work of writing a new constitution, 
while the former rebels of the CPN (Maoist) for the first time moved into the formal government 
offices in Singha Durbar in downtown Kathmandu.  The fears of many of Nepal’s conservative 
elites had come to pass.         
 A number of moves by Prachanda over the next year did nothing to assuage those fears.  
Interviewees pointed to a number of incidents, beginning with attempts to remove the South 
Indian Hindu priests at Pashupatinath Temple, the center of Nepalese Hinduism.  A number of 
other actions, including the systematic installation of Maoist cadres in the civil service and other 
government positions, continually solidified the impression in the minds of the other parties 
that Prachanda was attempting to build an unassailable political position from which CPN (M) 
could never be dislodged. 
 The final straw in this series of actions came in 2009 when Prachanda attempted to 
dismiss the Chief of Army Staff General Rookmangud Katawal.  Maoist interviewees painted this 
move in non-threatening terms, arguing that it would have been taken by any political leader in 
Prachanda’s situation, facing a figure like Katawal. Katawal had been a long-time royalist. Under 
a well-known pseudonym Katawal had written a number of public op-eds during the civil war 
period calling for “enlightened despotism,” and though he swore allegiance to Nepal’s new 
democratic regime after being elevated to Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) by Prime Minister Koirala 
in the months following the Second People’s Movement, his core sympathies were widely 
believed to be with the palace. In his later career he had played a key role in the RNA entering 
the war against the Maoists, during which time soldiers under his command had been accused 
of severe human rights abuses. He also faced inquiries over potential abuses by troops under his 
command during the Second People’s Movement in 2006.   
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  Most prominent in Prachanda’s desire to remove Katawal, however, was that Katawal 
had become a highly prominent critic of the Maoist government.  When forced to follow orders 
from his Maoist arch-enemies, Katawal had resisted, fighting back against, among other things, 
the integration of Maoist cadres into the army, the retirement of several army generals, and a 
freeze on recruiting new non-Maoist soldiers (Adhikari, 2014).  Prachanda thus attempted in 
May of 2009 to get Katawal to step down by offering him an ambassadorship.  When Katawal 
refused, the Prime Minister fired him. 
 For Nepal’s political establishment, as well as the Army itself, this was an unacceptable 
action.  The Nepalese Army was widely seen as the one functioning institution unable to be co-
opted by the Maoists.  With Katawal out, Nepal’s political parties feared that a full-scale Maoist 
takeover of the state would soon follow. 
 Katawal refused to step down, and, in a continuation of the pattern of following short-
term political incentives rather than the formal rule of law, Nepal’s president, Ram Baran Yadav, 
a member of the Congress party and a strong opponent of the Maoists, successfully kept him in 
place. The abrogation of the Prime Minister’s authority was too much for Prachanda to take and 
he resigned shortly afterwards. Intense jockeying for power followed, ultimately resulting in the 
establishment of a new government under UML Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal.   
 The Maoists, excluded from government despite their continued position as by far the 
largest party in parliament, refused to go quietly, and in May of 2010 they attempted a full-scale 
nonviolent defection.  Bringing tens of thousands of supporters from around the country to 
Kathmandu they attempted to replicate the conditions of the 2006 movement and force the 
Nepal government to fall. 
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 This time, however, the Maoists lacked alliances in civil society and the political parties, 
and their attempted civil resistance takeover failed to take hold.  With dwindling numbers of 
supporters enforcing their general strike in Kathmandu and no prospect of success, the Maoists 
ended the strike. 
 Intense competition continued, though, ultimately leading a few months later to Prime 
Minister Nepal stepping down as a gesture to attempt to break the political deadlock.  Nepal’s 
gesture, however, failed to achieve its desired effect.  Instead, for the next several months 
Nepal functioned without a Prime Minister as the various parties voted over and over again, 
with no candidate able to achieve an electoral majority.  Finally, after seven months of voting, 
the Maoists agreed to back the UML candidate, Jhala Nath Khanal, and a new government was 
formed.  The Khanal government was followed quickly thereafter by another governing 
crisis and the establishment of a new government under Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai. 
 Under Bhattarai’s tenure, Nepal reached another critical turning point in the transition.  
The constituent assembly elected in 2008 to write Nepal’s new constitution had originally been 
given a one-year mandate.  As unwillingness to reach political compromises and focus on the 
back and forth series of power struggles in Singha Durbar made the actual work of writing a 
constitution more and more difficult, the Assembly had voted to grant itself several extensions. 
However, in 2013 Nepal’s Supreme Court ruled that the assembly no longer had the right to 
continue to extend its mandate. 
 This once again put Nepal’s politicians in a position of making a short-term political 
compromise outside of the framework of the institutional rule of law.  The eventual compromise 
position was that Maoist Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai would step down and hand over 
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power to a technocratic government headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Khil Raj 
Regmi.  Regmi would have a very brief mandate, just long enough to plan and execute elections 
for a new constituent assembly. 
 Many of my interviewees pointed to this compromise as a particularly egregious 
example of the failure of Nepal’s politicians to honor the norms of democratic politics.  Regmi 
had, of course, never been elected, and while in office did not even give up the position of Chief 
Justice, but instead continued to serve in both capacities.   
 Democratic flaws aside, the Regmi regime did succeed in organizing elections in a 
relatively brief time period.  And, just as the Maoist victory in 2008 had been a shocking 
outcome for Nepal’s political elites, the outcome of the 2013 election was similarly shocking.  
The new, progressive political forces of CPN (Maoist) and the Madheshi political parties faced 
electoral annihilation.  CPN (M) went from the largest party in the constituent assembly by a 
wide margin to a distant third behind Nepal’s two traditional political parties, the NC and CPN 
(UML).  Madheshi parties were almost wiped out, with only a scattering of figures remaining in 
the second constituent assembly. 
 What explains this change in electoral outcome?  Interviewees were divided.  Some 
simply attributed it to a revelation of the population’s natural preferences when better voter 
rolls were in place and voter intimidation by the Maoists and their YCL had been largely 
eliminated.  Others argue that, as in 2008, the Nepalese public simply wanted change.  They 
were angry over the Maoists failure to deliver a new constitution in line with their promises in 
the jungle and in the lead-up to the 2008 election, and thus honored their rivals in the Congress 
and UML.  Others point to more sinister conspiracies, often with the common Indian flavor. 
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 Whatever the reason, Nepal’s traditional political elites were now firmly in charge of the 
government once again, an outcome that sparked alarm not just from supporters of the Maoists 
but across the spectrum of Nepalese progressive forces, those who still saw the 2006 movement 
as one not just for restoring the elite-dominated democracy of the 1990s but for fundamentally 
restructuring the Nepalese state. 
 The process of constitution-writing and competition over control of the central 
government remained contentious during the second constituent assembly.  In particular, a 
number of identity-based movements waged intense resistance struggles to ensure that the 
rights they had hoped to obtain from the Maoist-led first constituent assembly were maintained 
in this second, more conservative constituent assembly. 
 One prominent example of this was the struggle in 2015 by a number of Dalit 
organizations to ensure the protection of Dalit rights in the new constitution.  Led by long-time 
Dalit activists such as Padam Sundas of the Samata Foundation, the movement was sparked by 
rumors coming from Dalit members of the new CA that guarantees of proportional 
representation in elections and affirmative action for Dalits in public service promised during the 
first CA were on the verge of being rescinded in the new constitution.  Coordinated through 
Samata’s office in Sanepa, just south of Kathmandu, the Dalit movement engaged in a major 
push, coordinated through NGOs, sister organizations of political parties, and Dalit members of 
the various parties themselves to ensure that these rights were kept in the new constitution.  
Their activism was successful and many of the guarantees were reinstated. 
 The contentious process of constitution-writing might have followed the same outcome 
as the first CA, with infighting and political jockeying preventing the establishment of any final 
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document, except that in April of 2015 a major exogenous shock struck the country in the form 
of a massive earthquake, with an epicenter close to the heavily-populated Kathmandu valley.   
Thousands were killed in the immediate aftermath of the quake, and hundreds of thousands 
more made homeless. 
 The quake had two major effects on Nepal’s political development.  In the first case, it 
sparked a massive outpouring of international aid for disaster relief.  Aid had already become a 
major industry in Nepal since the beginning of the transition in 2006.  As one interviewee 
observed: “for many years the biggest industry in Nepal has been the peace industry.”  Yet the 
scale of aid immediately ramped up significantly following the earthquake.  These inputs of aid 
further demobilized Nepalese civil society from political activism, as NGOs shifted focus to 
earthquake-related service delivery and relief. 
 In the second case, the earthquake proved to be a potent motivator for Nepal’s political 
elites to finally come together and agree on a constitution.  In the months following the 
earthquake Nepal’s political parties departed from their typical pattern of winner take all 
politics to finally pass (with 90% support) and promulgate Nepal’s new constitution, its first to 
be written by an assembly elected by the people. 
 Almost all my interviewees had positive things to say about the new constitution.  It is 
impressively progressive, with guarantees of many fundamental rights enshrined in it.  It 
attempts to accommodate many of the most central demands articulated in the 2006 
movement and subsequent movements by Madheshis, Dalits, and indigenous peoples.  It 
includes required proportional representation for women and several different minority groups 
in the parliament and in government service. 
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 Yet, following the pattern of Nepal’s prior political agreements, the lofty rhetoric agreed 
to by the parties has often failed to be realized in practice.  When asked about the quality of 
Nepal’s democracy, this was a point emphasized by almost every interviewee from every sector.  
The guarantees of the constitution, the institutions called for by the constitution, are highly 
democratic, far more democratic than any other legal framework in South Asia.  Yet on almost 
no count are they fully implemented. 
 Beyond the problems of implementation, certain groups were deeply angered by the 
constitutional arrangement itself.  In particular, Madheshi groups condemned the constitution 
as continuing the dominance of Brahmin and Chhetri pahadis.  In particular, the Madheshis 
objected to the proposed borders of Nepal’s new federal states, which diluted Madheshi control 
by adding some hilly area districts into one of the proposed Tarai-based states and removing 
some others.   
 The Madheshis responded by launching a new movement, and once again employing 
their most powerful tool: a blockade of the main road and rail lines from India to the Kathmandu 
valley and other hilly regions.  In this, they were heavily assisted by the Indian government 
(though India disputes this).  As in 2007 the blockade proved potent in achieving its desired 
outcome, and the Nepalese government agreed to amend the new constitution to change the 
state boundaries and accommodate Madheshi demands. 
 This history largely brings us up to the present, a moment in which Nepal’s transition is 
ostensibly entering its final stages.  Upon promulgation of the constitution the constituent 
assembly redefined itself as a legislative parliament and extended its mandate until national 
elections could be held some time in 2017.  They also planned to hold local and federal elections 
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in the same time period, a triple electoral process that would ostensibly mark the final end to 
Nepal’s lengthy transition.  This timeline was complicated by the Madheshi agitation of 2015 
and early 2016, which put the federal boundaries in question.  As of this writing, in August of 
2017, the election timeline seems doubtful.  Local elections have taken place in six out of 
Nepal’s seven provinces – a major accomplishment considering the last local elections took 
place over 20 years ago – but the government has still failed to announce a date for 
parliamentary elections, and local elections in Province 2 have been delayed due to a 
threatened electoral boycott by Madheshi parties.57  The constitutional amendment agreed to 
as a compromise with the Madheshi forces has been put into question by powerful resistance 
from the CPN-UML and conservative elements of the Congress party, and its future remains 
uncertain as of this writing. 
 If Nepal’s political parties can agree on the amendment to the constitution, as well as 
schedule and hold elections at every administrative level, it will doubtless mark a major 
advancement and potentially an end to the applicability of the term transition to describing 
Nepal’s political situation.  Yet it remains to be seen whether a departure from transition in any 
practical, institutional sense will move Nepal away from its position as a fractious semi-
democracy.   
 Reasons for skepticism lie in a number of areas, but primarily in the structure of 
Nepalese political competition, a structure that seems unlikely to change with the simple move 
towards a more normal electoral system.  Every one of Nepal’s political parties is structured 
hierarchically, with key decisions on platform and personnel made almost exclusively by a small 
                                                          
57 See Kathmandu Post, August 15th, 2017. “EC officials urge PM to announce date for parliamentary 
election.” http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2017-08-15/ec-officials-urge-pm-to-announce-
date-for-parliamentary-election.html. 
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circle of senior leaders.  Loyalty from lower-level cadres is maintained primarily through the 
promise of future patronage and career advancement.   
 This lack of internal party democracy has undermined the establishment of ideological-
based distinction and party competition on the basis of service delivery.  Instead, competition 
tends to be based on absolute numbers of people who can be drawn into the individual party’s 
patronage network.  Since control of the center is the ultimate means of expanding one’s 
patronage network, political logic is focused almost exclusively on being part of the ruling 
coalition rather than achieving one’s own ideological goals.   
 This dynamic in turn makes political alliances unstable and undermines trust between 
the political parties.  In contrast to ideological commitments, whose implementation is at least 
to some degree zero-sum – for example, one cannot implement both a progressive land reform 
policy and maintain the privileges of the old landed elite – and thus drive alliances between 
parties for whom ideological conflict is minimal, the benefits of patronage are fungible between 
different alliance partners.  Alliance partners are interchangeable in the distribution of 
patronage, and negotiation becomes simply a matter of marginal degree.   
 Nepal’s current government is perhaps the ultimate example of this mode of political 
competition, as it brings together the ostensibly far-left CPN (Maoist), the traditional center-
right (In Nepalese politics, at least), Nepali Congress, and, at least until recently, the monarchist 
Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP).  Knowing that they are interchangeable, and seeing the 
pattern of shifting alliances and betrayal of prior agreements, political parties have reasons to 
be skeptical of one another’s guarantees.  Yet this lack of trust in guarantees continues to 
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exacerbate the radicalized conflict over control of the center and de-emphasize competition 
over positive service delivery and implementation of a particular ideological platform. 
 Greater implementation of the new constitution, particularly through lower-level 
elections, could have an important impact on these dynamics.  A new cadre of young, local 
political leaders could shake up the top-down, patronage-based structure of Nepal’s political 
parties, and bring new blood to the fore who would be incentivized to seek public support on 
the basis of a political platform or delivery of government services.  Yet it is certainly possible 
that even in these circumstances the patterns of politics engrained by Nepal’s political parties to 
date will continue to shape and shove new leaders into its mold.  The future is open-ended, but 
it seems highly likely that Nepal’s status as a fractious semi-democracy will continue into the 
future. 
Analysis 
 What explains the trajectory of Nepal’s transition?  Why has Nepal been able to make 
such tremendous progress towards social and political transformation and yet failed to move to 
a more consolidated, regular democratic system?   I consider some of the most popular 
explanations, both from my interviewees and from broader scholarship on Nepal. 
 The first explanation relates to Nepal’s neighbors, in particular India.  Indian 
underhanded behavior is a favorite explanation for almost any political event in Nepal 
indefinitely into the past until today.  Different accounts offer different rationales for India’s 
interference, but a focus on Indian involvement is important in almost any description of the 
trajectory of Nepal’s transition.  One interviewee went so far as to describe the primary division 
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in Nepal’s politics as between the rastrabadh – nationalists – and lampasarbadh, those who are 
willing to give in to Indian interests. 
 Indian perfidy is particularly prominent in discussions of the Madheshi movement.  The 
Madheshis are often painted as tools of Indian foreign policy to divide Nepal and provide India 
with a frontier region under easily-controlled political leaders.  The close linguistic, ethnic, and 
familial ties between the populations of the neighboring Indian states of Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh and the Madheshis make such connections easy to draw. 
 That India has played an important role in the transition is undeniable.  Indian mediation 
played an important part in bringing together the Maoists and the seven-party alliance before 
the 2006 Second People’s Movement.  The 12-point agreement between the two was signed in 
Delhi, under the watchful eye of the Indian government.  And the Indian ambassador in Nepal 
has played an important role at key moments of political crisis, throwing his weight behind one 
political faction or another in order to achieve particular political outcomes. 
 Thus a weak version of the argument that Indian influence explains Nepal’s transition 
certainly has some merit.  In specific instances, when tracing the political process, one often 
finds Indian actors in the middle.  However, several key pieces of evidence undermine the 
stronger argument for an overwhelming causal role for Indian foreign policy. 
 The first is the character of popular mobilization first in the Jana Andolan II and then in 
the Madheshi movement and subsequent mobilizations.  While India played a role in bringing 
the political elites together in the 12-point agreement, in the movement of 2006 these political 
elites initially played a fairly marginal role.  Due to a widespread loss of legitimacy, few people 
were willing to mobilize on the streets in support of the political parties.  Instead it was 
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independent civil society leaders who organized the first large-scale protests against the King’s 
rule.  The political parties and Maoist revolutionaries were later folded into the movement, but 
they were not the key actors who sparked it, nor the majority of those who participated.  Thus, 
even assuming that all those who agreed to the 12-point agreement were acting as tools of 
Indian foreign policy (itself a fairly challenging argument to make), the movement itself cannot 
be explained solely or even primarily through their actions.  It was a massive popular upswell 
driven by civil society and popular attitudes more broadly that were deeply opposed to the 
king’s actions. 
 Some interviewees alleged that the mobilization itself was simply the result of Indian 
money, that protesters on the streets were paid by India.  While I cannot rule out this 
accusation, a number of data points make it extremely unlikely. 
 The first is the sheer size of the 2006 movement.  Estimates vary, but even 
conservatively the participation was at least in the millions, with demonstrations in almost every 
municipality in the country.  In Kathmandu alone, according to multiple interviewees from 
different political and civil society groups, during the height of the Jana Andolan II the march 
along Kathmandu’s ring road filled the entire circumference of the road, which would put the 
number of participants in this demonstration at bare minimum in the hundreds of thousands.  
While it is impossible to rule out that some participants in these demonstrations received 
financial compensation of some kind, it stretches plausibility to assume that this number was 
any significant portion. 
 The second is the reports of an overwhelming percentage of interviewees.  During the 
course of my fieldwork I had access to many of the most central leaders in the 2006 movement.  
 178 
 
They all told a fairly consistent story about the progression of the movement’s mobilization, 
with differences that would be expected based on their different positions at the time.  As with 
the numbers of participants, I am, of course unable to determine with 100% accuracy the 
veracity of individual statements made to me by interviewees, however, the existence of a 
consistent conspiracy begins to stretch plausibility as the number of those speaking against it 
increases. 
 Thus it is difficult to argue that India played a sufficient role in the 2006 Jana Andolan.  
Absent popular mobilization by fiercely independent civil society leaders such as Devendra Raj 
Pandey and the CMDP it is difficult if not impossible to imagine the 2006 movement following 
the trajectory that it did.  Was Indian intervention necessary?  Here the causal question is 
somewhat more complex.  Certainly the 12-point agreement was an important moment 
enabling the movement and helping to spark mobilization, since people went onto the streets 
not just for democracy but also for peace, and the 12-point agreement made it clear that peace 
would only be achieved if the king was out of the picture.  Yet even here, India’s necessary 
position is unclear.  The agreement was signed in India, but it was preceded by various 
negotiations that were not orchestrated by India.  Thus counterfactually it is not difficult to see a 
situation in which an agreement between the parties could have been reached absent Indian 
intervention.  Thus, whether India’s involvement was necessary for the success of the 2006 
movement is also questionable.   
 So much for India’s grand role behind the 2006 movement.  What of the major political 
events in the succeeding ten years of transition?  Did India derail Nepal’s transition for its own 
nefarious intentions?   
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 Perhaps the strongest piece of evidence against a consistent Indian role here is the 
absence of a consistent story among my interviewees as to what exactly the Indian disruptive 
role was. Many if not all were clear that India’s foreign policy played a deleterious role, yet their 
view of that deleterious role varied significantly depending on their political position.  Those 
further on the left, particularly Maoists, argued that India’s interference was essentially on 
behalf of the Hindu right, to ensure that Nepal remained a Hindu state.  Those further on the 
right pointed to India’s connection with the Maoists and argued that India fundamentally sought 
to destabilize Nepal, to prevent Nepal from standing on its own two feet.   
 Consistent historical instances in which Indian interference derailed the transition 
process are also difficult to find.  My interviewees listed very few at all, and none consistently 
across different political positions. 
 The one exception to this rule was in regards to the 2015 border blockade.  With the 
exception of some Madheshi activists, all of my interviewees condemned this instance as a clear 
attack by India on the successful completion of the constitution, and prime evidence of India’s 
destabilizing hand. 
 Yet was this in fact the case?  The blockade certainly imposed heavy costs on the 
Nepalese economy, and forced Nepal’s political parties to negotiate with the Madheshis over 
the provincial boundaries.  Yet it does not appear to have had any particularly differentiating 
impact on Nepal’s transition.  Indeed, as evidenced by the 2007 Madheshi movement, it seems 
doubtful that Indian interference was even necessary for a major costly blockade to be imposed.  
Had the promulgation of the constitution gone forward absent amendment, Madheshi 
mobilization alone could very plausibly have led to similar concessions.  Furthermore, while this 
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remains a point of intense contestation, it is not a unique point in Nepalese politics.  Rather it 
follows a pattern of practice common beyond the 2015 blockade and the Madheshi issue more 
generally.  Thus, even in the most heavy-handed of India’s alleged actions during the Nepalese 
transition, it is difficult to determine a determinative Indian influence on the political trajectory. 
 To reiterate, this in no way implies that India has played no role in the transition.  The 
Indian embassy has doubtless been actively involved in Nepalese politics throughout the 
transition period, as has been the case ever since Indian independence, but the argument that 
their influence has been a determinative factor in Nepal’s current regime is doubtful. 
 I would make a similar argument about the influence of Western powers, particularly 
the United States.  That they played, or attempted to play, an influence is undeniable.  However, 
whether their influence was either necessary or sufficient to ultimately affect the outcome of 
Nepal’s transition is more doubtful.   
 The first piece of evidence on this regard was the inconsistent nature of the arguments 
for Western influence.  Some argued it was positive, supporting and encouraging democratic 
development.  Others argued that it was negative, encouraging a professionalization and 
demobilization of civil society, disconnecting politicians from their role in writing Nepal’s new 
constitution, and forcing focus away from actual indigenous needs towards the particular 
program of donors. 
 Thus, western influence certainly played a role, but the role does not seem to have been 
determinative in any meaningful fashion. 
 What about structural determinants, and the broader modernization argument?   Nepal 
is certainly poor, with a GDP per capita of only $1,684 at the time of the Jana Andolan II, only 
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rising to $2,288 by 2016.58  Some interviewees pointed to poverty as a factor shaping how the 
transition unfolded, particularly with poverty’s add-on effects on education.  However, can 
poverty really explain the outcome in Nepal?  What are the mechanisms whereby we could 
determine that outcome? 
 Lipset’s traditional analysis of the effects of modernization on democratization, the 
initial analysis that underlies most of the contemporary thinking in this regard, focused on the 
effects of wealth on the mindset of the poor and wealthy (Lipset, 1959).  In countries with high 
levels of poverty the poor would be attracted to radical anti-democratic ideologies against the 
wealthy, while the wealthy would look down on the poor with disdain and be resistant to 
extending the franchise to them.  Does this pattern characterize Nepal’s transition? 
 A first glance might indicate that it does.  After all, Nepal’s ten-year civil war was led by 
Maoist revolutionaries.  Would this not indicate that in fact the Lipset argument about poverty 
is not only applicable but in fact crucial?  Perhaps.  But a closer look even at Nepal’s Maoist 
revolution puts that into question.  In their attempt to wage a class-based Maoist struggle the 
CPN (Maoist) in fact found itself constantly thwarted, a phenomenon that forced them to 
change their rhetorical strategy from one focused on class, poverty, and inequality and instead 
focused on Nepal’s unique constellation of caste-based and ethnic-based discrimination.  
Similarly in the transition economics has played a marginal role in the rhetoric of the so-called 
progressive parties.   
 Neither have the Nepal’s economic elites used the fear of the lower classes and the fear 
of redistribution as a major argument against democratization, as argued for in more recent 
                                                          
58 PPP GDP per capita in constant 2011 international $ from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators (www.databank.worldbank.org) . 
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scholarly arguments on the role of economics in democratization (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; 
Boix, 2003).  Indeed, there is near-consensus across all of Nepal’s political parties (dominated by 
the political and economic elite) that Nepal should be run as a socialist democracy.  The picture 
of the mechanisms whereby poverty affects democratization is unclear at best.   
 What about the traditional transitologist’s picture of a democratic transition where elite 
pacts between moderates are the driving force in pushing towards democratization, and 
popular mobilization is a dangerous force that can put elite pacts into jeopardy (O'Donnell & 
Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies, 1986)?  Here too, the facts of the Nepalese transition make the traditional 
transitologist’s picture a poor fit.  First, while transitology predicts a popular upsurge by civil 
society and the masses at large to arise in response to an initial opening on the part of the 
regime, in Nepal the direction is reversed.  The peak mobilization of the Jana Andolan II in fact 
came at the most authoritarian, most repressive moment in King Gyanendra’s rule, and was in 
fact largely sparked by that.  In contrast, once the king had been removed there was a large-
scale de-mobilization of civil society, not the pent-up upsurge that O’Donnell and Schmitter 
would lead us to expect.  Instead mobilization shifted from a civil society upswell to a 
maximalized winner-take-all confrontation between the political parties. 
 And what of the beneficial character of elite pacts?  Here too the Nepalese picture gives 
us reason to be skeptical.  If there was one common theme across Nepal’s transition, it was 
continuous pact-making.  From the 12-point agreement before the king’s fall to the series of 
agreement with the Madheshis in 2007, to the agreements over the constitutional amendment 
in 2016 and 2017 Nepal’s elites have become practiced at making pacts with one another.  Yet 
the pacts, far from establishing sustainable democratic politics, instead seem to hinder that 
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process.  Pacts have enshrined the power of a small anti-democratic elite, hindered Nepal’s 
move towards an inclusive democracy.  When they have been in a progressive direction, it has 
come as a result of pressure from outside. 
 Nor is there significant evidence that pressure from “radicals” has significantly 
destabilized the transition or incentivized “hardliners” to attempt to overthrow the transition 
and return things to the status quo ante.  There is pressure to return to an authoritarian system.  
But the source of the pressure is not primarily fear of radicalism but rather disgust with the 
pattern of Nepalese politics currently evidenced by the “moderates” skilled at pact-making with 
one another!   
 Finally, what of Higley and Burton’s (2006) argument that elite unity is the key factor 
defining the success of a democratic transition?  Nepal’s transition provides powerful evidence 
for the problematic nature of any analysis that relies on the “elite” as an analytical category.   
Who exactly are Nepal’s “elite?”  And how can we know whether they are united? 
 One can easily marshal a story from Nepal’s transition of a disunited elite.  As described 
in the prior sections, the factions of Nepal’s Jana Andolan II had radically different visions of the 
future.  Under the common banner of a “New Nepal” any number of different visions flew and 
indeed continue to fly, from the Maoist vision of a one-party people’s republic to the Madheshi 
vision of federalism, to the Nepali Congress vision of a multiparty regime.  Nepal’s elites are 
disunited, therefore sustainable democracy is impossible. 
 However, one can just as easily interpret the data in the opposite direction.  Nepal 
remains dominated by a small group of primarily Brahmin and Chhetri educated leaders.  The 
same family names that have dominated Nepalese politics for decades continue to be in pride of 
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place.  They share a vision of a Nepal with limited competition between themselves, with the 
influence of other social and ethnic groups limited or non-existent, and with power centralized 
in Kathmandu. 
 Beyond this there is a third story, and one which hits the Higley and Burton argument in 
a more central place. Who are the elites to begin with? Are the elites the old Brahmin-Chhetri 
Kathmandu educated set? They certainly have the historical pedigree for it. Yet the Maoists, 
whose political role has been central to the transition, would not fit into this category. Once one 
has been a Prime Minister twice, as Prachanda has, surely one fits into the category of elite. Yet 
if one accepts Higley and Burton’s definition of the political elite: “persons who are able…to 
affect political outcomes regularly and substantially,” (Higley & Burton, 2006, p. 7) then this is 
questionable.  Have they truly been able to affect political outcomes “regularly and 
substantially?” They have had to compromise away almost all of their core principles, and, for 
the most part, failed when attempting to push political outcomes in their direction.  What really 
are their preferences to begin with? And what about the Madheshis? Are they elites? Or not? 
The very category is dubious to begin with. Furthermore, the key moments of the Nepalese 
transition are not characterized by elite initiative and mass influence wielded instrumentally.  
Rather mass action by the people drives elites into particular actions.   
 For all these reasons, traditional explanations of Nepal’s democratic transition are 
severely wanting.  How well then does the picture fit the predictions of my theory of strategic 
challenges in civil resistance transitions? While the fit is imperfect, as is to be expected 
when applying theoretical ideal types to particular empirical cases, my theoretical picture 
predicts the Nepalese transition quite closely.   
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 First, in regards to mobilization, it is undoubtedly true that mobilization of a sort 
remained high following Nepal’s democratic transition, and continued to powerfully shape the 
transition process.  The best example of this is the Madheshi movement, to whose activism the 
entire direction of the Nepalese transition, from a unitary to a federal republic, may be 
attributed. Yet a fine-grained look at the Nepalese transition reveals hundreds of causes 
mobilized for during the course of transition.  My interviewees gave frequent witness to this, 
describing the frequent instances of popular mobilization, from street demonstrations to 
general strikes, that have characterized Nepal’s transition.  Other scholars’ work confirms this 
dynamic.  For example, the UN Department of Safety and Security recorded 4,451 general 
strikes in Nepal from 2008 through 2013.  The overwhelming majority of these general strikes 
are conducted by political parties and other groups pushing particular political agendas, not 
trade unions or other traditional labor groups (Shrestha & Chaudhary, 2014).   
 Did mobilization shape outcomes?  Again, the answer is very clear.  As Aditya observes 
in the conclusion of an in-depth examination of Nepal’s political parties, the first lesson of the 
transition was that “protest and pressure work” (Aditya, 2016, p. 79).  Throughout the 
transition, when political forces hit the streets they often achieved their goals, and redirected 
the endpoints of the transition process.  This is most clearly seen in the example of the 
Madheshi mobilization, but various other mobilizations such as the Dalit movement in 2015 
were very successful in pressuring elites into concessions. 
 Was mobilization a check on democratic backsliding?  There was some indirect evidence 
of this effect among several of my interviewees.  While many expressed fear (or hope!) of a 
move towards a more authoritarian system in Nepal, all also expressed a firm belief that an 
authoritarian system was ultimately impossible in Nepal because of the activation of the 
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Nepalese people.  Elites appeared to be closely attentive to the signals emerging from the 
streets, and recalibrated their political positions on the basis of this mobilization. 
 However, there was one major factor undermining the democratizing effect of 
mobilization.  Little of it was independently connected to ordinary citizens absent political 
formations.  Political parties, or civil society groups closely linked to political parties, 
manipulated much of the mobilization for their own narrow ends.  They adopted the mantle of 
democracy in most cases to bring people to the streets, but largely used the mobilization to 
advance their own particularistic agenda. 
 The dynamics of the holdovers also largely fit the predictions of my theory, though 
Nepal falls much closer towards the co-optation side than initially predicted.  Many, perhaps 
even the majority of Nepalese political elites currently enjoying political power emerged from 
the prior regime.  Some were even major figures in the worst excesses of the monarchy.  These 
elites have clearly benefited from the new democratic regime and thus have not found it in their 
interest to attempt to derail the transition in a major way towards authoritarianism.  However, 
there have been some limited moves to remove old regime elites guilty of the worst abuses.  
This effort is ongoing – recently taking the form of impeachment proceedings against Chairman 
of the Commission for the Investigation of the Abuse of Authority Lokman Singh Karki.   
 What of the third challenge of maximalism?  The empirical dynamics are certainly there.  
Some of the most disruptive tactics of civil resistance have been used repeatedly by particular 
political factions in order to pursue a narrow political agenda.  The election results after both 
the 2008 and 2013 constituent assembly elections were contested as unfair at the time, and 
remain perceived as unfair by those on various sides of the Nepalese political spectrum.   
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The rhetoric used by the various political factions to describe one another is maximalist.  
This is particularly the case across a developing master cleavage in Nepal’s politics, with the 
“traditional” or “conservative” parties of the Nepali Congress and the UML on one side and the 
CPN (Maoist Center) and Madheshi parties on the other side.   
These maximalist mobilizations have played key roles in preventing Nepal’s constituent 
assemblies from writing constitutions.  Had it not been for the intervention of the 2015 
earthquake, it seems quite likely that even the 2015 constitution would not have been passed.  
Even today, several Madheshi respondents described the constitution as inherently racist.  
Meanwhile, Congress and UML respondents often described the Maoists, despite their move 
into the mainstream of politics, as fundamentally seeking to destroy Nepal’s democratic political 
system, and the Madheshis as a force for the dissolution of the country. 
Thus the position of maximalism in derailing democratic progress is fairly self-evident in 
the Nepalese case.  The important question then is whether this pattern represents a 
meaningful example of political agency.  Is it meaningful to discuss maximalism as a factor 
affecting democratization in its own right or is maximalism in the Nepalese case reducible to the 
deterministic workings of the underlying structure of Nepalese politics? 
The question is of course difficult to suss out empirically, for many of the reasons 
eloquently described in many of the discussions of structure and agency in seminal works of 
political science.  Theda Skocpol’s discussion of agency during times of revolution is particularly 
apropos (Skocpol, 1979, p. 18).  Structure certainly plays an important role.  It is difficult to 
imagine, for example, that the maximalism over ethnic federalism would have taken place 
without the long-standing ethnic division between madheshi and pahadi, or the history of 
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exclusion of madheshis by the pahadi class.   The presence of two powerful neighbors, one of 
whom is seen as particularly manipulative of Nepalese politics, is another crucial structural 
factor that shaped these political dynamics.  The distinction between rastrabadh and 
lampasarbadh is an easy frame to draw on to delegitimize one’s opponents, pointing to them as 
a threat to Nepal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.  Without a history of domination by a 
powerful neighbor, this frame would be unavailable to Nepal’s political elites. 
Social and political structure is undoubtedly the raw material of radicalized political 
contention.  Yet, as discussed in Chapter 1, it is constituted and regenerated through practice, 
and this practice is never fully determined by prior conditions.  The practices of Nepalese politics 
in the transition to democracy were not predetermined, and at several critical juncture points 
could have shifted in alternate directions. 
This is perhaps best illustrated through the many invocations of “blunders” by my 
interviewees.  Time and again interviewees pointed to particular political choices that hung in 
the balance only to be resolved at a sub-optimal level for all concerned. Political elites 
miscalculated the dynamics of a particular situation and made a strong play for narrow political 
power. Ordinary people rewarded or punished elites for particular actions in ways that 
retrospectively do not flow from the prior conditions.  While their actions make up a single 
story, they do not flow in deterministic fashion from that story. 
Perhaps the most damaging consequence of Nepal’s maximalized politics is how it has 
undermined faith in the functioning of democracy.  Early in the transition, support for 
democratic principles was extremely high across almost all segments of Nepalese society . 
However, as radicalized politics first prevented the formulation of a constitution, and later 
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undermined effective government development and service delivery, faith in democracy has 
declined. 
This decline in faith in democracy is not limited to the poorly educated or informed.  
Several of my interviewees, from the highest elite levels of Nepalese society, expressed 
nostalgia for an authoritarian past in which a single leader could do away with the disturbances 
entailed by maximalized politics.  Some argued that the only way to fix the current dynamics of 
Nepalese politics would be to do away with democracy and impose order through a period of 
military rule or a return to the monarchy. 
Such an occurrence was almost universally depicted by my interviewees as extremely 
unlikely.  They argued that the freedom of expression and association brought about by the 
1990 and 2006 movements had moved Nepalese society too far towards democracy for 
significant backsliding, and that any serious move to reverse the last two decades of democratic 
progress would spark significant public backlash.  However, if Nepal’s political class continues to 
fail to institutionalize democratic politics, and service delivery remains extremely poor, then the 
likelihood of major democratic backsliding seems at the very least plausible. 
Nepal’s politics, for instance, currently resemble the situation in Thailand from the mid-
2000s until the 2014 military coup.  Constant back and forth struggle by diametrically opposed 
political factions in that case eventually led to the end of Thailand’s most recent democratic 
experiment. Interviewees connected with the Nepalese military discounted the possibility of a 
military takeover, emphasizing the professionalization of the NA’s officer corps.  However, 
similar dynamics in Bangladesh, a country whose military is similar to Nepal’s in many respects, 
puts this in question. 
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In conclusion, Nepal’s transition has proven problematic for many of the reasons 
predicted by my theory.  The causal mechanisms I argue for in Chapter 1 provide closer 
explanation for the Nepali transition than prominent explanations specific to the Nepal case (the 
pernicious influence of India) as well as major scholarly explanations such as modernization 
theory, transitology, and the elite theory. 
The case does, however, indicate room for expansion and growth in future theory-
building when it comes to transitional patterns of behavior. In particular, the evidence from 
Nepal problematizes the concept of mobilization. Mobilization may be high in a particular case, 
but if it is easily captured by maximalized political groups, then its democratizing influence may 
be attenuated. Even partisan mobilization may have a good long-term effect, as it diffuses 
political skills across the population, but in the short term its effect is likely to be negative. 
Having traced the path of a transition to “fractious semi-democracy” I now turn my 
attention to a potential case of “elite semi-democracy,” the 1991 political transition in Zambia. 
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Chapter 4: “Power is Sweet” Elite Semi-Democracy in Zambia 
 
 My second case comes from Southern Africa, and moves back in time from the 2000s to 
the 1990s.  
 Zambia has an important place in civil resistance struggles.  Like Nepal it has 
experienced multiple transitions following primarily nonviolent resistance movements.  In the 
1960s an anti-colonial movement, first under Mbikusita Lewanika and later under Kenneth 
Kaunda peacefully fought first to expel the British and then against an effort to make Zambia a 
part of a Federated Rhodesian state dominated by white settlers.  Kaunda, the leader of the 
movement, was explicit in his commitment to nonviolence, and this commitment deeply shaped 
both the resistance and the shape of the future state.  In the 1970s, Kaunda and his United 
National Independence Party (UNIP) ended Zambia’s democracy on the grounds that the 
existence of multiple political parties was fostering tribalism.  In 1990 and 1991 a new 
nonviolent movement, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), successfully overthrew 
Kaunda’s one-party state and re-established democracy.  Finally, in 2001, a third major 
nonviolent movement successfully resisted attempts by MMD leader Frederick Chiluba to 
extend his presidency into a third term. 
 In this chapter I focus on the second of these three major nonviolent movements in 
Zambia’s history: the 1990-1991 Movement for Multi-Party democracy and the transitional 
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period that followed its electoral victory over President Kaunda and UNIP in the 1991 Zambian 
elections.  I argue that Zambia follows the path of an “elite semi-democracy.”  Following a large 
civil resistance campaign that comes together to oust an old regime, leaders are unable to 
maintain mobilization during the transitional period.  This, tied with a lack of robust measures of 
holding holdovers accountable, led to a semi-democratic regime dominated by a small group of 
elites that manipulate the levers of government for their own advantage. 
 In the Zambian case, the causes for this particular pattern of demobilization are 
manifold.  Many Zambian interviewees pointed to a culture of faith in the “big man,” a pattern 
they argued is common across many African countries.  Others pointed to the severe economic 
crisis that faced Zambia in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 election.  As the MMD moved 
away from the quasi-socialist policies of their predecessor and embraced a harsh structural 
adjustment program with terms dictated by the International Monetary Fund, the attendant 
economic dislocation led ordinary Zambians away from political mobilization and forced them to 
focus on the increasingly difficult task of simply providing for themselves and their families.  
Others were deeply critical of the person of President Frederick Chiluba himself, arguing that 
from the beginning the goal of Chiluba and many in his central circle had not been greater 
democracy but rather simply occupying the seat of power.  Still others made an institutional 
argument, pointing to the extremely high level of power granted to the president by the 
Zambian constitution, and pointing to the ways in which Zambian political institutions give the 
President high levels of capacity to both repress and co-opt potential opponents. 
 I do not attempt to distinguish between these arguments.  As I argue in the first chapter, 
patterns of transitional behavior can be reached through many different potential causal 
pathways.  Any number of different historical, cultural, and institutional factors may have 
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affected the outcomes of these strategic challenges.  My key argument is that once one arrives 
at this pattern of behavior the behavior itself has a long-term impact, regardless of the specific 
path that may have led to it.  In this case, I focus on how a lack of mobilization and a holdovers 
policy that led to domination of the new government by members of the old regime – due to 
any number of potential causes – gave space for a decline in democratic quality that prevented 
the MMD from fully realizing the dream of democracy that inspired its first leaders. 
 First, a few matters of clarification.  Is Zambia an elite semi-democracy, as I have 
described it?  Most interviewees I spoke to argued that Zambia, similar to Nepal, is somewhat 
democratic but not fully democratic and has been so to some degree since the beginning of the 
1991 transition.  Elections are held, and are meaningfully contested, but are often subject to 
severe suspicion of manipulation.  Almost all interviewees universally spoke of the 
pervasiveness of corruption and patterns of patronage in Zambian politics.  The Zambian 
constitution, while in general laying out democratic institutions, is also almost unchanged from 
Zambia’s days as a one-party socialist state dominated by a single powerful president.  Only 
article four of the Zambian constitution, which specifically forbade the existence of more than a 
single party, was changed as a result of the activism of the original Movement for Multi-party 
Democracy.  Authoritarian legacies live on in restrictions on freedom of speech, freedom of the 
press, and perhaps most prominently on freedom of assembly.  The Public Order Act, a colonial 
legacy, continues to be in operation, and requires any group desiring to hold a public meeting to 
get approval from the local police up to two weeks in advance.  This permission is frequently 
denied on explicitly partisan grounds, with opposition parties and civil society groups denied 
permission to meet while the ruling party is never refused permission to meet. 
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 International scholars of democracy largely agree with this analysis.  The figure below 
shows Zambia’s score on three prominent democracy indices in the decade before and after the 
1991 political transition.  For all three indices, the success of the MMD prompted a jump in the 
level of democracy, but the jump falls short of democratic thresholds.  The V-Dem polyarchy 
score remains roughly around 0.5, with similar rankings from the Polity dataset (Marshall, Gurr, 
& Jaggers, 2016) and Unified Democracy Scores (Pemstein, Meserve, & Melton, 2010). 
Figure 4.1: Zambia’s Democracy Index Scores 
 
 Scholars of Zambian history and politics generally concur.  Miles Larmer refers to 
Zambia’s political system as a “largely choiceless or disciplined democracy” (Larmer, 2011, p. 
264), and Lise Rakner, writing about the ten years of the Chiluba presidency (1991-2001) 
concludes that: “democratic governance in Zambia in the 1990s has remained in a ‘grey zone,’ a 
situation of partial reform” (Rakner, 2003, p. 174).  Bauer and Taylor go much further, describing 
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the ten years of the Chiluba regime as a “descent into an anti-democratic kleptocracy” (Bauer & 
Taylor, 2011, p. 53).  Similar analyses can be found in the work of any number of scholars 
(Ihonvbere, 1995; Erdmann & Simuntanyi, 2003; van Donge, 1995; Mbikusita-Lewanika, 2003; 
Cheeseman & Larmer, 2015). 
 Zambia’s political system at the end of its most recent transition also fits the “elite” 
variety of semi-democracy that I have described previously quite closely.  Politics is dominated 
by a small group of political and economic elites, and is largely focused on the personal 
enrichment of that elite class.  Competition does not revolve around ideological lines but is 
instead primarily focused on gaining control of access to state resources.  The same group of 
political leaders that have dominated politics since the 1990s remains central to Zambian 
politics.  Party allegiances are fluid, with major political figures shifting their party identification 
frequently in order to maintain access to the central levers of power.  
 In the remainder of the chapter I first provide a brief history of Zambia’s political 
environment since independence, then a narrative of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
and the subsequent political transition.  I focus on the challenges of mobilization and holdovers, 
arguing that a lack of continued mobilization and the incorporation of anti-democratic elites 
(and the attendant sidelining of more democratic MMD leaders) are key in explaining the 
outcome of the Zambian transition.  I spend less time on the problem of maximalism, since I 
expect lower levels of mobilization to make maximalism less relevant.  However, I do discuss this 
challenge in relation to the competition between the MMD and rump-UNIP.  
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Background 
 Zambia achieved its independence in 1964 after a long, largely nonviolent struggle.  By 
the time of independence the undisputed leader of the independence struggle was Dr. Kenneth 
Kaunda.  Kaunda had begun as an activist in the Zambian branch of the African National 
Congress but left the ANC to form his own organization – originally called the Zambian National 
Congress and later the United National Independence Party, or UNIP – after believing that the 
ANC was not radical enough in its pursuit of independence.  At independence UNIP was the 
dominant political force in the country, but the ANC remained a potent political force. 
 As with most African states, Zambia is a country of a variety of ethnic and linguistic 
groups, with roughly 70 different ethnic groups according to government statistics.  Five groups: 
the Bemba, Tonga, Chewa, Lozi, and Nsenga make up roughly 60% of the population, with other 
groups accounting for much smaller percentages.  While interviewees were quick to argue that 
tribalism has played little role in Zambian politics for much of its history, in the first years after 
independence there were some moves towards partisan division on tribal lines.59   
 These tribalist divisions provided the primary justification for the move in 1973 from 
multi-party competition to formalizing UNIP’s domination of Zambian politics and making all 
other political parties illegal.  Kaunda and UNIP argued that this decision did not fundamentally 
undermine Zambia’s democracy but instead simply re-shaped it, allowing a means for 
“participation” but without partisanship that would be damaging to national unity. 
 Kaunda’s UNIP government followed the model of many other contemporary African 
nations, perhaps most prominently Julius Nyerere’s Tanzania, in pursuing collectivization and a 
                                                          
59 See Wina 1985 for an examination of these dynamics at this point in Zambian history. 
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large expansion of the welfare state in tandem with the domination of the state by a single 
political force.  In Zambia’s case, this massive expansion of the state was facilitated by the large-
scale export of Zambia’s most precious and abundant primary commodity: copper.   
 The one-party state faced major challenges almost immediately as the 1973 oil crisis led 
to a sharp increase in the price of exports and the price of copper subsequently declined.  As 
copper revenues decreased throughout the 80s the government became increasingly incapable 
of supporting its extensive welfare state, while the parastatal businesses that dominated the 
economy were increasingly inefficient and ineffective.   
 Zambian political figures I interviewed pointed primarily to these economic challenges 
as a central factor in sparking the eventual movement that would overthrow the Kaunda regime.  
In addition, President Kaunda’s increasing personalization of power alienated many of the UNIP 
elites who had been involved in the struggle for independence and then subsequently become 
long-time supporters of his government.  The sources of this alienation were areas of significant 
contention between my interviewees.  Many argued that the majority of those dismissed by the 
Kaunda government were dismissed for good, justifiable reasons.  Others, however, argued that 
their moves away from the Kaunda government was motivated by conscience – anger at the 
increasing personalization of power under Kaunda and a desire for meaningful political and 
economy reforms. 
 While Zambia’s regime at this time was technically dominated by the political party, 
along the lines of the one-party regimes of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries, in fact 
power was more and more concentrated in the person of President Kaunda.  This concentration 
was perhaps best captured by the growing cult of personality surrounding Kaunda.  A popular 
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slogan often repeated by interviewees was: “In heaven, there is God, on earth there is Kaunda.”  
Kaunda was the undisputed leader of UNIP, and the one topic in which no political dissent or 
anti-government expression was tolerated. 
 Elections, even for the presidency, continued to take place at regular five year intervals 
during the period of one-party rule.  At the local and parliamentary levels these elections even 
involved some degree of competition, as various UNIP functionaries competed for the party’s 
nomination.  At the level of the presidency, however, there was no political competition.  While 
Kaunda ran for re-election, he always ran unopposed.  Many interviewees recalled particular 
presidential elections in which Kaunda would run against a picture of a frog or rabbit to 
symbolize the degree to which Kaunda controlled Zambian politics. 
 However, while UNIP firmly controlled Zambian politics during this period, opposition 
was by no means absent.  In the absence of formal opposition parties or civil society 
organizations beyond those focused on service delivery, sources of opposition common to most 
stories of resistance to authoritarian rule played a significant role in opposing the Kaunda 
regime.  Student criticism of the government, primarily at the country’s flagship institution, the 
University of Zambia, was frequent and vocal.  Many of my interviewees cut their political teeth 
as student activists marching in protest and organizing student groups against the one party 
state. 
The Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), originally formed as a UNIP organ to co-
opt labor activism into the party structure, emerged as early as the late 1970s as an important 
counterweight to UNIP influence.  ZCTU president Frederick Chiluba organized the union’s 
cadres to oppose the 1980 Local Government Act, a legislative act that would have eliminated 
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the universal franchise for electing local officials and limited voting for local councils to UNIP 
members.  The resistance was intense – between 1981 and 1983 the ZCTU and the 
Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia (MUZ) organized over 200 illegal strikes in opposition to the act 
(Chiluba, 1994, p. 73).  Chiluba himself was briefly sent to prison for his role in organizing this 
opposition.  Chiluba also refused the place on the UNIP central committee traditionally reserved 
for the secretary-general of the ZCTU, an act that many of my interviewees reported gave him a 
great deal of credibility as an opposition leader. 
 Zambian churches also emerged as an important locus of resistance to the excesses of 
one-party rule, with church leaders using their significant moral authority to demand greater 
protection for human rights.  The National Mirror newspaper, jointly published by Zambia’s 
three largest church bodies: the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ), Christian Council of 
Zambia, and the Zambian Episcopal Conference (ZEC), was one of the few, if not the only major 
independent media voices by the end of the period of one-party rule.  While President Kaunda 
made many efforts to integrate church leaders into his regime several issues, particularly UNIP’s 
embrace of a more open policy towards abortion and attempts to implement “scientific 
socialism” alienated church leaders and led to increasing levels of confrontation (Hinfelaar, 
2008). 
 Many in Zambia’s growing intellectual community also criticized the one-party state, 
with the Economics Association of Zambia (EAZ), led by Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika and 
Derrick Chitala becoming one early center of critique.  The EAZ hosted monthly discussions on 
economic and political topics which frequently involved criticism of the one party state and 
became an important convening forum in which those discontented with the one party state 
could meet and share ideas. 
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Struggling Against the One-Party State 
 These disparate centers of opposition to the one-party state: disenfranchised former 
UNIP elites, trade unions, churches, and intellectuals, came together in 1990 under the banner 
of a movement that would later become Zambia’s new ruling party: The Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy, (MMD).   
In the late 1980s the Kaunda government had begun to roll back some of its prior 
extensive government consumption supports, particularly price supports for the staple foods of 
mealie meal (corn meal) and cooking oil.  The economic downturn sparked by declining copper 
prices was the underlying factor behind these rollbacks.  Declining amounts of foreign exchange 
forced the Kaunda government to seek a bailout from the IMF, which demanded significant 
reductions in government expenditure in return.   
Even before the subsidies were removed, discontent with President Kaunda’s handling 
of the Zambian economy had been growing.  Many of my interviewees related stories about the 
difficulties in actually getting access to government price-supported goods at this time.  Long 
lines were the norm to obtain even the most basic staples.  When the government raised prices, 
this simmering discontent boiled over into direct disruption and defiance.  Food riots broke out 
across many of the country’s major urban centers, first in the major cities of the Copper Belt and 
later in Lusaka.   
In response to these riots, a small group of Zambian army officers led by Lieutenant 
Mwamba Luchembe attempted to overthrow the Kaunda government on July 1, 1990.  While 
the coup failed, it was greeted with a great deal of enthusiasm on the streets, providing a 
powerful signal that the people were no longer supporting the Kaunda government.   
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In this context, a group of intellectuals who had been involved in discussions in the 
Economics Association of Zambia about reforming Zambia’s political system began talking about 
bringing together the various strands of potential opposition to the one-party state under a 
single umbrella.  Mr. Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, a member of the Barotse royal family 
and former president of the EAZ, was the driving force behind organizing a meeting in which a 
formal discussion of this opposition could take place.   
The meeting took place on July 20th and 21st, 1990, in the Garden House Hotel in Lusaka.  
Chaired by freedom fighter and long-time major political player Arthur Wina, the two-day 
conference featured many of the figures who would later become central in Zambian politics.  
By the end of the two-day conference, the attendees had decided to form an organization, the 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, whose task would be to advocate for a return to 
multiparty politics in Zambia.  The organization was explicitly not organized as a political party, 
in order to steer clear of violating Zambia’s prohibition of multiparty politics.  This care went as 
far as the name of the organization itself.  Several of my interviewees who attended the Garden 
House meeting vividly recalled the debate over this issues.  The original name for the 
organization had been the “Alliance for Democracy and Development.”  Fear that this name 
made the organization sound too much like a political party prompted the organizers to change 
the name to the “Movement for Multi-Party Democracy.” 
The various strands of anti-government activism came together in MMD’s early leaders.  
The founding executive committee included alienated elites from the old regime such as Arthur 
Wina, Vernon Mwaanga, and Keli Walubita as well as ZCTU chairman Frederick Chiluba.  
Akashambata Mbikusita-Lewanika and many of the so-called “intellectual” wing of the 
opposition dominated the MMD secretariat. 
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MMD was able to rapidly organize opposition to the one-party state.  In large part they 
drew on the pre-existing national structures of the ZCTU, a fact that gave ZCTU chairman 
Chiluba outsized influence in the organization.  In addition to ZCTU, though, a number of other 
semi-autonomous opposition groups had arisen in the previous years.  One interviewee 
reported how he joined a small cell in Ndola planning resistance to the one-party state after an 
informal conversation on a minibus.  Their cell met weekly: “only a hundred meters from the 
police station!” Once the national-level structure of the MMD had been formed, these groups 
quickly integrated into this structure as well.   
MMD’s initial goal was to get President Kaunda to allow a return to multiparty politics 
through a national referendum.  However, in late 1990 President Kaunda, instead of following 
his initial plan for a referendum, instead called on the UNIP national assembly to change Article 
four of the Zambian constitution (the Article banning parties outside of UNIP), and announced 
that he would cut short his term to allow for a presidential election in 1991.  In general, my 
interviewees agreed that this was a strategic move on Kaunda’s part (though ultimately it ended 
up being a strategic blunder).  Kaunda was not confident that he would succeed in a 
referendum, and if the referendum passed, waiting until the next scheduled presidential 
election in 1993 would give the nascent opposition forces too much time to mobilize around a 
single presidential candidate. 
With this change in political environment, MMD was faced with the question of how to 
continue to pursue its goals.  The organization’s leadership decided to repurpose themselves as 
a political party competing with UNIP in the 1991 elections.  Some competition among the 
various leaders of the party eventually resulted in Frederick Chiluba becoming the party’s 
candidate for President.   
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On no subject were interviewees so divided as the character and personality of 
Frederick Chiluba.  Some described him as a strong, principled leader whose strength of 
character and commitment to democratic principle were crucial in moving Zambia to a 
democratic system.  Such is certainly the picture that emerges in Chiluba’s own writing on his 
involvement in the struggle for multi-party democracy, first in the ZCTU and later in the MMD.  
The greatest example of this is Chiluba’s 1994 master’s thesis, written during his first term as 
President of Zambia.  The thesis is a powerful critique of the one-party state, arguing that the 
system set up by Kaunda was fundamentally untenable from the beginning, and offers many 
strong arguments both for the superiority of a fully democratic system and the necessary steps 
for moving Zambia towards a greater and more sustainable democracy.  In particular, Chiluba 
argues for the need for a greater democratic culture among elites, more systematic means of 
political engagement for ordinary citizens, and the reform of many of Zambia’s formal political 
institutions. 
However, many interviewees painted a much darker picture of Zambia’s second 
president.  Most common was the picture of a political opportunist.  In the words of one 
interviewee: “Chiluba’s goal was always the president’s seat.  Beyond that he didn’t care” 
According to these interviewees Chiluba was fundamentally ambiguous when it came to actual 
democratic institutions.  He had no particularly pro or anti-democratic preferences from the 
beginning.  Instead, he was solely interested in his own personal wealth and prestige.  The 
limited space for personal advancement afforded by the one-party state pushed Chiluba first 
into the trade unions and then into the opposition.  Once he became president, he then used 
the office for personal enrichment but beyond this level of corruption was a fairly benign and 
even positive influence. 
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The third picture of Chiluba is much darker, that of a ruthless narcissist with dictatorial 
tendencies and deep insecurities that drove him to unrelentingly attack all those who 
threatened his position.  Not pro-democratic, or even neutral towards democracy, but rabidly 
anti-democratic throughout his entire career.  Some interviewees pointed as far back as 
Chiluba’s rise to leadership of the ZCTU, and the often brutal methods by which he put down 
potential competitors to that position.  Chiluba had been leader of ZCTU for seventeen years 
before he became MMD’s presidential candidate and then president of Zambia in 1991.  Once in 
power, these interviewees argued, the tools at Chiluba’s disposal to enhance his own power and 
put down his rivals were radically expanded, and he used them to devastating effect. 
There were other more shadowy accusations against Chiluba as well.  Several 
interviewees reported a pattern of mysterious killings of prominent MMD figures or former 
MMD figures such as Emmanuel Kasonde or Ronald Penza. Deaths or unexpected suicides 
seemed to track many of those who had some kind of presidential aspiration during the Chiluba 
presidency.   
Which of these pictures of President Chiluba is the true one?  Answering that question 
goes well beyond the scope of this research. Yet, in a sense, this psychological question is 
ultimately irrelevant to my larger argument. Regardless of the actual psychological motivations 
of President Chiluba, what all interviewees shared was a strong emphasis on Chiluba’s agency. 
As an individual, Chiluba made key decisions that shifted the Zambian transition in important 
ways. The structural story was certainly important. Many interviewees discussed the 
constraining effects of poverty, an international system dominated by donor states more 
interested in dictating from above rather than allowing autonomy to develop from below, and 
other factors beyond the control of Chiluba and the new MMD government.  However, these 
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factors acted as shoves, not puppet strings. Chiluba and the major figures of the MMD 
government, as well as Zambian civil society and the population as a whole, made choices that 
pushed the transition. I now turn to a discussion of these larger set of social decisions. 
With Chiluba as its presidential candidate, the MMD was fully repurposed as a political 
party.  They developed an extensive nationwide infrastructure, and fielded candidates for 
parliamentary seats across the country. The MMD leaders traveled extensively, holding rallies in 
urban and rural areas in every province in Zambia. Interviewees reported an electric 
atmosphere, an almost boundless feeling of optimism over the possibility for change and the 
country’s potential if new leadership could be brought into power. 
While there were some scattered incidents of violence against the MMD, on the whole 
government repression was fairly minimal. President Kaunda attempted to use the machinery 
and resources of the state to support his own campaign, and the Public Order Act was deployed 
from time to time to suppress MMD public gatherings, but for the most part political elites and 
ordinary Zambians felt the winds of change, saw the intense popularity of MMD, and rather 
than resist attempted to work out accommodations with this new political force.  In the lead-up 
to the 1991 election defections from UNIP to MMD were rapid and widespread. One of the most 
high-profile of these was future President of Zambia Michael Sata, a UNIP MP and long-time 
political fixer who brought a significant political machinery along with him. 
The MMD in Power 
 The MMD domination of the 1991 election was staggering. Out of 150 seats in the 
Zambian national assembly, MMD candidates won 125. This was despite the fact that during the 
election President Kaunda and the UNIP leadership continued to use the state resources at their 
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disposal to improve their electoral prospects. The vote totals for MMD candidates in many 
constituencies went over 90%. In the presidential contest, Chiluba won the presidency with 76% 
of the vote. The Zambian electorate had sent an overwhelmingly powerful message demanding 
change and endorsing the MMD. 
 Thus, while MMD of course campaigned as the champions of multi-party democracy, 
they effectively entered power almost as a new single party regime, to the extent that some 
observers described the 1991 election as nothing more than a move from a “de jure to de facto 
one party state” (Chikulo, 1993, p. 99).  Their domination in the national assembly and the 
presidency gave them almost unlimited power both to reshape the ranks of government and to 
change laws and even the Zambian constitution.  To be effective, any resistance would have to 
come from within the ranks of the MMD or from forces outside of politics. 
 Resistance within MMD began to develop around a year after the 1991 election when a 
small number of prominent MMD figures, including the convener of the Garden House meeting 
Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, resigned from their positions in the Chiluba government 
over accusations of corruption.  Aka, Baldwin Nkumbula, and others who resigned moved to 
form an opposition party: the National Party.  The pattern was repeated several times 
throughout the Chiluba presidency, including perhaps most prominently in 1996-97, when Vice 
President Levy Mwanawasa resigned over accusations of corruption.60 
 Yet, despite this fragmentation of the MMD, no serious political opposition emerged 
from these defections.  All of the parties that emerged from the MMD defectors remained 
                                                          
60 This incident is discussed in-depth in Malupenga 2009. 
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extremely small, with little or no ability to directly influence policy and few card-carrying 
members.  In the 1996 election, MMD in fact expanded its majority from 125 to 131 seats. 
 The MMD’s dominance in the 1996 election was enhanced because the one opposition 
force not emerging from its ranks: the rump UNIP, chose to boycott the election following the 
changes to the Zambian constitution that barred former President Kaunda, UNIP’s leader, from 
running for the presidency.   
The interaction between the MMD and UNIP during this period provide interesting 
insights into the maximalism challenge, which proved to be relevant even in an environment of 
fairly low mobilization.  After a brief retirement, Kaunda returned as leader of UNIP and began 
strenuously pushing against the MMD government, rapidly advocating for civil disobedience and 
even describing the MMD government as a government that: “should be fought in the same way 
UNIP fought the colonial government” (Ihonvbere, 1995, p. 95).  In 1993 several UNIP leaders, 
including Kaunda’s son Wezi Kaunda, developed a plan to carry out this fight, the so-called “Zero 
Option” plan, that planned to overthrow the government prior to the 1996 elections through a 
combination of fostering divisions within MMD and orchestrating a nationwide campaign of 
strikes and demonstrations.  The plan also called for more sinister attempts to disrupt MMD rule 
through, for instance, paying unemployed young men to initiate a wave of thefts and other 
petty crimes in major town centers in order to create a feeling of chaos and insecurity around 
the country (Ihonvbere, 1995, p. 99)  This plan was never implemented, but badly shook the 
MMD government and led to the arrests of a number of 26 UNIP leaders, and a brief declaration 
of a state of emergency. 
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Following the disruption of the “Zero Option” plan, Kaunda shifted tactics and began 
making moves to run against President Chiluba in the 1996 presidential election.  President 
Chiluba threw the whole mechanism of the Zambian state against him.  The Public Order Act, a 
holdover from colonial days used throughout Zambian history to suppress political opposition, 
was employed extensively against UNIP rallies.  Kaunda was arrested, and even physically 
attacked during his political activities.  And finally, in early 1996 President Chiluba orchestrated 
an amendment to the Zambian constitution that barred from the presidency all people lacking 
two parents born in Zambia, anyone who had previously served two presidential terms, and 
traditional chiefs.  The only potential contender for the presidency at that time to whom the 
first two stipulations would apply was President Kaunda, while the third stipulation eliminated 
the UNIP deputy leader Chief Inyambo Yeta.61 
   Thus formal political opposition was largely ineffective in providing a check on the MMD 
once in power.  What of informal political forces from civil society? 
 The return of multi-party democracy doubtlessly expanded the space for civil society to 
function, something attested to by many different interviewees involved in civil society during 
this period.  The sheer number of civil society groups expanded significantly, and they put 
pressure on the MMD government on a number of different front.  The Zambian women’s 
movement, for instance, which had played a prominent role in the movement against the one-
party state, engaged in a great deal of advocacy on a number of issues.  A growing free press, 
perhaps best embodied in the Post newspaper, also engaged in significant criticism of the 
government. 
                                                          
61 In an ironic twist, though, it is possible that the constitutional provision would have actually disqualified 
Chiluba himself, as Zambian media revealed significant evidence that Chiluba’s parents originally came 
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Reynolds, 1999, p. 154). 
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 However, these efforts to hold the MMD government accountable were significantly 
hampered by a lack of grassroots public support.  Elite civil society groups were largely reliant on 
foreign sources of funding and support, and had relatively limited levels of success in mobilizing 
ordinary Zambians to engage in serious political activism. 
 This declining mobilization and level of political engagement is evidenced by the fact 
that political participation actually declined from its levels in the one-party state after the 
transition to multiparty politic. Elections under the one-party state had participation levels 
estimated at about 39% of the eligible electorate. In the 1996 election this dropped to around 
30% (Erdmann & Simuntanyi, 2003, p. 29). The numbers are even more striking in the elections 
that took place between these two presidential elections. In local elections in 1992 only 14% of 
registered voters took part, while parliamentary by-elections between 1991 and 1994 averaged 
turnout of only 21% of registered voters (Bratton, 1999, p. 555). 
 The decline in formal methods of political participation was matched by a precipitous 
decline in informal or non-institutional methods of political participation.  While the labor 
movement did engage in a series of strikes in protest against the MMD’s moves to privatize 
state resources and shrink the size of the state (Ihonvbere, 1995, p. 16), Zambians as a whole 
largely eschewed any kind of mass political participation.62  A comprehensive political 
participation survey in 1996 found that only 6 percent of Zambians had participated in even a 
single political demonstration, march, or rally in the five years between the 1991 election and 
1996 election (Bratton, Alderfer, & Simutanyi, 1997, p. 7). 
                                                          
62 An important point here is that, while the trade union movement played an important role in the 
organization of the MMD, trade union participation in Zambia is actually quite low.  In a 1993 survey only 
2% of respondents reported membership in any kind of trade union (Bratton, 1999, p. 560). 
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 In this mobilizational vacuum, the MMD government steadily moved away from the 
principles on which the movement had been founded.  Perhaps the most visible of these moves 
away was in the area of corruption.  While the extent of corruption is difficult to measure, and 
interviewees disagreed significantly on its pervasiveness in the Chiluba administration, that 
President Chiluba presided over a significant increase in corruption from the Kaunda years is 
undeniable.   
 Second, MMD showed itself increasingly intolerant of the political opposition.  The 
attacks on Kaunda and UNIP mentioned above were the most prominent but by no means the 
only example of this.  The 1996 election was a significant step down in democratic quality from 
the 1991 election in which the MMD had first come to power.  In the lead-up to the election the 
government launched a voter registration effort contracted out to the Israeli company NIKUV 
that systematically excluded rural voters and was rife with irregularities (Reynolds, 1999, p. 
155).  The MMD also freely manipulated media coverage in its favor, and liberally used the 
stipulations of the Public Order Act to prevent its political rivals from holding public meetings.  
This manipulation of the political playing field led almost all international and domestic 
observers of the election to conclude that the election had been far from “free and fair” 
(National Democratic Institute, 1997)  
 Third, MMD failed to deliver on its promise of fundamentally re-shaping the Zambian 
political system.  While in opposition to the one-party state, the MMD had promised that, once 
in power, they would rewrite the Zambian constitution to encourage greater democracy, 
particularly by ending the public order act and curtailing the power of the president in 
appointing government officials.  A constitutional review did take place beginning in 1993 under 
the mantle of the Manakatwe Commission.  However, the government ignored almost all of the 
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commission’s recommendations and the only changes were those previously mentioned which 
targeted former president Kaunda. 
 Fourth, MMD followed the practice of UNIP in highly politicizing not just the top officials 
in the government but the government as a whole, using government resources and jobs in the 
civil service as political patronage. 
 Why did the MMD follow these trends?  I argue that low mobilization, as well as high 
integration (or co-optation) by former leaders in the one-party state were key factors.  One 
interviewee laughed when asked about the challenges of democratization: “these guys were all 
UNIP.  What did you expect they would do?”  While many of the early leaders of the MMD had 
emerged from civil society groups, by the time MMD had been in power for a few years it was 
fully dominated by elites from the old UNIP government, whose experience in administration 
and professional norms were overwhelmingly those of a non-democratic regime.   
 These norms and preferences might have been shaped to a greater degree by popular 
pressure to do so.  After all, many of these leaders had defected from the one-party government 
while the outcome of the struggle for multi-party democracy was by no means fully decided.  
They had strongly espoused democratic principles when the Zambian people were out en masse 
to push for them.  But in the politically demobilized moment of the first few years of the Chiluba 
administration, old regime elites found themselves with a relatively free hand to operate as they 
pleased. 
 Why did these patterns occur?   Interviewees offered various reasons.  Most argued that 
cultural values related to “patience” were important factors. “Zambians are a very patient 
people…” one interviewee related. “We won’t do anything until we are really pushed.” There 
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were certainly also active efforts on the part of the government to demobilize potential 
opposition outside of the MMD, through the liberal use of the public order act and the strategic 
deployment of political patronage.  One interviewee involved in opposition politics during the 
1990s related an incident in which he was called into President Chiluba’s office in the lead-up to 
the 1996 election.  President Chiluba told him that his activism was disruptive, and offered to 
give him and his party a specific number of seats in parliament in the upcoming election if they 
would agree to stop mobilizing against him.  After this opposition figure refused he was later 
attacked by MMD supporters at a rally, leading to significant injuries.   
 The power of popular mobilization to shape elite preferences is shown in another 
episode of major civil resistance that occurred at the end of President Chiluba’s second term in 
2001.  In the last few years of Chiluba’s second term many interviewees both from politics and 
civil society reported concern that no steps were being taken to prepare a successor for the 
presidency.  As 2001 grew closer, President Chiluba began explicitly making moves towards 
changing the constitution to allow him to run for a third term.   
 These moves sparked an immediate reaction within civil society.  Organizations from the 
NGOCC in the women’s movement to the Law Association of Zambia came together to form the 
Oasis Forum, an alliance of civil society groups that demanded that President Chiluba give up 
any attempt to run for a third term.  The churches, including the evangelical churches, which 
had been major supporters of President Chiluba since his proclamation of Zambia as a Christian 
Nation, joined the Oasis Forum in condemning any moves for Chiluba to extend his time in 
office. 
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 These moves had a powerful effect deep within President Chiluba’s inner circle.  Close 
advisors such as former Foreign Minister Vernon Mwaanga who had remained in place 
throughout the Chiluba presidency came together to tell President Chiluba that his time was up.  
The master political manipulator, who had sidelined all other major figures within MMD and 
made it almost his own personal fiefdom, found his pillars of political support collapsing under 
him.  Faced with the prospect of losing the support of his party, President Chiluba backed off 
from his attempts to push for a third term and instead agreed to give the MMD nomination to 
his former Vice President Levy Mwanawasa, a widely-admired figure that was judged to be 
acceptable to the civil society coalition that had orchestrated the movement against President 
Chiluba’s third term.   
 It is beyond the scope of this analysis to detail Zambia’s political history from 
Mwanawasa’s presidency to the present.  The relevant aspects of democratic quality and 
legitimacy have fluctuated in the decades since. Tribalism has become more relevant in recent 
years, particularly since the rise of current Zambian President Edgar Lungu. Yet my interviewees 
overall agreed that the general character of the Zambian political regime has remained 
consistent. The patterns of behavior set up during the political transition have been 
institutionalized and remain fairly consistent until today. 
Analysis 
 How does the Zambian case match the predictions of my theory and the findings on the 
impact of mobilization, maximalism, and holdovers from my quantitative research? 
 That significant demobilization occurred after the MMD’s 1991 ascension to power is 
clear.  The reports of my interviewees also strongly supports the contention that this 
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demobilization gave significant leeway for the failure of the transition to result in a more fully 
democratic regime.  There is similar strong evidence for the impact of a co-optation pattern of 
holdovers policy.  MMD’s heavy reliance on old UNIP loyalists to fundraise, mobilize, and 
campaign on its behalf put into power a great number of people whose primary goal in ousting 
President Kaunda was not to fundamentally change the Zambian state but who joined the 
movement in order to gain power and prestige for themselves in an elite semi-democracy. 
 Maximalism, as evidenced on the one hand by UNIP and the “Zero Option” plan and by 
the MMD’s attempts to shut President Kaunda out of the political process also played a 
significant role in undermining Zambia’s democratic development. This is a surprising element, 
considering that mobilization was quite low, even for UNIP, and thus one might expect 
maximalism from such a minor political force to have a relatively minor impact. The outsized 
impact can in part be explained by UNIP’s history as a ruling party, and particularly by the larger 
than life figure of President Kaunda himself.  Many of my interviewees who were involved in the 
MMD government in the 1990s spoke of the deep paranoia that President Chiluba felt 
concerning President Kaunda. This may have caused him to over-react to the UNIP threat. 
So the patterns of behavior that I have described do seem to have had their expected 
impacts on Zambia’s democratic development. Yet this is, of course, not the key question. The 
key question is whether these patterns of behavior are simply the result of a natural flow from 
deeper structural factors. Such determinism was certainly evident in some of my interviewees’ 
attitudes towards the transition. Many major political figures in Zambia have become cynical 
about the prospects of popular action bringing about any kind of significant political change. 
Several looked back fondly on the Kaunda era, recalling the strict limits on corruption and 
powerful economic supports that were in place for the Zambian people even during the most 
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dictatorial periods of President Kaunda’s rule. So, was it all for nothing? Was the outcome of the 
Zambian transition predetermined by structural factors?  By the fact that Zambia is poor, or 
ethnically divided, or just in Africa? 
 Poverty, tribal divisions, colonial history, natural resources dependence, and regional 
context have doubtless played a role in shaping the outcome of the Zambian political system. 
Cultural attitudes are no doubt also an important factor in shaping the decision-making 
processes both of political elites and ordinary people.  Yet the sharp breaks in political continuity 
and powerful moments of political mobilization in Zambia’s history belie the plausibility of any 
simply structural story.  Zambia first waged a peaceful struggle for independence under the 
British.  Then in the 1980s until 1991 a panoply of political actors engaged in highly effective 
political struggle that brought an end to President Kaunda’s single-party rule.  Even in the 
context of a quasi-democratic system under President Chiluba, moments of political action were 
not absent, as evidenced by the struggle over the third term.  While Zambians may be divided by 
ethnicity and held back by poverty and history, they have shown time and time again that when 
roused they can use nonviolent tools of political action to achieve astounding changes. 
 That these moments of intensely powerful nonviolent mobilization have failed to 
continue through periods of consolidation, leading to a less than perfectly democratic outcome, 
does not take away from their influence. Instead, it suggests powerfully that the strategic 
challenge of mobilization is itself that, a challenge. When it is not resolved successfully, 
democratic transitions have a tendency to break down. But when it is resolved, when the people 
hit the streets, even in conditions of powerful structural disadvantages, major changes can 
occur. 
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 The particular resolution of this challenge in the Zambian case did not simply flow from 
the strategic alignments given by the pre-existing economic, social, and cultural structure of 
Zambia, but instead was shaped by the choices made during the period itself.  For instance, as 
Sishuwa Sishuwa writes regarding politics in Zambia during the Chiluba years:  
“Opposition leaders…played their hands badly.  A closer examination of the nature of 
leadership during this period would reveal that many of the most prominent opposition 
actors were elitists who failed to take politics out of the boardroom and onto the 
streets.  They lacked a language with which to connect their political agenda with the 
demands or concerns of the electorate, the majority of whom lived in abject poverty, 
and so failed to build grassroots support networks” (Sishuwa, 2012, p. 364).   
The outcomes did not flow simply from the “hand” dealt to Zambia by the past, but how 
this “hand” was played in the moment by political leaders.   
 What alternative explanations are there for the outcome of the transition in Zambia?  
Perhaps the most common is one related to modernization theory.  Many interviewees 
attributed Zambia’s failure to democratize to the low levels of socio-economic development that 
characterize the country.  Poverty, according to many of these arguments, played the definitive 
role in the demobilization that allowed a small group of elites to take control of the Zambian 
government and turn it to their own ends.   
 While there are certainly truthful elements to this story, I find it ultimately unsatisfying 
for two key reasons: first, it fails to explain well the most important event of this transitional 
story: the 1990-91 movement itself.  And in fact the indicators of modernization are deployed to 
explain both mobilization and demobilization.  On the one hand, the poverty engendered by 
economic difficulty in the 1980s is used as a factor to explain why the Zambian people were 
amenable to the mass mobilization that was necessary to oust Kaunda and bring the MMD to 
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power, while on the other it is also deployed to explain why, a few years later, the same group 
of people were de-mobilized and unable to hold this new government to account. 
 Second, data on political participation in Zambia during this period gives no support to 
the traditional contention that poverty undermines democratic participation or attitudes.  In a 
1993 survey Bratton found that poverty had no impact on Zambians’ likelihood to participate in 
politics, and increasing levels of education actually had a negative impact on the likelihood of 
participation (Bratton, 1999, p. 561).  Similarly, a 1996 survey by Bratton, Alderfer, and 
Simutanyi found that traditional socio-economic measures had inconsistent impacts on political 
participation (Bratton, Alderfer, & Simutanyi, 1997, pp. 17-18).  If the modernization story were 
correct, the data should look very different.  We would expect to see low levels of political 
participation and support for democracy among the poor, rural, uneducated segments of 
Zambian society.  That such patterns almost fully fail to obtain suggests that something very 
different is going on. 
 Clearly poverty plays a significant role in Zambian politics.  Economic development or 
the lack thereof is a central axis of political contention.  As the literature shows and as I also 
show in my quantitative testing, modernization plays a significant role in shaping 
democratization outcomes.  Yet this role is mediated by a long list of strategic choices and 
patterns of behavior made by those who come into power and the people who enable them to 
do so.   
 Zambia, as an elite semi-democracy, is perhaps an excellent example of the elite theory 
of democratization.  But here too, as in Nepal, a close examination of the facts makes the 
theory’s application problematic.  The old question of who counts as an elite is relevant – the 
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1991 movement elevated a number of figures who had been marginal in the old regime.  One 
might interpret this as elite circulation, along the lines of classical elite theory (Mosca, 1939; 
Pareto, 1915).  Yet many of these “new elites” quickly fell out of political favor and proved 
unable to actually pursue their policy agenda.   So were they ever elites in the first place?  How 
can one judge an intensely powerful impact for a relatively short period of time that falls away?   
 Next, one might argue that there was an elite consensus against a full-fledged liberal 
democratic regime, and that the elite semi-democracy was always the goal of the movement.  
Yet to do so requires a great deal of post hoc reconstruction.  The MMD manifesto, for instance, 
is a document of sterling democratic intention, focused on goals that even the most critical 
democratic analyst would find difficult to criticize.  Similarly, the reports of the political elites 
themselves in interviews indicate a significant degree of consensus on the preferability of a 
liberal democratic system.  One may, of course, assume that such statements are deceptive, but 
to do so on the basis of outcomes is, again, not using elite consensus for or against democracy 
as a means of predicting a democratic or non-democratic outcome but instead defining the lack 
of an elite consensus on the basis of a failure to democratize. 
 Furthermore, the elite theory of democratization is belied by the fact that the initiative 
for both of the major changes in Zambia’s political system: the 1991 movement for multi-party 
democracy and the 2001 movement against President Chiluba’s third term, emerged from 
outside of the ranks of the political elites, and political elites were forced to respond to it.  Far 
from serving as the force initiating major transformations, political elites for the most part 
proved themselves to act more as adaptors, shaping their actions in response to the pressures 
that they received from outside. 
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 I find my focus on policy towards holdovers as a transitional challenge a much more 
satisfying way of dealing with the question of the impact of elites.  Instead of assuming that we 
can treat elites as a single category and judge their degree of preference and consensus towards 
democracy as an explanatory factor, my approach instead assumes that individuals come to 
politics in transitional times with varying degrees of political power and preferences.  Those 
whose background and socialization are in the leadership of a non-democratic regime are likely 
to hold preferences and engage in patterns of political behavior that are opposed to a full-
fledged democratic regime.  When such figures are given significant latitude to integrate into a 
fledgling democratic regime they are likely to shift the regime in directions that will undermine 
democratization. 
 This is, in fact, quite close to what we observe when looking at the Zambian transition.  
Erstwhile UNIP leaders who had a brief democratic awakening when the mobilization of the 
1990-1991 movement made it in their interest to have one moved rapidly to appropriating the 
state for personal benefit and undermining the democratic character of the new regime once in 
place.  Rather than attempting to divine the preferences and degree of unity amongst the 
nebulous category of “the elite” we can gain more insight by looking directly at the avenues of 
access to power in the new regime that were open to these figures on the basis of the levels of 
mobilization and the formal and informal policy towards holdovers adopted during the 
transition.  
 Can Zambia’s failure to democratize be attributed simply to “cultural factors” of 
passivity and a preference for patronage politics?  As with poverty, it seems clear from the 
literature and my own interview research that these factors play an important role in shaping 
the dynamics of mobilization and holdovers policy that I focus on.  Yet the dynamic character of 
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these events also belies the explanatory usefulness of a single focus on “culture.”  Can a 
“passive” culture explain Kaunda’s ouster?  Or the resistance to Chiluba’s third term?  At the 
very least Zambian political culture is a complex, involved factor that sometimes can explain 
some degree of mobilization and at other times a degree of demobilization.  Culture helps to set 
the stage, but patterns of agential behavior make up the play.   
 In conclusion, while the picture is complex, a close analysis of the Zambian transition 
generally supports my theory and the findings from my quantitative research.  The particular 
constellation of patterns of behavior relative to mobilization, maximalism, and holdovers have 
resulted in a regime that closely approximates my description of an elite semi-democracy.  
These patterns, while influenced by prior structural factors, are not fully determined by them, 
nor can the outcome be satisfactorily explained by a focus on the preferences of elites or the 
traditional focus in transitology on elite pact-making.   
 Having covered regimes that approximated my two medial categories of fractious semi-
democracy and elite semi-democracy I now turn to analyzing a case of successful 
democratization in the aftermath of a Civil Resistance Transition: the transition to democracy in 
Brazil in the 1980s. 
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Chapter 5: Brazil: Moderation and Mobilization 
 In this final case study chapter I trace Brazil’s transition from military rule to democracy 
in the 1980s.  I argue that Brazil is an example of a successful transition to democracy. In recent 
years the country has certainly experienced democratic challenges, particularly related to 
corruption.  Yet since the transition to civilian rule in 1985 and the promulgation of the new 
constitution in 1988, Brazil’s political system has been broadly representative, its elections have 
been widely considered free and fair, and its protections for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms have been robust.  The system is imperfect, as all political systems are, but well 
exceeds Schumpeter’s threshold and in some respects even approaches Dahl’s ideal.   
 Brazil scores quite highly on the most highly-respected cross-national quantitative 
measures of democracy.  Figure 5.1 below replicates the figures from Chapters three and four, 
showing Brazil’s scores on the Polyarchy, Polity, and Unified Democracy scores in the ten years 
before and after the beginning of the transition in 1985.  Even the lowest of these, the Unified 
Democracy Score, rates Brazil as at least minimally across the threshold of a democratic regime, 
and Polity and Polyarchy rate the regime as quite highly democratic. 
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Figure 5.1: Brazil’s Democracy Index Scores 
 
 Brazil follows two out of the three patterns that I theorize would push a country 
towards a more democratic regime.  Political and social mobilization remained extremely high 
after the initial democratic breakthrough in 1985.  This mobilization took a number of forms, 
with the greatest emphasis focused on advocating for protections to be incorporated in the 
1988 constitution.  Brazil’s labor movement was one major source of this mobilization, both 
within the constitution-writing process and outside in day to day struggles for greater labor 
rights and protections.  This mobilization successfully constrained potential anti-democratic 
forces and helped push the Brazilian transition towards a more full-fledged democratic regime.  
Mobilization during the transition also almost universally took non-maximalist forms, 
with the focus of most major actors on working within the confines of the new constitutional 
system.  Brazil’s major political actors, even those associated with the old authoritarian regime, 
focused their attentions not on all-or-nothing grabs for power at the center but on developing 
cooperative relationships for mutual benefit based on responding to a diverse set of pressures 
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from the broader society.  Even formerly maximalist actors such as the Communist Party of 
Brazil (PCdoB) focused on engaging in institutionalized, electoral politics rather than seeking to 
fundamentally disrupt the political system.  This is particularly surprising considering Brazil’s 
long history of “political activism” overcoming “legalism” as numerous political actors relied on 
whatever means necessary to achieve their goals (Schneider, 1991, p. 9). 
 Where Brazil diverges from my theory’s expected patterns of behavior is in its policy 
towards the holdovers of the old regime.  Instead of pursuing a middle of the road integration 
policy with some , as I argue is most likely to lead to democracy, Brazil engaged in almost no 
punishment or exclusion of figures from the old regime. A wide-ranging amnesty law from 1979 
protected almost all figures from the old regime from prosecution, and the nature of the 
transition meant that from the beginning leading figures in the new government were the same 
elites who had dominated during the period of military rule.  This is perhaps best captured by 
the fact that Brazil’s first civilian president after military rule, Jose Sarney, was a defector from 
the military government’s political party, in which he had been a central figure.  This 
undermines my argument that an integration-based “holdovers” policy is an important factor 
shaping the likelihood of post-transition democracy, and accords with the statistical evidence 
showing that holdovers policy has an inconsistent effect on democratic outcomes. 
 However, this lack of accountability has not been without consequences for the quality 
of Brazil’s democracy.  A number of interviewees pointed to amnesty as a major factor 
undermining the quality of Brazil’s democracy and leading to a modern politics that is 
characterized to a significant degree by clientelist relationships (Avritzer, 1995). 
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My research strategy in approaching the Brazilian case was slightly different than my 
strategy in Nepal and Zambia.  The events in question are further removed in time.  The 
country’s political and social elites are also much more widely dispersed, with major figures 
distributed among urban centers such as Brasilia, Sao Paolo, Rio de Janeiro, Porto Allegre, and 
many others.  Thus, it was less feasible for me to conduct a large number of primary source 
interviews.  Hence, my analysis in this chapter relies on the scholarly literature to a much 
greater degree than in the other two chapters.  Brazil’s transition has been a major topic for 
scholars of democratization, providing an extensive amount of prior scholarly work that I could 
easily mine for insights.  I was able to conduct a limited number of interviews through Brazilian 
research assistants, which supplement and deepen the insights of the scholarly literature.   
 In this chapter first I briefly describe the historical and political context for Brazil’s 
transition to democracy, then trace the events of the transition itself, focusing on the role 
played by continued mobilization and the move towards institutionalized politics rather than 
maximalism.  I conclude with an analysis of the role of these challenges in the Brazilian 
transition and make an argument for their importance. 
Brazil: The Road to Military Government and Out of it Again 
 Brazil is a vast and diverse country, with a rich history and deeply complex political 
dynamics even within its many regions, much less at the level of the national government.  The 
history I sketch here will be only the briefest overview in order to set the stage for the events of 
the 1985 transition.   
 Modern Brazil’s history begins with Portugese colonialism in 1500.  After a period of 
colonial rule, the country became independent in 1822 as the Empire of Brazil under the rule of 
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Pedro I.  The imperial period was followed by the revolution of 1889, which shifted the country 
ostensibly to a republic, but one which was dominated by a small class of large landowners.   
 The old republic came to an end in 1930 when the so-called “coffee with milk policy” of 
power-sharing between the most populous and powerful states of Sao Paolo and Minas Gerais 
broke down and led to an armed conflict.  This revolution brought opposition politician Getulio 
Vargas to power.  Vargas initially ruled as a more or less democratic ruler, but following rumors 
of a Communist coup centralized power in his own hands in 1938, leading to the establishment 
of the corporatist, quasi-fascist Estado Novo.  Vargas ruled Brazil until 1945, when he was 
deposed in a military coup. 
 Vargas’ ouster led to an almost twenty year period of democratic rule.  Yet Brazil’s 
nascent democracy collapsed in 1964 when rumors that President Joao Goulart was planning on 
attempting major land reform initiatives triggered a military coup.   
 Brazil’s military regime initially waged an intense repressive campaign to suppress 
political opposition and concentrate power in their hands.  However, throughout their period of 
rule the regime always maintained a degree of at least nominal adherence to quasi-democratic 
institutions, prompting Juan Linz to observe in 1973 that Brazil did not have an authoritarian 
regime but rather simply an authoritarian “situation” (Linz J. , 1973).   
 In particular the military regime sought to institutionalize and incorporate opposition to 
the regime.  Their primary strategy to achieve this goal was through outlawing all pre-1964 
political parties and establishing a government-mandated two-party system (Kinzo, 1988).  In 
this system the military’s conservative allies ruled through the Aliança Renovadora Nacional 
(ARENA), or National Renewal Alliance, and the opposition was represented through the 
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Movimento Democratico Brasileiro MDB), or Brazilian Democratic Movement, the government-
sanctioned “loyal opposition” party.  The MDB was permitted to contest elections, and even 
sometimes to win them, but the electoral and governing institutions were heavily tilted to 
advantage ARENA and maintain a firm hold on power by elites loyal to the military. 
 Brazil’s period of military rule was defined by the various generals who assumed the 
presidency during this period.  Brazil’s military was heavily factionalized, and the various 
factions’ visions of the goals of military rule diverged widely (Zirker, 1986).  Under Presidents 
Castelo Branco, Costa e Silva, and Medici the regime assumed a set of highly repressive policies, 
particularly the fifth institutional act (AI-5) of 1968, which centralized power in the executive 
branch, suspended rights of habeus corpus, and severely restricted freedom of the press, 
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.   
These extremely repressive measures sparked a backlash.  Several different opposition 
groups attempted to organize violent insurgency-based opposition to the military regime.  One 
of the most prominent of these were the so-called “Araguaia Guerrillas,” organized by the 
Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB).63  The PCdoB had broken off from the more mainstream 
Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) over the question of achieving the goal of a single-party 
Communist state through armed insurrection even prior to the military coup of 1964.  The coup 
provided the impetus for accelerating their efforts and beginning to create cells of guerrillas in 
the jungles of the Araguaia region.  The guerrillas followed the Maoist model of “prolonged 
popular war,” and some had received military training in China.  The Brazilian military was 
extremely effective at suppressing this movement.  By the early 1970s, through a combination 
                                                          
63 For more on the Araguaia Guerrillas and other violent opposition to the military regime see Teles 2017, 
Almeida 2015. 
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of intensive intelligence operations and application of overwhelming military force the guerrillas 
had been almost entirely eliminated, with their leaders arrested, killed, or driven into exile. 
A period of liberalization began with the ascension to the presidency of Ernesto Geisel in 
1974.  Geisel began lifting some of the heavy restrictions on freedom of assembly, and to allow 
for greater civil society mobilization.  The goal of the liberalization was primarily to enhance the 
legitimacy of military rule by allowing the façade of popular participation while still maintaining 
a heavy authoritarian control on the scope of opposition to the government (Lamounier, 1989). 
The response was a flowering of various social movements.  The Catholic Church played 
a crucial role in this flowering.  Traditionally a conservative force in Brazilian politics, the 
dynamics of the Catholic Church in Brazil, as in much of Latin America, had begun to change in 
the aftermath of the Vatican II council in the early 1960s and the Medellin Council of Latin 
American bishops in 1968.  On an elite level, by the 1970s the leadership of the Brazilian 
Catholic Church, organized under the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB), began 
sponsoring programs for social change, focused around a “centrist defense of civil liberties and 
human rights” (Della Cava, 1989, p. 146), in particular expressing opposition to torture and 
other authoritarian excesses.  On the grassroots level, much more radical clergy and laypeople 
engaged in much more direct activism through the formation of the Ecumenical Base 
Communities, or CEBs, small local cells that functioned as crucial brokers between the various 
sections of Brazil’s emerging civil society. 
The regime still heavily limited the degree to which social organizations could directly 
question the state, and so few focused on the issue of democratization.  Instead there was a 
diversity of different movement goals, based on the type of organization.  One interviewee 
 228 
 
spoke about how his organization “did not directly call for the end of the military regime.  But 
we discussed things that could be worked on in a new system.” Yet the overall frame of resisting 
authoritarianism gave a sense of unity to these disparate social movements (Hochstetler, 2000, 
p. 166).  A vast number of neighborhood movements, for example, grew to advocate for the 
interests of people in particular localities.  These often began as simple service delivery 
organizations, but when confronted by the political nature of the challenges facing their 
communities often escalated their activity to direct advocacy (Mainwaring, 1989).  Mother’s 
groups and neighborhood women’s groups also emerged to advocate for the rights of women 
(Alvarez, 1989), and linked the struggle for women’s freedom in the home with freedom from 
the violence of authoritarian rule (Nelson, 1996).    
A resurgent labor movement also began to take shape, primarily in the industrial areas 
of Sao Paolo State’s ABCD region.  During the Estado Novo period under President Vargas, the 
Brazilian government had created a set of labor institutions that severely limited the power of 
unions.  Union leaders were designed to be almost civil servants whose responsibility was not to 
advocate for the interests of their union members but instead to ensure harmony between 
workers and the government (Keck, 1992).  A large portion of union expenses were paid through 
a union tax collected by the government and distributed to union leaders.  The primary 
responsibility of union leaders was to oversee the distribution of social security benefits, a task 
that cemented their role as government functionaries and undermined any sense of an 
independent power base. 
Thus, for much of the military regime there had been little in the way of labor 
organizing, despite the fact that the Brazilian military regime was explicitly focused on a highly 
unequal, internationalist, neoliberal mode of development.  However, the end of Brazil’s 
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“economic miracle” as growth rates declined in the late 1970s due in part to the shock to oil 
prices due to the OPEC embargo, along with the widening space for organization because of the 
government’s liberalization process, led to increased levels of activity. 
The first major example of organization came in response to the revelation in 1977 that 
the government had been falsifying inflation indexing numbers, resulting in a severe 
underpayment for workers in several different unions (Keck, 1992, pp. 63-64).  Luis Inacio “Lula” 
da Silva, the President of the Sao Paolo Metalworkers’ Union, revealed the government’s 
deception and demanded that the salary numbers be adjusted. 
This initial example of resistance on a labor level helped lead to a massive strike wave in 
1978 and 1979.  During the wave of strikes hundreds of thousands of workers across dozens of 
industries went on strike over various labor demands.  Lula, the Metalworkers’ Union leader, 
emerged as a touchstone in these strikes, a powerful charismatic figure able to rally huge 
crowds of workers and to frame the demands of the working class for social, economic, and 
political change in way that had not previously been articulated. 
The strikes of 1979 coincided with a strategic re-calculation by the government.  The 
MDB had successfully used the enforced two-party system as a way of transforming elections 
into plebiscites on the government’s performance.  Particularly as Brazil’s economic fortunes 
worsened, this meant that, despite electoral rules that heavily favored ARENA, the MDB was 
increasingly gaining seats in the Brazilian Congress, as well as local positions around the country.  
As the only legal anti-government party, MDB aggregated a wide set of diverse social and 
political forces under its banner. 
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Thus, the government sought to disrupt MDB’s electoral momentum by changing the 
laws to allow for the creation of multiple parties.  The rules for party creation were still 
extremely strict – in order to be formed parties had to demonstrate a wide degree of geographic 
dispersion, as well as meet high electoral thresholds.  Radical leftist parties such as the 
Community Party of Brazil (Portuguese acronym PCdoB) were still illegal.   
Perhaps the most significant long-term consequence of the party liberalization law was 
the creation of the Worker’s Party (PT) as an outgrowth of the revitalized labor movement 
under leaders such as Lula.  Unlike Brazil’s traditional political parties, including the MDB (now 
renamed the PMDB in accord with the naming rules in the new party law), the PT from the start 
was a party with a mass base and membership that was highly invested in party structure.  The 
PT also incorporated a significant degree of intra-party democracy, choosing candidates through 
mechanisms in which party members were able to select candidates independent of the 
preferences of party bosses (Keck, 1992, p. 112). 
While the PT and a handful of other parties formed in response to the new party law, 
the PMDB was initially much more successful in making the case to the Brazilian people that 
they were the real alternative to military rule.  The military was increasingly unpopular, and the 
appeal of opposition government was growing.  The PMDB’s leadership was under pressure to 
push for a rapid move to civilian government, but under leaders such as Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso they instead opted to work within the system to gradually assume control, rather than 
more directly confronting the military.  Cardoso in particular made the argument that a direct 
confrontation with the military would lead to bloodshed, and that in the long term democratic 
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government could only be achieved not if the military was defeated but if it was brought on 
board with democratic change. 
1982 was a crucial turning point in this process of growing PMDB strength.  In the 
elections that year PMDB candidates assumed the governorships of Brazil’s three largest states 
– a position with significant power and influence in Brazil’s federal system, and took many 
federal deputy and senate seats.   
In 1984 these winds of change broke into a storm as Brazil’s social movements, the PT, 
and the PMDB came together in a massive campaign of civil resistance to push for an immediate 
end to military rule through an amendment to the constitution that would allow for direct 
elections to the presidency.  Brazil’s constitution at the time dictated that the president be 
elected through an indirect electoral college whose members were dominated by military 
loyalists.   
The Diretas Ja (Direct Elections Now!) movement was the largest example of nonviolent 
resistance in Brazil’s history, with millions taking to the streets to push for the amendment’s 
passage. The movement failed in its immediate goal of passing a constitutional amendment.  Yet 
the signaling of popular opposition to military rule forced major reconsiderations of the future 
among the military and their political elite allies.  The goal of abertura: to create a stable 
foundation for continued quasi-authoritarian rule dominated by the military, would have to be 
re-thought.  Since the beginning of Geisel’s presidency the military had justified its rule by 
claiming that it was gradually preparing the country for democracy, that they did not want to 
rule indefinitely but that the transition to democracy must be very carefully managed by the 
traditional military and political hierarchy.  It is unclear how exactly the military leadership and 
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their civilian allies intended for this process to take place.  Yet it is clear that diretas ja signaled 
to many that the process would have to adapt to realities on the ground, and “spelled the death 
of authoritarianism in Brazil” (Avritzer, 1995, p. 256). 
Perhaps the most consequential outcome of this significant demonstration of popular 
opposition to continuing authoritarian rule were widespread defections by a number of 
legislators from the government’s party, the PDS (Martinez-Lara, 1996, p. 34). 64  These 
legislators, interested in finding a role in what now, because of Diretas Ja, felt like an inevitable 
move to democratization, formed the center-right Liberal Front and began negotiating with 
centrists in the PMDB for an acceptable way of transitioning from military to civilian rule.   
Top military leaders also began negotiating with the PMDB.  The character of these 
negotiations remains largely a matter of speculation, and several of my interviewees reported 
that they could only offer vague assumptions about the specifics of what both sides agreed to 
give up to achieve a peaceful transition.  Yet one almost definite demand from the 
government’s side was in who the PMDB would elevate as their candidate for President.  The 
PMDB did not nominate long-time head and prominent dissident Ulysses Guimarães, but instead 
put forward the much more moderate PMDB governor of the state of Minas Gerais, Tancredo 
Neves. 
The result of these defections and negotiations was that in the electoral college 
elections for the presidency in January 1985 Tancredo Neves defeated the PDS candidate Paolo 
Maluf.  Former PDS party head and now leader of the Liberal Front Jose Sarney ran on Neves’ 
                                                          
64 The successor to ARENA after the party reform of 1979. 
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ticket as his vice president, bringing the PDS defectors on board and further assuaging fears 
from military leaders of a radical opposition victory.   
The continuation of popular opposition during the period leading up to election served 
to secure Neves’ position.  Maluf extended wide patronage guarantees to the members of the 
electoral college and threatened defectors with retribution.  Yet popular opinion polls showed 
that the Neves ticket had an almost three-to-one advantage over Maluf, and mass rallies held by 
Neves around the country demonstrated the continued willingness of large numbers of people 
to resist the continuation of military rule, should the military’s allies attempt to undermine the 
PMDB ticket (Schneider, 1991, p. 302). 
Brazil’s first non-military president since the coup of 1964 was set to take office in 1985 
and initiate a full-scale democratic transition. 
The Brazilian Transition 
 A stroke of unkind fate changed the character of the Brazilian transition.  Shortly before 
taking office, Tancredo Neves was taken ill and died on April 21st, 1985.  The next steps were 
somewhat unclear.  Jose Sarney, former head of ARENA and a long-time military loyalist, was 
the vice-president and thus had a certain claim to the presidency.  However, since he had never 
been sworn in as the vice-president, the legal precedent for his taking office was not 
straightforward.  Were Sarney not to take office, the presidency would fall to the Speaker of the 
House, Ulysses Guimaraes, a more radical leader of the PMDB with whom the military had some 
serious concerns. To ensure the stability of the transition, Guimaraes agreed to not contest the 
presidency, and swore Sarney in as Brazil’s first civilian president since 1964 (Martinez-Lara, 
1996, p. 52; Goertzel, 1999).   
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 While the level of social mobilization did not reach the peak of the Diretas Ja 
movement, widespread popular opposition continued under the Sarney government.  As 
Hochstetler writes:  
“Although the mid-1980s did see significant changes in social movements organizing in 
Brazil, popular and middle-class actors did not retreat from active mobilization.  In fact, 
they launched a new cycle of social movement protest…[which showed] social 
movements to be important and positive contributors to the effort to deepen Brazilian 
democracy” (Hochstetler, 2000, p. 163)   
Many of the social movements that had struggled against the military regime felt that 
the new government was far from what they had wanted, particularly with Sarney at the helm.  
Furthermore, while the various social movements that had come together to make up the 
opposition had shared a desire for democratization, for many of them a shift to civilian 
government and direct elections was not the endpoint of their struggle, but rather the 
beginning point for advocacy for a greater set of rights (Keck, 1992, p. 2).   
Popular movements born in the fires of resistance to authoritarian rule began 
considering the means by which they could turn the mobilization necessary to fight military rule 
into the creation of a genuine, fully participatory democracy (Della Cava, 1989, p. 152).  These 
popular movements, while they had joined hands with the MDB and later PMDB to resist 
military rule, also for the most part remained autonomous from the MDB or any other political 
party structure.  Thus they were able to maintain an external source of pressure over particular 
policy goals during the transition period (Mainwaring, 1989, p. 190; Avritzer, 1995).  The 
strategies and slogans of resistance to authoritarian rule were repurposed for the goals of 
particular policy-based movements in the transition.  For instance, the Diretas Ja, or “Direct 
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Elections Now” slogan of the movement against military rule was repurposed as Planejamento 
Familiar Ja! Or “Family Planning Now!” during the transition (Alvarez, 1989, p. 221). 
Civil society movements were well aware of the potential for demobilization during the 
transition, and actively sought to counter those tendencies.  As Martinez-Lara writes:  
“[Popular movements] believed that organized efforts should be arranged in order to 
avoid the demobilizing effects of the ‘transition through transaction’ and to maximize 
the prospects of making a break with the past…aspirations for a more just society could 
only be achieved if popular pressure and participation were exercised” (Martinez-Lara, 
1996, p. 86). 
Thus mobilization during the transition was undertaken not just in reaction to 
immediate needs but as part of a wider vision of advancing a democratic agenda during the 
uncertain times of the transition. 
 Within the party system the PT, while they had allied with the PMDB over the issue of 
direct elections, had even at that time critiqued the PMDB as a bourgeois elite party that did not 
truly have the interests of workers at heart (Keck, 1992).  Under Sarney the labor movement 
launched a wave of strikes that even exceeded their level of activity in 1978 and 1979 
(Skidmore, 1988, p. 294).  In 1989 over 3,000 strikes took place around the country, a massive 
increase even from the peak of pre-transition labor activism (Sandoval, 1993, p. 156).  
Environmental movements, women’s movements, neighborhood associations, and others 
continued their push for their own preferred policy agenda through this period. 
 Mobilization was also facilitated by widespread disillusionment with the Sarney 
government’s attempts to address Brazil’s economic woes through the so-called “Cruzado Plan.”   
This plan involved a series of macroeconomic interventions, including the creation of a new 
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currency and an extensive system of price controls, that were intended to fight inflation and 
stabilize Brazil’s economy.  While the Cruzado plan had some initial success in 1985 and 1986 by 
1987 its effectiveness was waning, leading to an increase in popular opposition to President 
Sarney and his government. 
 High levels of mobilization and political engagement were evidenced by the high turnout 
in Brazil’s first national elections after the return of civilian rule, with almost 95% of registered 
voters participating (Lamounier & Neto, Brazil, 2005, p. 175).  The elections were particularly 
crucial as the legislature elected would also be tasked with serving as a constituent assembly to 
write Brazil’s new constitution.  
The PMDB dominated the 1986 election, winning roughly 55% of the seats in the Senate 
and Chamber of Deputies, an important majority as the rules of the constituent assembly 
dictated that the constitution would be passed by simply majority (Sa, 2014, p. 87) Yet as the 
PMDB increasingly became seen as “the government,” its social movement allies began to 
mobilize against it in favor of their preferred policy positions.  Vast numbers of people from 
different movements came to Brasilia to push the constituent assembly to include things such as 
greater human rights protections, and policies to address Brazil’s high levels of poverty and 
inequality, in the new constitution.  The PMDB, with its long history of simply being a forum for 
opposition to the military government, was also highly fragmented and had little capacity to act 
as a unified front. 
 While the constitution was not a full “people’s constitution” in the sense that it was 
largely drafted by Brazil’s political elite class, including a large number of legislators from the old 
PDS government, the advocacy of labor rights activists, human rights defenders, and others was 
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successful in gaining a number of different concessions from the government, leading to the 
creation, for example, of Brazil’s national health service. 
 Civil society and social movement groups participated actively and heavily in the 
drafting of the constitution through the proposal of popular amendments.  The diversity of 
these amendments and the large numbers of signatures obtained by the organizations pushing 
for them displays the depth and breadth of popular mobilization during the Brazilian transition.  
122 popular amendments were sent to the assembly, by organizations as diverse as the labor 
unions, the agricultural cooperative movement, and the National Housewives Association (Sa, 
2014). 
 While there was certainly a diversity of political opinions and strategies, as one might 
expect in such a large and diverse country, most mainstream Brazilian politicians also pursued 
fairly institutionalized, non-maximal strategies for achieving political power.  Political party and 
social movement leaders tended to push for their preferred policy agendas within the 
framework of the constitutional convention, and to accept the outcome. 
 As scholars have observed, Brazil’s transition, more than perhaps any other in Latin 
America, maintained the privileged position of the military (Hunter, 1997).  The amnesty law of 
1979 protected military figures from prosecution for human rights abuses committed during the 
military regime, and political deals that allowed elites to shift parties, for instance through the 
defection of senators from the PDS to the liberal party and the PMDB, allowed many of the old 
regime elites to stay in power.  President Sarney, of course, as an old ARENA hand himself, was 
friendly to the prerogatives of the military and did not question the military leadership to a 
significant degree. 
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 Part of this friendliness to the military regime was due to the relatively light nature of 
Brazilian military dictatorship.  While the regime brutally suppressed Brazil’s own Communist 
insurgency in the late 1960s, the regime had a much less checkered past than the military 
dictatorships in Brazil’s neighbors such as Argentina and Chile.  The numbers of recorded 
“disappearances,” for instance, are quite slight for such a large country and compared to either 
of these other countries.  Thus the impetus for a reckoning with the sins of the past was less 
intense.  Furthermore, the political bargains that had been struck between the political elites 
who had cooperated closely with the military and those that had labored in the opposition 
hampered any efforts to clean the slate.  The president himself had been a leader in ARENA, and 
the PMDB government was full of figures who had been part of the military system for its entire 
tenure. 
 Thus in terms of holdovers policy, Brazil went very far in the direction of co-optation.  
Elites from the ancien regime largely remained in positions of power and influence, simply 
adapting themselves to the new political dispensation.  Nearly 50% of the members of Brazil’s 
constituent assembly had, at some point, served in the military regime’s allied party ARENA (de 
Souza, 1989, p. 355).  However, for the most part these elites did not seek to undermine the 
democratic character of the new government but rather maintained their positions of political 
power through democratic means. 
 In 1988 Brazil’s constituent assembly passed and promulgated Brazil’s new constitution, 
formalizing the transition to a democratic regime.  The passage of the constitution was followed 
soon afterwards by Brazil’s first direct presidential election, in which a divided party space led to 
the surprise election of President Fernando Collor de Melo, a scion of one of Brazil’s oldest 
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political families and a figure that, like President Sarney, had been closely associated with the 
old regime. 
 By most measures, and according to the reckoning of the majority of my interviewees, 
the election of President Collor indicated the end of the political transition, as new rules for 
achieving political power had been fully established and put into practice, such that political 
actors’ expectations could converge around the new rules.  However, because subsequent 
dramatic events played a role in the establishment of the new regime, and evidence the impact 
of nonviolent resistance on the Brazilian democratic regime, they bear some mention here. 
 President Collor had based his appeal primarily around his youth and a stated 
commitment to clear out old corrupt elites.  Yet very quickly after beginning his presidential 
term it became apparent that the president himself was presiding over a deeply corrupt 
administration, centered around his family members.  As these allegations became increasingly 
clear, Brazil’s civil society began mobilizing to demand that the problem of corruption be 
addressed.  Non-partisan mobilization around the issue of corruption reached a peak in late 
1992, when numbers similar to those that had hit the streets during the Diretas Ja campaign 
returned to the public square to demand that Collor be impeached for his corrupt practices 
(Hochstetler, 2000, p. 171). Brazil’s political parties responded by uniting in opposition to the 
president and, following the procedures laid out in the new constitution, impeaching him. 
 This episode is important because of the evidence it shows for the power of both high 
mobilization and low maximalism in Brazil’s transitional and post-transitional politics.  Even 
though the rules were relatively untested, and a move to more maximalist mobilization would 
have been eminently understandable, political forces for the most part did not take advantage 
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of this opportunity.  Instead they followed the legal, institutionalized process, preserving the 
new democratic order. 
Analysis 
 How well does my theory do in explaining the Brazilian transition to democracy and how 
well does it stand up against prominent alternative explanations? 
 The Brazilian transition certainly exhibits two out of my three proposed patterns of 
behavior that I expect will promote greater democratization.  The level of mobilization during 
the transitional period was extremely high, with widespread activity on multiple fronts by new 
political parties, civil society groups, social movements, and a growing labor movement.   
 What were the sources of this continued mobilization?  The diffuse nature and diverse 
goals of the Brazilian movement for political change was frequently cited by interviewees as a 
key reason that this mobilization continued.  Opposition to the military regime had been 
situated in a broad set of movements with many different goals over much of the period of 
military rule.  For almost all of these ending the military regime had only been seen as a step 
along the way.  They had broader goals related to the social character of the state, increased 
rights for workers, greater protection of the environment, and many more.  Even the PMDB, 
whose identity had been for decades almost entirely focused around its opposition to military 
rule, was forced to quickly shift into a political party advocating for a particular agenda as it 
rapidly found itself competing for electoral supremacy with the PT and other political parties.   
  Mobilization was also facilitated by the incomplete nature of the 1985 transition.  The 
death of Tancredo Neves and ascension of Jose Sarney to the presidency put most opposition 
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forces in a position of deep suspicion towards the government.  The PT in particular felt that it 
was critical to continue to act as a counterbalance to the influence of Sarney and old PDS 
loyalists. 
 These patterns of mobilization were by no means predetermined by Brazil’s political 
past.  Indeed, the flowering of civil society and its increasing influence during the transition of 
the 1980s was a radically new and innovative pattern in Brazilian politics.  As Schneider writes in 
the early 1990s: “Mobilization of the populace has been a strikingly ineffective force in Brazilian 
political life” (Schneider, 1991, p. 13).  In the past, clientelist relationships, a strict social 
hierarchy, and the very diversity of interests across the vast country’s different regions had 
stymied both the size and the impact of political mobilization of ordinary people.  Thus we 
would expect such mobilization to continue to be minimal in size and marginal in impact in this 
political transition.  Yet, while the old patterns continued to exert an influence, they were 
heavily influenced by popular mobilization along various fronts of a greater degree than the 
country had ever previously experienced, to the point that by the 1990s former president Itamar 
Franco suggested the “Diretas Ja and impeachment campaign models” as powerful tools for 
achieving difficult political goals (Hochstetler, 2000, p. 171).   
 Both tactically and rhetorically, the various players in Brazil’s politics also eschewed 
maximalism and moved to institutionalize political contention.  Political struggle quickly moved 
to the forum of the constituent assembly and contention over the degree to which various 
agendas would be incorporated in the new constitutional structure, and then to the structures 
put in place by the constituent assembly process.   
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 Throughout the transition there was a pattern of compromise and agreement, rather 
than all or nothing control of the center.  As Schneider writes: “The successful transition owed a 
great deal to the reasonableness and moderation demonstrated by almost all significant political 
actors.  Those disappointed by the course of events came to accept their setback and eventually 
assumed a statesmanlike stance” (Schneider, 1991, p. 304).  Major political actors did not 
exhibit maximalist tendencies, but instead accepted losses and sought to maintain the 
environment of conciliation among political factions. 
This was perhaps best captured in the way that the transition was initiated, through an 
agreement between Tancredo Neves and those PDS political leaders who had seen the level of 
mobilization during the Diretas Ja movement and sought to adapt to the new political order.  
These kinds of agreements continued to be a pattern during the transitional period.  And even 
when major moves to change power in the center took place, as in the impeachment 
proceedings against President Collor de Melo, these moves took place within the confines of the 
new legal order.  Major disruptive non-institutional action played a fairly minimal role in 
achieving these political changes. 
As the transition and later Brazil’s new democratic regime moved forward, the low 
maximalism and high degree of institutionalization in Brazil’s politics was well-captured by the 
strategies pursued by the PT.  Despite its connections to more revolutionary leftist groups, the 
PT quickly moved to function as a “loyal opposition,” articulating its goals and grievances 
through the realm of institutionalized politics and providing a structured, nonviolent channel of 
participation for activists disillusioned with the ways in which Brazil’s politics fell short of the 
ideals they had hoped for when struggling against the military regime (Nylen, 2000).   
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 This type of action has not been typical of Brazilian politics for much of the country’s 
history.  Rather, at least since the beginning of Brazil’s old republic in the late 1880s political 
competition had tended to follow much more typically maximalist lines, with political goals 
trumping allegiance to any particular legal or normative structure.  The pattern of politics that 
the MDB began to articulate during the period of military rule and that came to the fore during 
the transitional period was a new pattern in Brazil, off the equilibrium path of the past.  This 
sharp divergence speaks to the importance of actors’ agential choices.  Culture, economics, and 
political institutions shape but do not define the choices that actors make, particularly during 
the critical juncture moments of political transitions.  As scholars we must look at these choices 
directly and systematically if we are to understand major political outcomes. 
 A holdovers policy that largely welcomed figures from the old regime is the one 
exception to my theory – though the fact that such a policy did not fundamentally undermine 
Brazil’s democratization accords with the mixed evidence of the impact of holdovers policy from 
my quantitative testing. 
 What about the major alternative explanations?  Because of the situation of this case in 
particular, it is important to take a slightly different approach than in my other chapters.  The 
strongest alternative explanation is that this transition was not a civil resistance transition at all 
but instead that the transition was solely a matter of military initiative, and its terms dictated by 
the hierarchy of the Brazilian military leadership.  Brazil is one of the cases most often cited as 
an example of a pacted transition brought about through top-down initiative, and Wendy 
Hunter describes the position of the Brazilian military at the beginning of the transition as 
“unassailable” (Hunter, 1997, p. 26).   Since this is the case, is my theory truly applicable? 
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 That initiative on the part of the military leadership played a key role in Brazil’s 
transition is undeniable.  The decision by President Geisel to initiate the distensão or 
“decompression” and later abertura or “opening” critically shaped the sequence of events that 
resulted in Brazil’s transition to democracy.  It is difficult to imagine the shape of the Brazilian 
transition had such steps not been taken.   
 But similarly, it is difficult to imagine the shape of the Brazilian transition, or indeed 
even the occurrence of a transition, absent the long tireless efforts of the opposition.  The years 
of abertura were a dialectical process, in which both the government and opposition were 
feeling out how far they could push the other (Skidmore, 1989).  As Mainwaring writes: “many 
changes were not foreseen by the originators of the abertura; they rather reflected an ongoing 
process of opposition initiatives, followed by subsequent regime response and initiatives, with 
occasional negotiating between the two sides” (Mainwaring, 1989, p. 196).  The process of 
abertura was not merely a matter of top-down initiative but reflected pushes from both above 
and below. 
When Geisel came to power and initiated some liberalizing steps his vision was not of 
democratization but a gradual move towards increased participation by “responsible elites.”  
Their steps were designed not to democratize the Brazilian government, but rather to stabilize a 
form of authoritarian rule (Schneider, 1991, p. 269), in which elections might occur but pro-
government parties would always win (Skidmore, 1988, p. 164; Martinez-Lara, 1996).  The 
military continued to open because they feared the consequences if they remained closed.  
They feared the consequences of remaining closed at least in part because of the intensity of 
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widespread opposition to their regime, which they anticipated would continue to narrow their 
range of potential options if they kept the political regime fully closed (Schneider, 1991, p. 270).   
Once abertura was initiated, resistance by the opposition played a key role in cementing 
the gains made and pushing for more.  As Lamounier writes: “The importance of movements of 
so-called civil society…was not so much that they forced the beginning of the abertura, but that 
little by little they created informal but effective constraints on the dictatorial exercise of 
power” (Lamounier, 1989, p. 71).  Nonviolent resistance prevented a return to dictatorial 
control and pushed the minimal liberalization envisioned by the military into a full-fledged 
democratic transition.  Interviewees who had participated in various civil society movements 
during this period heavily emphasized this aspect of the democratic resistance. 
 The military did enjoy a significant degree of influence over the transition.  There was no 
full breakdown of regime control, and military leaders were able to negotiate significant 
concessions for themselves in the new regime.  But this control was by no means absolute, and 
by the time of Collor’s presidency had faded significantly into the background (Zirker, 1993).  As 
Wendy Hunter’s work shows, in the transitional period military leaders quickly found 
themselves sidelined by the political leaders that had been elevated to positions of influence.  
For example, the Brazilian military had a well-known preference in limiting labor rights in the 
new democratic regime, and in particular limiting the right to strike (Hunter, 1997, p. 84).  Yet 
well-organized popular mobilization by the Brazilian labor movement not only resulted in 
increased protection of labor rights, but even got the right to strike enshrined in the Brazilian 
constitution.  When the military attempted to intervene in strikes during the transition, it 
sparked such wide societal backlash that the military was forced to significantly scale back its 
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role in labor relations (Hunter, 1997, p. 90).  If the military were pulling the strings all along we 
would not expect to see this result. 
 Thus I argue that it is reasonable to look at Brazil as a case of a Civil Resistance 
Transition.  Civil Resistance did not lead to the disintegration of the Brazilian military regime.  
But disintegration is only one of the mechanisms whereby civil resistance can achieve political 
change.  The Brazilian case evidences instead the mechanisms of accommodation, in which the 
opponent perceives the shifting balance of power brought about through nonviolent resistance 
and attempts to avoid a worse result by going along with it (Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent 
Action, 1973, pp. 733-40).   
 So much for the idea that the military leaders in Brazil were solely responsible for the 
transition and its character.  What about broader arguments related to modernization? 
 Brazil had certainly gone through significant socio-economic development when the 
transition began in 1985.  Yet it is difficult to see the mechanisms of modernization theory at 
work in the Brazilian case, primarily because of Brazil’s high degree of inequality.  While GDP per 
capita had risen to a level beyond which democratic breakdowns were unlikely, these economic 
gains were heavily concentrated in Brazil’s wealthiest classes.  A large majority of the Brazilian 
population still lived (and lives) in extreme poverty.   
 Increasing levels of economic development, education, etc… were filtered through a 
particular set of strategies pursued by the major political actors in Brazil’s transition.  The 
economic situation shaped, but did not determine the particular shape that these strategies 
took.   
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 Elite theory is a better candidate in the Brazilian case.  Elite pacts did play an important 
role in both initiating the transition and in determining its shape.  Brazil, more than most 
countries, has a political elite whose shape is fairly straightforward to observe.  A number of 
large political families have dominated the country’s politics for most of its history and at least 
in part continue to do so today.   
 Yet even here the boundaries of “the elite” are porous, and an explanatory model that 
rests upon their preferences is of limited utility.  One example of this porousness is the rise of 
the PT and a new set of “elites” such as Lula.  By transition’s end Lula and the PT leadership 
were certainly in the ranks of Brazil’s political elite.  Yet at what point do we determine their 
entry?  The 1978 strikes that initially brought them some level of political influence?  Their first 
accession to political power in 1980s?   
 Similarly, even the PMDB’s “elite” credentials are questionable before the transition.  
Prior to the 1982 election the PMDB’s power was almost entirely symbolic.  They had little to no 
power to actually influence policy, certainly at the national level and even at the state and local 
level.  By 1985 their position of political power certainly qualifies them as “elite.”   
 During the transitional period whether there was an elite consensus is also empirically 
questionable.  While the appetite for a return to military rule may have been limited, there was 
a great diversity of opinion as to the character of the future Brazilian regime.  For example, the 
early drafts of the constitution as drawn up by the Afonso Arinos commission prior to the 
beginning of the constituent assembly envisaged a move from a presidential system of 
government to a parliamentary system of government.  After the assembly began, many 
members of the PMDB supported such a proposal as a way of undermining the authority of 
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President Sarney.  Only later in the constitutional drafting process did the presidential system 
return to prominence, and the vote between the two options in the constitutional assembly was 
sharply divided.   
 Even the basic structure of democracy was questioned by more fringe groups during the 
transition, with some groups even advocating for a return to a monarchical system of 
government (Sa, 2014, p. 139), a position of such influence that the country held a referendum 
on the subject in 1993.   
 Similarly, the traditional transitology approach, which was in part inspired by the early 
stages of the Brazilian transition, certainly fits the transition to some degree.  But the fear over 
popular mobilization and emphasis on the agency of elites will lead us astray if we focus on 
them too heavily.   The political decisions of ordinary people played a central role in shaping the 
transition’s direction, and the mobilization of society to continue to push the transition forward 
was key in leading Brazil to not just become an illiberal quasi-democracy but instead a well-
developed, highly democratic political system. 
 Thus, in the end, I argue that, while prior theories do a good job of explaining some of 
the features of the Brazilian transition, my theory adds important explanatory power.  The 
transitional dynamics themselves shaped the development of Brazilian democracy, leading to a 
result that could have been very different had political leaders and ordinary people made 
different choices. 
 This examination of the Brazilian transition concludes my three case studies and the 
“model-testing small-n analysis” component of my nested analysis research design (Lieberman, 
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2005).  In all three cases, while the qualitative examination of the cases revealed some potential 
additional factors to explore, such as the degree of autonomy of political mobilization during the 
transition, the qualitative research supports my quantitative findings.  High mobilization and 
high maximalism in the Nepali case undermined the institutionalization of a new democratic 
system and led to a fractious semi-democracy.  Low mobilization and low maximalism in the 
Zambian case led to an elite semi-democracy.  And in Brazil the combination of high mobilization 
and low maximalism during the transition has led to  
 The case studies also confirm the uncertain and inconsistent impact of holdovers policy.  
Similar policies in different cases have had radically different results.  This also confirms the 
weak statistical finding in regards to holdovers policy, and speaks both to the strength of the 
statistical model overall and to the need for greater research to examine the impact of 
holdovers policy on democratization. 
 With my case studies concluded, I now move to a final chapter summarizing the findings 
of this research, examining its limitations, and articulating potential areas for expansion and 
future research.  
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Conclusion: Civil Resistance and Democratization 
 In this study I have examined the question of democratization in transitions initiated by 
nonviolent resistance.  The study was motivated by this underlying empirical puzzle: that despite 
the overall positive influence of nonviolent resistance on the prospects for democratization, we 
have still observed significant variation in democratic prospects in civil resistance transitions.  
Why is this the case?  And can it be explained simply by looking at underlying variation in the 
facilitating conditions for democracy in these transitions? 
 I have shown through a nested analysis research design, beginning with quantitative 
analysis and then supplementing with three case studies that the answer does not lie in these 
traditional structural approaches to democratization.  These give us part, but not all of the 
answer to the puzzle.  In order to explain democratization in civil resistance transitions we must 
examine the political dynamics and patterns of behavior within the transitional period itself.  As 
Francisco Weffort, one of the protagonists of the democratization struggle in Brazil, writes:  
“It is always possible to take different paths of action…much as the conditions weigh 
upon the situation, much as the past imposes itself, there are always choices to make.  A 
political action is par excellence, an act of freedom.  It takes place only in the present 
and in the face of a future which is always open and uncertain” (Weffort, 1989, p. 331). 
This builds upon the insights of transitologists, who have long pointed to the importance 
of the contingent decisions of political actors.  I extend their work by building simple, 
parsimonious theory that can be consistently operationalized cross-nationally and fits the 
incentives implied by a transition initiated through nonviolent resistance.   I theorized three 
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challenges based on the simple core characteristics of political transitions that would be likely to 
affect democratization. 
 The evidence of the quantitative testing and case studies is that two of these challenges: 
transitional mobilization and maximalism, consistently impact both the likelihood of democracy 
and its quality at the conclusion of civil resistance transitions.  The impact of holdovers policies 
is less consistent cross-nationally, and is an area for further research.  Quantitatively, the index 
of lustration policies gives us little additional information about the level of democracy and 
likelihood of crossing the democratic threshold, either when looked at linearly or quadratically.  
Similarly, while I have identified some effects of holdovers policy in my cases, these effects are 
inconsistent.  In Zambia, the failure to punish members of the old regime and the full-fledged 
integration of those members into the new regime had a pernicious effect on the transition, 
resulting in an elite semi-democracy.  In Brazil, however, the pernicious effects of a similar policy 
were undermined by the consistent application of popular mobilization and the political 
incentives of an incoming political class. 
 These challenges mediate the impact of more exogenous structural factors such as the 
degree of socio-economic modernization and the percentage of democratic neighbors.  That is 
to say, while structural factors exert some effect both on the likelihood of successfully resolving 
these strategic challenges and on the level of democracy, this does not mean that the effects of 
mobilization and maximalism can be reduced to their structural preconditions.  The level of 
correlation between these strategic factors and structural factors is not sufficient to justify this 
conclusion.  In addition, adding the strategic factors to a structural model significantly improves 
model fit across multiple estimation methods, indicating the increase in variance explained by 
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looking beyond structure.  Thus it is empirically justifiable and analytically useful to incorporate 
this kind of strategic analysis into explanatory models of democratic transitions. 
 I ground this approach in a structurationist understanding of social theory, building on 
the insights of Giddens and others that critique the model of remote structural causes acting on 
temporally posterior actors.  Actors and structures co-constitute one another, meaning that the 
decisions of individuals, particularly in situations of political flux, may diverge from what we 
might expect to be a structural “equilibrium path.”  Thus, systematizing patterns of behavior is a 
productive means of improving both our analytic understanding and predictive power when it 
comes to rare, yet consequential phenomena such as CRTs. 
 The enumeration of the two challenges that I have found support for in this analysis is 
by no means the last word on the question of CRT democratization, nor of my broader 
theoretical approach of operationalizing all of the steps along the causal chain from a structural 
antecedent to a political outcome.  Numerous other challenges could certainly be articulated.  
For instance, the decisions of military leaders to either submit to civilian leadership or attempt 
to subvert the transition is a crucial factor in almost every transition. 
 The key thing to keep in mind when formulating new challenges to test is the necessity 
of broad applicability and explanatory parsimony.  The role of the military, for instance, is highly 
context-dependent, based on whether the prior authoritarian regime was a military regime or 
not.   
 In this study I have attempted to gain explanatory parsimony by limiting my 
independent variables to factors that can be defined on the basis of level of political power and 
preferences regarding the old and new regime, characteristics which can reasonably be applied 
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across the board to transitions of any kind.  Other similarly parsimonious theoretical schema are 
certainly possible.  Scholars should bring as many models as possible to bear in the interest of 
gaining explanatory leverage.  Yet we should be careful to not overfit our models by selecting 
explanatory variables whose character is limited to transitions of a particular time, place, or 
prior regime. 
 Next steps in this research program involve building these new models and working 
towards the expansion of the approach.  There are three avenues where I see this research most 
productively continuing.  First, articulating additional challenges through continuing to theorize 
about the political incentives implied by the nature of civil resistance transitions.  Second, 
applying this approach to looking at the broader questions of democratization more generally, 
and third looking systematically at the sources of the patterns of mobilization and maximalism in 
political transitions.   
 First, what other challenges might we articulate and test to build better explanations of 
democratization in CRTs?  One insight from the case studies relates to mobilization.  
Mobilization was most effective in promoting democratization when it was independent from 
the political parties that came into power after the success of the civil resistance movement.  
When mobilization was tied too closely to political leaders, its democratizing effect was 
attenuated.  In Nepal, for instance, activism has been hampered by the perception that most 
“independent” civil society actors are in fact simply figures from one of the country’s three 
political parties for whom it is not currently convenient to be in office.  Attempts to pursue 
ostensibly non-partisan, pro-democratic agendas are perceived by major political actors as being 
strategically deployed for partisan benefit.  In Zambia, the fact that the infrastructure of 
resistance was almost entirely channeled through an organization that became a political party 
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meant that once that political party entered power there were few powerful countervailing 
forces to resist its excesses.  In Brazil, in contrast, the opposition had been highly dispersed 
among different groups with divergent goals.  The years of transition were characterized by high 
levels of pressure from groups that had only tangential connections to particular political 
parties, and thus could credibly advocate for their particular issue areas. 
 Thus an additional challenge in civil resistance transitions would relate to not just the 
existence of mobilization during the transitional period but also its organizational structure.  
What are avenues through which mobilization is pursued?  Related to this, a more specific 
examination of the goals of mobilization could also enrich our understanding of the mechanisms 
whereby mobilization has its positive effect on democratization.  Numerous other challenges 
could also be articulated.  The careful blending of qualitative theory building and quantitative 
testing will be crucial in establishing the applicability and effects of these challenges. 
 Second, do maximalism and mobilization have the same effects in other kinds of 
democratic transitions?  I theorize that the mechanisms should operate similarly, but with some 
important divergences.  We would expect that popular pressure would generally be positive for 
democratization, and the disruption caused by maximalist political contention would generally 
be negative.  Yet the contextual differences between a CRT and other forms of political 
transition should impact their effects.  
Finally, understanding the sources of mobilization and maximalism in a systematic way 
will be another crucial way to expand this research agenda.  In this study I have argued that 
there is a certain degree of equifinality in the paths to particular patterns of behavior during 
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political transitions.  Multiple stimuli can lead to the particular set of decisions that take place 
during a transition. 
My models show as well that this set of patterns cannot be reduced to any of the “usual 
suspects” in democratization theory.  For instance, high mobilization during a political transition 
does not automatically come in countries with high levels of modernization, or in those 
countries that had relatively light authoritarian regimes prior to the transition.  Just as civil 
resistance itself is difficult to predict through structural factors (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017), so 
are the patterns of behavior during civil resistance transitions.  Yet, just as I have shown that 
strategic factors during the transition matter in defining the transition’s conclusion, so it is 
certainly plausible that particular strategic factors from before the transition might matter 
systematically in at least partially explaining these patterns of behavior. 
Scholars have already done some initial work in examining these questions.  For 
instance, in a 2014 study I showed that the mechanism whereby a nonviolent resistance 
movement succeeded in ousting an authoritarian regime had a statistically significant influence 
on the country’s level of post-transition democracy (Pinckney 2014).  As with civil resistance 
itself, the effects of these mechanisms might work through affecting the levels of mobilization 
and maximalism during the transition. 
Similarly, Charles Butcher and his co-authors (2018) have shown that when certain 
social groups, particularly labor unions, participate in nonviolent resistance movements, their 
future level of democracy is significantly increased.  This occurs because these groups have 
justifications for functioning that come from quotidian needs that endure beyond the ousting of 
the old regime.  Thus, these groups are able to continue to mobilize resistance once the old 
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regime has been removed.  The mechanism here is identical to my mechanism of transitional 
mobilization.  Thus, examining the connections between the makeup of resistance movements 
and patterns of mobilization would likely be a fruitful avenue to explore. 
Political institutions in the old regime may also have an impact on the likelihood of 
democratization and the level of democracy in the country at the end of the transition.  Scholars 
of the post-Communist transitions in Eastern Europe, for example, have argued that countries 
that had allowed for even minimal, non-competitive opposition were better prepared for their 
democratic transitions than those that had largely suppressed opposition (Ekiert, Kubik, & 
Vachudova, 2007).  One mechanism for this effect to obtain would be through affecting the 
mobilizational capacity of various social and political actors during the transition and making 
maximalism a less attractive choice. 
 What are the lessons of this study for the study of nonviolent resistance more 
generally?  One lesson is positive.  Civil resistance as a force for initiating political change does 
indeed have a powerful democratizing effect, an effect which is stronger and more consistent 
than many of the other traditionally-considered sources of democratization.  Civil resistance 
certainly is not less democratizing than more orderly, elite-led transitions, and in fact seems to 
be much more democratizing.  Thus the critique of civil resistance as, on average, ushering in 
“Maidancracies” in which unstable street politics destroy the potential for establishing 
consolidated democratic institutions, is largely unfounded, at least when compared to all other 
potential sources for political transition (Li, 2014). 
 However, civil resistance transitions can certainly break down.  Initiating a transition 
nonviolently, while it may give a country an advantage in the struggle for democratization, is by 
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no means a panacea.  Many civil resistance transitions fall short of the high-flown democratic 
ideals that outside observers often attribute to them at the heights of their mobilization.   
 Yet, when civil resistance transitions break down we can understand the systematic 
sources of that breakdown: they tend to come when either mobilization fails or maximalism 
triumphs.  Maintaining mobilization during the transition is a difficult challenge, as the 
centralizing and unifying figure of the old regime is no longer there to maintain disparate 
factions’ connections to one another.  The temptations of maximalism, using the disruptive and 
destructive potential of nonviolent resistance for narrow political ends, is also a major challenge 
that a country’s new leadership often fails to overcome.  And breakdowns in mobilization and 
moves to high levels of maximalism eliminate much of the advantage of civil resistance over 
other types of transition.    
 The insights into the effects of mobilization and maximalism on democratization also 
speak to several related debates in the nonviolent resistance literature.  For instance, there is 
both a popular and a scholarly debate over the potential benefits of mixing nonviolent 
resistance with violent tactics.  Some argue that any departure from strict nonviolent discipline 
reduces the chances of campaign success through undermining the mechanisms of nonviolent 
action (Chenoweth & Schock, 2015), while other work argues that mixing some violent tactics 
with nonviolent ones protects vulnerable nonviolent protesters, aids in creating the kinds of 
disruption that make nonviolent resistance effective, and may give the nonviolent segments of a 
resistance campaign greater appeal and leverage over their opponents (Haines, 1984). 
 Leaving the question of success aside, my research indicates that the use of violent 
tactics to overthrow an authoritarian regime likely has a pernicious effect on long-term 
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democratization through encouraging maximalist political dynamics.  This was clearest in Nepal, 
where the fact that Nepal’s political parties, particularly the Maoists, had armed cadres that 
they could call upon significantly undermined trust between major political actors, discouraged 
compromise, and encouraged attempts by all the actors involved to push as much as possible 
for their own secure power base. 
 Are there practical lessons for political leaders and ordinary citizens of countries going 
through civil resistance transitions?  The necessity of strong, continued popular mobilization 
beyond the moment of the campaign itself is a clear implication of the work.  How can this 
mobilization be achieved?  The case studies have several lessons here.  Suspicion  of one’s own 
leaders is one important lesson.  In Zambia, mobilization collapsed in large part because of the 
faith in the new MMD government.  In Nepal, mobilization continued but became tainted with 
maximalism as the avenues for mobilization largely followed the dictates of particular political 
leaders.  Thus personalized nonviolent movements with prominent leaders who dictate the 
character of mobilization to their followers might be one risk factor for a decline in mobilization 
during a transitional period.  Similarly, a too close attachment to the fortunes of any particular 
leader, rather than to the success of the system, may encourage the kinds of winner-take-all 
politics characteristic of high maximalism systems. 
 The findings also speak to the importance of compromise, and the potential for tension 
between democracy as a set of political institutions and as an ultimate goal.  The sources of 
maximalism in Nepal, for instance, were given greater salience by a push to fundamentally 
restructure the state through the demands of particular narrowly defined communities.   
Engaging in maximalism, while it may lead to short-term gains, ultimately undermines the 
institutional frameworks that support democratic consolidation. 
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 In conclusion, I return to the words of Hannah Arendt that opened this study, and the 
distinction between liberation and freedom.  The road to liberation is hard enough, filled with 
treacherous passes and forks to choose from whose import may only be clearly seen long after 
they have passed.  And yet, achieving liberation, overthrowing an old oppressive regime, is only 
the beginning.  Getting from liberation to freedom is long, arduous, and uncertain.  Yet we may 
shed at least a little light on the turns in the path.  If the work done here enlightens that long 
road even a little for one of the many heroic travelers on that journey, then all the effort put 
into it will be more than worth it.  
 
  
 
  
 260 
 
Works Cited 
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Achen, C. H. (2002). Toward a New Political Methodology: Microfoundations and ART. Annual 
Review of Political Science, 5, 423-50. 
Achen, C. H. (2005). Let's Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits Where They 
Belong. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 22, 327-39. 
Adhikari, A. (2014). The Bullet and the Ballot Box: The Story of Nepal's Maoist Revolution. 
Brooklyn, NY: Verso. 
Aditya, A. (2016). Minorities on March; Turbulent Tarai-Madhes: Reshaping Party Image and 
Renurturing Nepali Politics. In The Role of Political Parties in Deepening Democracy in 
Nepal: A Study of Party Image, Issues at Stake, and Agenda Building (pp. 1-114). 
Kathmandu: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
Almeida, T. F. (2015). Araguaia: Maoist Uprising and Military Counterinsurgency in the Brazilian 
Amazon, 1967-1975. Amhert, MA: University of Massachusetts - Amherst (Master's 
Thesis). 
Althaus, S., Bajjalieh, J., Carter, J. F., Peyton, B., & Shalmon, D. A. (2017). Cline Center Historical 
Phoenix Event Data Variable Descriptions. Cline Center for Democracy. Retrieved from 
http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/event/phoenix/ 
 261 
 
Alvarez, S. (1989). Politicizing Gender and Engendering Democracy. In Democratizing Brazil: 
Problems of Transition and Consolidation (pp. 205-251). New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
Avritzer, L. (1995). Transition to Democracy and Political Culture: An Analysis of the Conflict 
Between Civil and Political Society in Post-Authoritarian Brazil. Constellations, 2(2). 
Banks, A. S. (2016). Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Binghamton: Center for Social 
Analysis, State University of New York. 
Barahona de Brito, A. (2001). Truth, Justice, Memory, and Democratization in the Southern 
Cone. In A. Barahona de Brito, P. Aguilar, & C. Gonzalez-Enriquez (Eds.), The Politics of 
Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies (pp. 119-60). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Barnett, M., & Duvall, R. (2005). Power in International Politics. International Organization, 
59(1), 39-75. 
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social 
Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), 1173-82. 
Barro, R. J. (1999). Determinants of Democracy. Journal of Political Economy, 107(6), 158-83. 
Bates, R. (1997). Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy? PS: Political Science and 
Politics, 166-69. 
Bauer, G., & Taylor, S. D. (2011). Politics in Southern Africa: Transition and Transformation. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 262 
 
Bayer, M., Bethke, F. S., & Lambach, D. (2016). The Democratic Dividend of Nonviolent 
Resistance. Journal of Peace Research, 758-71. 
Beissinger, M. (2013). The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine's Orange 
Revolution. American Political Science Review, 107(3), 574-92. 
Bernhard, M., Reenock, C., & Nordstrom, T. (2004). The Legacy of Western Overseas Colonialism 
on Democratic Survival. International Studies Quarterly, 48(1), 225-50. 
Berry, J. M. (2002). Validity and Reliability Isues in Elite Interviewing. PS: Political Science and 
Politics, 35(4), 679-82. 
Bethke, F. S., & Pinckney, J. (2016). Nonviolent Resistance and the Quality of Democracy. V-Dem 
Users Working Paper. 
Bia, M., & Mattei, A. (2008). A Stata Package for the Estimation of the Dose-Response Function 
Through Adjustment for the Generalized Propensity Score. The Stata Journal, 8(3), 354-
73. 
Blackledge, P. (2006). Reflections on Marxist Theory of History. Manchester, UK: Manchester 
University Press. 
Boix, C. (2003). Democracy and Redistribution. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Bonacich, P. (1972). Factoring and Weighting Approaches to Clique Identification. Journal of 
Mathematical Sociology, 2, 113-20. 
Bratton, M. (1999). Political Participation in a New Democracy: Institutional Considerations from 
Zambia. Comparative Political Studies, 32(5), 549-88. 
 263 
 
Bratton, M., & Van de Walle, N. (1997). Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in 
Comparative Perspective. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Bratton, M., Alderfer, P., & Simutanyi, N. (1997). Political Participation in Zambia, 1991-1996: 
Trends, Determinants and USAID Program Implications. Washington, DC: United States 
Agency for International Development. 
Brinks, D., & Coppedge, M. (2006). Diffusion is no Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave 
of Democracy. Comparative Political Studies, 39(4), 463-89. 
Bueno de Mesquita, B. (2005). The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Bunce, V. J. (2003). Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist 
Experience. World Politics, 55(2), 167-92. 
Bunce, V. J., & Wolchik, S. L. (2011). Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist 
Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Burrows, M., & Stephan, M. J. (Eds.). (2014). Is Authoritarianism Staging a Comeback? 
Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council. 
Butcher, C., Gray, J. L., & Mitchell, L. (2018). Striking it Free? Organized Labor and the Outcomes 
of Civil Resistance. Journal of Global Security Studies, Forthcoming. 
Carothers, T. (2002). The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 5-21. 
Carter Center. (2008, April). Observing the 2008 Nepal Constituent Assembly Election. Retrieved 
August 15, 2017, from The Carter Center: 
 264 
 
https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_repor
ts/finalreportnepal2008.pdf 
Celestino, M. R., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2013). Fresh Carnations or all Thorn, no Rose? Nonviolent 
Campaigns and Transitions in Autocracies. Journal of Peace Research, 50(3), 385-400. 
Central Bureau of Statistics. (2014). Population Monograph of Nepal: Volum II - Social 
Demography. Kathmandu, Nepal: Government of Nepal. Retrieved from 
http://cbs.gov.np/image/data/Population/Population%20Monograph%20of%20Nepal%
202014/Population%20Monograph%20V02.pdf 
Chandra, K. (2006). What is Ethnic Identity and Does it Matter? Annual Review of Political 
Science, 9, 397-424. 
Cheeseman, N., & Larmer, M. (2015). Ethnopopulism in Africa: Opposition Mobilization in 
Diverse and Unequal Societies. Democratization, 22(1), 22-50. 
Chenoweth, E. (2015). Trends in Civil Resistance and Authoritarian Responses. In Is 
Authoritarianism Staging a Comeback? (pp. 53-62). Washington, DC: The Atlantic 
Council. 
Chenoweth, E., & Schock, K. (2015). Do Contemporaneous Armed Challenges Affect the 
Outcomes of Mass Nonviolent Campaigns? Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 
20(4), 427-51. 
Chenoweth, E., & Stephan, M. (2011). Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of 
Nonviolent Resistance. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
 265 
 
Chenoweth, E., & Ulfelder, J. (2017). Can Structural Conditions Explain the Onset of Nonviolent 
Uprisings? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(2), 298-324. 
Chikulo, B. (1993). End of an Era: An Analysis of the 1991 Zambian Presidential and 
Parliamentary Elections. Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, 20(1), 87-
104. 
Chiluba, F. (1994). Democratisation in Zambia (Doctoral Dissertation). Warwick, UK: University of 
Warwick. 
Collier, R. B., & Collier, D. (1991). Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, The Labor 
Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press. 
Cooley, A. (2015). Countering Democratic Norms. Journal of Democracy, 26(3), 49-63. 
Cooper, A. (2008). Nepal: The Constituent Assembly Election 2008. Bangkok: The Asian Network 
for Free Elections. 
Coppedge, M., Alvarez, A., & Maldonado, C. (2008). Two Persistent Dimensions of Democracy: 
Contestation and Inclusiveness. The Journal of Politics, 70(3), 632-47. 
Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, S., Hicken, A., . . . Teorell, J. (2011). 
Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach. Perspectives on Politics, 
9(2), 247-67. 
Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S.-E., Teorell, J., Altman, D., . . . Paxton, P. 
(2016). V-Dem Dataset v6. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. 
 266 
 
Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S.-E., Teorell, J., Altman, D., . . . Pemstein, D. 
(2017). V-Dem Codebook v7. Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. 
Dahl, R. (1957). The Concept of Power. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 2(3), 201-15. 
Dahl, R. (1973). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Dahl, R. (1991). Modern Political Analysis (5th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
de Souza, M. d. (1989). The Brazilian "New Republic": Under the Sword of Damocles. In 
Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation (pp. 351-394). New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. 
Deininger, K., & Squire, L. (1996). A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality. The World Bank 
Economic Review, 10(3), 565-91. 
Della Cava, R. (1989). The "People's Church," The Vatican, and Abertura. In A. Stepan (Ed.), 
Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation (pp. 143-167). New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. 
Do, Q.-T., & Iyer, L. (2010). Geography, Poverty, and Conflict in Nepal. Journal of Peace Research, 
47(6), 735-48. 
Dutt, P., & Mitra, D. (2008). Inequality and the Instability of Polity and Policy. Economic Journal, 
118(531), 1285-1314. 
Easton, D. (1953). The Political System. New York: Alfred A Knopf. 
Ekiert, G., & Kubik, J. (1999). Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic 
Consolidation in Poland, 1989-1993. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
 267 
 
Ekiert, G., Kubik, J., & Vachudova, M. A. (2007). Democracy in the Post-Communist World: An 
Unending Quest? East European Politics and Societies, 21(1), 7-30. 
Erdmann, G., & Simuntanyi, N. (2003). Transition in Zambia: The Hybridisation of the Third 
Republic. Lilongwe, Malawi: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. 
Farrar, D. E., & Glauber, R. R. (1967). Multicollinearity in Regression Analysis: The Problem 
Revisited. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 49(1), 92-107. 
Fatton, R. (1999). The Impairments of Democratization: Haiti in Comparative Perspective. 
Comparative Politics, 31(2), 209-29. 
Fernandes, T. (2015). Rethinking Pathways to Democracy: Civil Society in Portugal and Spain, 
1960s-2000s. Democratization, 22(6), 1074-1104. 
Fish, M. S. (2002). Islam and Authoritarianism. World Politics, 55(1), 4-37. 
Friedman, M. (1953). Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research, 6(3), 167-91. 
Ganz, M. (2009). Why David Sometimes Wins: Leadership, Organization, and Strategy in the 
California Farm Worker Movement. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Garcia-Ponce, O., & Wantchekon, L. (2017). Critical Junctures: Independence Movements and 
Democracy in Africa. Working Paper. 
Geddes, B. (1999). What do we know about Democratization after Twenty Years? Annual Review 
of Political Science, 2(1), 115-44. 
 268 
 
Geddes, B., Wright, J., & Frantz, E. (2014). Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New 
Data Set. Perspectives on Politics, 12(2), 313-31. 
Gerring, J. (2004). What is a Case Study and What Is It Good For? American Political Science 
Review, 98(2), 341-54. 
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press. 
Giddens, A. (1995). A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism. Standord, CA: Standord 
University Press. 
Gleditsch, K. S., & Ward, M. (2006). Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization. 
International Organization, 60(4), 911-33. 
Gleditsch, K. S., & Ward, M. D. (1997). Double Take: A Re-Examination of Democracy and 
Autocracy in Modern Polities. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(3), 361-83. 
Goertzel, T. G. (1999). Fernando Henrique Cardoso: Reinventing Democracy in Brazil. Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Haber, S., & Menaldo, V. (2011). Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of 
the Resource Curse. American Political Science Review, 105(1), 1-26. 
Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. R. (2012). Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and 
the Stability of Democratic Rule. American Political Science Review, 106(3), 495-516. 
Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. R. (2016). Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime 
Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 269 
 
Haines, H. H. (1984). Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957-1970. Social 
Problems, 32(1), 31-43. 
Harrison, E., & Mitchell, S. M. (2014). The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West. 
London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hausman, J. A. (1983). Specification and Estimation of Simultaneous Equation Models. In Z. 
Griliches, & M. D. Intriligator (Eds.), Handbook of Econometrics (pp. 391-448). 
Cambridge, MA: Elsevier. 
Head, M. L., Holman, L., Lanfear, R., Kahn, A. T., & Jennions, M. D. (2015). The Extent and 
Consequences of P-Hacking in Science. PLoS Biology, 13(3). Retrieved from 
http://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.1002106 
Helvey, R. (2004). On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals. Boston, 
MA: The Albert Einstein Institution. 
Higley, J., & Burton, M. G. (2006). Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield. 
Hinfelaar, M. (2008). Legitimizing Powers: The Political Role of the Catholic Church, 1972-1991. 
In J.-B. Gewald, M. Hinfelaar, & G. Macola (Eds.), One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards 
a History of Post-Colonial Zambia (pp. 129-43). Leiden: Brill Publishers. 
Hipsher, P. L. (1998). Democratic Transitions and Social Movement Outcomes. In M. G. Giugni, 
D. McAdam, & C. Tilly (Eds.), From Contention to Democracy (pp. 149-67). Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
 270 
 
Hirano, K., & Imbens, G. W. (2004). The Propensity Score with Continuous Treatments. In 
Applied Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference from Incomplete-Data Perspectives (pp. 
73-84). New York: Wiley. 
Hochstetler, K. (2000). Democratizing Pressures from Below? Social Movements in the New 
Brazilian Democracy. In P. R. Kingstone, & T. J. Power (Eds.), Democratic Brazil: Actors, 
Institutions, and Processes (pp. 167-184). Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Honaker, J., King, G., & Blackwell, M. (2011). Amelia II: A Program for Missing Data. Journal of 
Statistical Software, 45(7), 1-47. 
Houle, C. (2009). Inequality and Democracy:Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not 
Affect Democratization. World Politics, 61(4), 589-622. 
Hughes, M. M., Peterson, L., Harrison, J. A., & Paxton, P. (2009). Power and Relation in the 
World Polity: The INGO Network Country Score, 1978-1998. Social Forces, 87(4), 1711-
42. 
Hunter, W. (1997). Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers. Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press. 
Ihonvbere, J. O. (1995). From Movement to Government: The Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy and the Crisis of Democratic Consolidation in Zambia. Canadian Journal of 
African Studies, 29(1), 1-25. 
Ihonvbere, J. O. (1995). The 'Zero Option' Controversy in Zambia: Western Double Standards vis 
a vis Safeguarding Security? Africa Spectrum, 30(1), 93-104. 
 271 
 
Ioannidis, J. P. (2005). Why Most Published Researched Findings Are False. PLoS Medicine. 
Retrieved from 
http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124 
Jeffery, R. (2017). Nepal's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Human Rights, Compliance, and 
Impunity a Decade On. International Affairs, 93(2), 343-64. 
Jenkins, R. M. (1992). Movements into Parties: The Historical Transformation of the Hungarian 
Opposition. Program on Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper Series #25. 
Johnstad, P. G. (2010). Nonviolent Democratization: A Sensitivity Analysis of How Transition 
Mode and Violence Impact the Durability of Democracy. Peace & Change, 35(3), 464-82. 
Karatnycky, A., & Ackerman, P. (2005). How Freedom is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable 
Democracy. New York, NY: Freedom House. 
Keck, M. E. (1992). The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Kingstone, P., Young, J. K., & Aubrey, R. (2013). Resistance to Privatization: Why Protest 
Movements Succeed and Fail in Latin America. Latin American Politics and Society, 55(3), 
93-116. 
Kinzo, M. D. (1988). Legal Opposition Politics under Authoritarian Rule in Brazil: The Case of the 
MDB, 1966-79. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press. 
 272 
 
Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In I. 
Lakatos, & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (pp. 91-196). New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Lakier, G. (2007). Illiberal Democracy and the Problem of Law: Street Protest and 
Democratization in Multiparty Nepal. In M. Lawoti (Ed.), Contentious Politics and 
Democratization in Nepal (pp. 251-72). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Lamounier, B. (1989). Authoritarian Brazil Revisited: The Impact of Elections on the Abertura. In 
A. Stepan (Ed.), Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation (pp. 43-
82). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Lamounier, B., & Neto, O. A. (2005). Brazil. In D. Nohlen (Ed.), Elections in the Americas: A Data 
Handbook (Vol. II, pp. 163-252). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Landman, T. (2005). Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study. Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press. 
Larmer, M. (2011). Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia. Burlington: 
Ashgate. 
Leech, B. L. (2002). Asking Questions: Techniques for Semistructured Interviews. PS: Political 
Science and Politics, 35(4), 665-68. 
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold 
War. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Li, E. X. (2014, October 6). The Umbrella Revolution Won't Give Hong Kong Democracy. 
Protesters Should Stop Calling for It. Retrieved June 19, 2016, from The Washington 
 273 
 
Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/10/06/the-umbrella-
revolution-wont-give-hong-kong-democracy-protesters-should-stop-calling-for-it/ 
Lichbach, M. I. (1998). The Rebel's Dilemma. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Lieberman, E. S. (2005). Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research. 
The American Political Science Review, 99(3), 435-52. 
Linz, J. (1973). The Future of an Authoritarian Situation of the Institutionalization of an 
Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil. In A. Stepan (Ed.), Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, 
Policies, and Future (pp. 233-54). New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Linz, J. (1978). The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration. 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Pres. 
Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69-105. 
Lipset, S. M. (1960). Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Lukes, S. (1986). Power. New York, NY: NYU Press. 
 274 
 
Mainwaring, S. (1989). Grassroots Popular Mobilization and the Struggle for Democracy: Nova 
Iguacu.". In A. Stepan (Ed.), Democratizing Brazil: Challenges of Transition and 
Consolidation (pp. 168-204). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Malupenga, A. (2009). Levy Patrick Mwanawasa: An Incentive for Posterity. Grahamstown, 
South Africa: NICS (pty), Ltd. 
Marcus, R. R. (2004). Political Change in Madagascar: Populist Democracy or Neopatrimonialism 
by Another Name? Institute for Security Studies Papers, 89, 1-20. 
Marshall, M. G., Gurr, T. R., & Jaggers, K. (2016). Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2015. Center for Systemic Peace. 
Martinez-Lara, J. (1996). Building Democracy in Brazil: The Politics of Constitutional Change, 
1985-95. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press. 
Marx, K. (1978). The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. In R. C. Tucker (Ed.), The Marx-
Engels Reader (pp. 594-617). New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 
May, T. (2015). Nonviolent Resistance: A Philosophical Introduction. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Mbikusita-Lewanika, A. (2003). Hour for Reunion: Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, 
Conception, Dissension, and Reconciliation. Lusaka: African Lineki Courier. 
McAdam, D. (1982). Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
McCracken, G. (1988). The Long Interview. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 275 
 
McFaul, M. (2002). The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative 
Transitions in the Postcommunist World. World Politics, 54(2), 212-44. 
Mill, J. S. (1967). A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. London, UK: Longmans. 
Mills, T. C., & Patterson, K. (2006). Palgrave Handbook of Econometrics. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Mitzen, J. (2006). Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma. 
European Journal of International Relations, 12(3), 341-70. 
Mohamedou, M.-M. O., & Sisk, T. (2016). Turbulent Transitions into the 21st Century. In M.-M. 
O. Mohamedou, & T. Sisk (Eds.), Democratization in the 21st Century: Reviving 
Transitology. Taylor & Francis. 
Moore, B. (1966). Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making 
of the Modern World. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. 
Moore, P., Chenoweth, E., Day, J., Hunter, K., Pinckney, J., & Stauch, N. (2016). The Major 
Episodes of Contention (MEC) Data Project: An Introduction. Working Paper. 
Mosca, G. (1939). The Ruling Class. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Muller, E., & Seligson, M. (1987). Inequality and Insurgency. The American Political Science 
Review, 81(2), 425-52. 
Murdie, A. (2009). The Impact of Human Rights NGO Activity on Human Right Practices. 
International NGO Journal, 4(10), 421-40. 
 276 
 
National Democratic Institute. (1997). The November 18, 1996 National Elections in Zambia: A 
Post-Election Assessment Report. Retrieved August 22, 2017, from National Democratic 
Institute: https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/870_zm_report_111896.pdf 
Nelson, S. (1996). Constructing and Negotiating Gender in Women's Police Stations in Brazil. 
Latin American Perspectives, 23, 131-48. 
Nepal Ministry of Peace and Reconciliation. (2005). 12-Point Understanding Reached Between 
the Seven-Party Alliance And Nepal Communist Party (Maoists). Retrieved August 11, 
2017, from UN Peacemaker: 
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/NP_051122_12%20Point%20
Understanding.pdf 
Nepstad, S. E. (2011). Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Nylen, W. R. (2000). The Making of a Loyal Opposition: The Workers' Party (PT) and the 
Consolidation of Democracy in Brazil. In P. R. Kingstone, & T. J. Power (Eds.), Democratic 
Brazil: Actors, Institutions, and Processes (pp. 126-143). Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
O'Donnell, G. (1996). Illusions About Consolidation. Journal of Democracy, 7(2), 34-51. 
O'Donnell, G., & Schmitter, P. (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Olsen, T. D., Payne, L. A., & Reiter, A. G. (2010). Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing 
Processes, Weighing Efficacy. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
 277 
 
Olsen, T., Payne, L., & Reiter, A. (2010). Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, 
Weighing Efficacy. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. 
Pareto, V. (1915). The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology. New York, NY: Dover. 
Paxton, P., Hughes, M. M., & Reith, N. E. (2015). Extending the INGO Network Country Score, 
1950-2008. Sociological Science, 2, 287-307. 
Peduzzi, P., Concato, J., Kemper, E., Holford, T. R., & Feinstein, A. R. (1996). A Simulation Study 
of the Number of Events per Variable in Logistic Regression Analysis. Journal of Clinical 
Epidemiology, 49(12), 1373-79. 
Pemstein, D., Meserve, S. A., & Melton, J. (2010). Democratic Compromise: A Latent Variable 
Analysis of Ten Measures of Regime Type. Political Analysis, 18(4), 426-49. 
Pinckney, J. (2015, September 18). Why This Week's Coup in Burkina Faso Might Not Last. 
Retrieved May 17, 2016, from Foreign Policy: 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/18/why-this-weeks-coup-in-burkina-faso-might-not-
last/ 
Pishchikova, K., & Youngs, R. (2016). Divergent and Partial Transitions: Lessons from Ukraine and 
Egypt. In M.-M. O. Mohamedou, & T. Sisk (Eds.), Democratization in the 21st Century: 
Reviving Transitology. Abingdon, UK: Taylor & Francis. 
Popper, K. (1962). Prediction and Prophecy in the Social Sciences. In K. Popper, Conjectures and 
Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Przeworksi, A., & Teune, H. (1970). The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. Malabar, FL: Robert 
E. Krieger Publishing Company. 
 278 
 
Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy and Development: 
Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Putnam, R. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Rabushka, A., & Shepsle, K. A. (1972). Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic 
Instability. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing. 
Rakner, L. (2003). Political and Economic Liberalization in Zambia 1991-2001. Stockholm: The 
Nordic Africa Institute. 
Reynolds, A. (1999). Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
Roberts, A., Willis, M. J., McCarthy, R., & Garton Ash, T. (Eds.). (2016). Civil Resistance in the 
Arab Spring: Triumphs and Disasters. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Robinson, W. I. (1996). Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. H., & Stephens, J. D. (1992). Capitalist Development & 
Democracy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 279 
 
Rustow, D. A. (1970). Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. Comparative Politics, 
2(3), 337-63. 
Sa, A. (2014). The Citizen's Constitution: A Study of the Constitution Making Process in the 
Transition to Democracy in Brazil. New York, NY: The New School for Social Research 
(PhD Dissertation). 
Sandoval, S. A. (1993). Social Change and Labor Unrest in Brazil Since 1945. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. 
Schaffer, H. B. (2002). Back and Forth in Bangladesh. Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 76-83. 
Schedler, A. (1998). What is Democratic Consolidation? Journal of Democracy, 9(2), 91-107. 
Schneider, R. M. (1991). Order and Progress: A Political History of Brazil. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Pres. 
Schrodt, P. A., Gerner, D. J., YIlmaz, O., & Hermreck, D. (2008). The CAMEO (Conflict and 
Mediation Event Observations) Actor Coding Framework. Annual Meeting of the 
International Studies Association. 
Schumpeter, J. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Sharma, S., & Sen, P. K. (2008). Nepal Contemporary Political Situation - V. Kathmandu: 
Interdisciplinary Analysts. 
Sharp, G. (1973). The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Boston, MA: Porter Sargent Publishers. 
Sharp, G. (2005). Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential. 
Boston, MA: Porter Sargent Publishers. 
 280 
 
Shrestha, M. B., & Chaudhary, S. K. (2014). The Economic Cost of General Strikes in Nepal. Nepal 
Rastra Bank Economic Review, 26(1), 1-23. Retrieved August 15, 2017, from 
https://www.nrb.org.np/ecorev/pdffiles/vol26-1_art1.pdf 
Sishuwa, S. (2012). Review: Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia by 
Miles Larmer. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 50(2), 363-65. 
Skidmore, T. E. (1988). The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
Skidmore, T. E. (1989). Brazil's Slow Road to Democratization: 1974-1985. In A. Stepan (Ed.), 
Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation (pp. 5-42). New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
Skocpol, T. (1973). A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy. Politics & Society, 4(1), 1-34. 
Skocpol, T. (1979). States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and 
China. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Smithey, L., & Kurtz, L. R. (1999). "We Have Bare Hands:" Nonviolent Social Movements in the 
Soviet Bloc. In Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective (pp. 96-124). 
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
Spradley, J. P. (1979). The Ethnographic Interview. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. 
Stepan, A. (1989). Introduction. In A. Stepan (Ed.), Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition 
and Consolidation (pp. vii-xvii). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 281 
 
Stradiotto, G. A., & Guo, S. (2010). Transitional Modes of Democratization and Democratic 
Outcomes. International Journal on World Peace, 27(4), 5-40. 
Svolik, M. (2012). The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Tarrow, S. (1993). Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire 
of Contention. Social Science History, 17(2), 281-307. 
Teles, J. d. (2017). The Araguaia Guerrilla War (1972 - 1974): Armed Resistance to the Brazilian 
Dictatorship. Latin American Perspectives, 44(5), 30-52. 
Teorell, J. (2010). Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 
1972-2006. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Tilly, C. (1978). From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Treier, S., & Jackman, S. (2008). Democracy as a Latent Variable. American Journal of Political 
Science, 52(1), 201-17. 
Tucker, J. A. (2007). Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist 
Colored Revolutions. Perspectives on Politics, 5(3), 535-51. 
Ulfelder, J. (2010). Dilemmas of Democratic Consolidation: A Game-Theory Approach. Boulder, 
CO: FirstForumPress. 
van Donge, J. K. (1995). Zambia: Kaunda and Chiluba - Enduring Patterns of Political Culture. In J. 
A. Wiseman (Ed.), Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 193-219). 
New York, NY: Routledge. 
 282 
 
Vinthagen, S. (2015). A Theory of Nonviolent Action: How Civil Resistance Works. London, UK: 
Zed Books. 
Vittinghoff, E., & McCulloch, C. E. (2007). Relaxing the Rule of Ten Events per Variable in Logistic 
and Cox Regression. American Journal of Epidemiology, 165(6), 710-18. 
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Weffort, F. (1989). Why Democracy. In Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and 
Consolidation (pp. 327-50). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Wina, S. (1985). The Night Without a President. Lusaka: Multimedia Publications. 
Wood, E. J. (2000). Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El 
Salvador. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
World Integrated Trade Solution. (2017). Nepal Trade at a Glance: Most Recent Values. 
Retrieved August 14, 2017, from http://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/NPL 
Zartman, I. W. (Ed.). (2015). Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat. Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press. 
Zirker, D. (1986). Civilianization and Authoritarian Nationalism in Brazil: Ideological Opposition 
Within a Military Dictatorship. Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 14, 263-76. 
Zirker, D. (1993). The Military Ministers and Political Change in Post-Authoritarian Brazil. 
Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 18(35), 87-110. 
Zolberg, A. R. (1972). Moments of Madness. Politics & Society, 2(2), 183-207. 
 
 283 
 
Appendix A: Variable Coding and Additional Statistical Tests 
 
Expanding Authoritarian Regimes Data 
 I expanded the Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) (GWF) dataset on authoritarian 
regimes through 2015 to include new cases of political transition.  I checked a number of 
sources to ascertain whether a regime change event occurred from 2011-2015.  For countries 
coded as democracies by GWF my first source to check was the V-Dem Polyarchy score.  If the 
score had remained more or less the same as in 2010 (less than a 0.2 decline), I simply coded a 
democratic regime as continuing through 2015.  If there had been a decline in the Polyarchy 
score I then checked the Freedom House reports on the country to ascertain the reasons for the 
declining score.  This was typically enough to determine whether a democratic breakdown (as 
defined by the GWF codebook) had occurred.   
 For authoritarian regimes I checked the Archigos dataset to determine whether there 
had been an irregular leader entry or exit from 2010-2015.  If no irregular leader change had 
occurred I simply coded the regime as continuing through 2015.  If Archigos did code an 
irregular leadership change I checked the Archigos case narratives and other secondary sources 
to determine the nature of the change. 
 I also added a prior regime coding of “colonial” to regimes if they entered the dataset as 
a result of obtaining independence from their colonizer (excluding previously colonized 
countries which became independent prior to 1946).  This allowed me to include cases of 
transition from colonial rule. 
 I attempted to follow the GWF coding rules as closely as possible, and unless the 
empirical evidence was overwhelmingly strong I deferred to their prior codings.  Prior to reading 
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the case notes below I recommend reading the GWF codebook for context, available at: 
http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/wp-content/uploads/sites/12570/2016/05/GWF-Codebook.pdf. 
Specific Case Codings 
Bosnia: GWF code Bosnia as “foreign-occupied” because of the power of the High 
Representative to overturn elected government decisions.  I follow their coding rule. 
Honduras: I coded this as a democratic regime continuing despite the country’s 2009 coup. The 
coup plotters did not fundamentally change regime rules and democratic elections (according to 
GWF rules) were held in 2010 and 2014. 
Guinea Bissau: I code the regime as provisional from 2012-2013.  A military coup in 2012 
deposed the democratic government, but the military authorities quickly established a 
transitional government that did end with free and fair elections.  I code the regime as 
democratic from 2014 onward.  
Macedonia: The country has had some serious democratic backsliding since 2010, particularly 
related to the 2014 election, however, unlikely that this rises to the level of GWF coding rules 
for democratic breakdown.  While GWF do consider a “rigged election” one possible start date 
for an authoritarian regime, it is unclear that the 2014 election would definitively qualify as 
“rigged.”  See Freedom House 2015 report on Macedonia 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/macedonia. 
Thailand: I code the democratic regime as ending in 2014 with the military coup that overthrew 
Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, and a military regime in 2015. 
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Myanmar: I considered re-coding Myanmar as beginning a democratic regime in 2011.  V-Dem 
marks Myanmar’s polyarchy score as improving from 0.18 in 2010 to 0.44 in 2015.  However, 
this is still extremely low, and Freedom House codes the country as still “Not Free” as of the end 
of the year in 2015.  Hence I coded the prior authoritarian regime as continuing. 
Kyrgyzstan: I coded Kyrgyzstan as beginning a democratic regime in 2011.  V-Dem codes a jump 
of around 0.1 in polyarchy score from 2010 to 2011 which is subsequently sustained.  Freedom 
House also codes the country as moving from “Not Free” to “Partly Free,” and records that the 
2010 election was free and fair. 
Afghanistan: I continued GWF’s coding of Afghanistan as personalistic from 2009 through 2015.  
I code  a regime failure moment at the 2014 election since this fits the definition of regime 
change, but this did not mark a democratic transition since the election was not free and fair.  It 
is difficult to categorize the current Afghan regime in terms of GWF’s typology, hence for ease of 
analysis I simply keep it as personalistic. 
Yemen: I code the Saleh regime as ending on 23 November with President Saleh’s signing of the 
GCC power-transfer agreement.  The following Hadi regime I code as provisional because Hadi 
was elected in an unopposed election with a mandate to orchestrate a transition to democracy.  
I code this regime as ending in 2014 with the Houthi takeover of Sana’a and subsequent 
breakout of civil war across Yemen. 
Egypt: I code the “Egypt 52-NA” regime as ending with Mubarak’s resignation on Feb 11th, 2011.  
I code the following regime as “provisional.”  While it was led by the military, it explicitly took 
power as a temporary measure to lead up to democratic elections, and then did in fact allow the 
elections to occur in 2012 when Mohammed Morsi was elected.  I code Morsi’s regime as 
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democratic because his election was widely considered to be free and fair.  I code the beginning 
of a new regime with the coup that overthrew Morsi in 2013, and the subsequent regime under 
Abdel-fatah al-Sisi as Military-Personalistic. 
Iraq: GWF code Iraq as transitioning from foreign occupation to autocracy in the beginning of 
2011.  I code the subsequent regime as party-personal, reflecting the domination both by Shi’a 
political parties and specifically by Nouri al-Maliki. 
Turkey: I strongly considered Turkey as moving to a personalistic regime during this period.  
However, Freedom House reports that the 2015 election, while certainly contentious, was 
relatively free and fair.  It is certainly possible, indeed likely, that the Erdogan regime’s 
crackdown on opposition following the 2016 attempted coup mark Turkey’s move away from 
democracy, but it does not appear that this transition occurred prior to 2016. 
Libya: I code the Gadhafi regime as ending with the fall of Sirte in November 2011.  The 
subsequent regime by the General National Council I code as provisional, and ending in 2014 
with the beginning of major hostilities between the Tripoli and Tobruk governments. 
Tunisia: I code the Ben Ali regime as ending with President Ben Ali’s flight from Tunisia on 
January 14th, 2011.  I code the following regime as provisional, first under Fouad Mebazaa and 
then under the National Constituent Assembly, which was tasked with running the government 
until a constitution could be written and democratic elections held.  I code this regime as 
continuing until the presidential and parliamentary elections in the fall of 2014, when I code 
Tunisia as becoming a democracy. 
Madagascar: GWF code the regime of Andry Rajoelina beginning in 2009 as personalistic.  
Rajoelina maintained that his regime was transitional, and did in fact allow another candidate to 
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take power in 2014.  Thus, I considered coding the regime as provisional.  However, by a strict 
reading of GWF’s coding rules, provisional governments are only those charged with conducting 
elections as “part of a transition to democracy,” and thus coding the Rajoelina regime as 
autocratic is closer to their rules.  I code the regime as failing with the assumption of power by 
democratically-elected president Rajaonarimampianina in January 2014. 
Botswana: GWF code Botswana as a single-party authoritarian regime due to the domination of 
Botswanan politics by the Botswana Democratic Party.  V-Dem gives Botswana a fairly high 
Polyarchy score (roughly 0.7 during the whole 2010-2015 period), one well above other regimes 
that GWF code as democracies.  However, for the sake of continuity I deferred to GWF’s coding 
and coded Botswana as a single-party authoritarian regime through 2015. 
Zambia: GWF code Zambia as a single-party regime from the 1996 ban on major opposition 
parties through the election of 2011 when the opposition Patriotic Front was allowed to take 
power, after which they say Zambia was a democracy.  I follow their coding and code Zambia as 
a democracy from 2012-2015. 
Burundi: GWF code Burundi as a democracy beginning with the election of 2005.  I code this 
democratic regime as ending in 2010 because of the widespread electoral fraud and 
intimidation of the opposition that characterized the May-July 2010 elections.  This follows 
GWF’s coding rules of an authoritarian regime starting when a leader assumes power through 
an election that is not free and fair (GWF Codebook page 6).  I code the following regime as a 
party-personal regime. 
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CAR: I code the regime in CAR as ending in 2013 with the capture of Bangui by the Seleka militia.  
I code the subsequent regime under Michel Djotodia as personalistic, and code it as ending with 
Djotodia’s resignation and the election of Catherine Samba-Panza in 2014.   
Burkina Faso: I code the Compaore regime in Burkina Faso as ending in October 2014 with 
Compaore’s ouster in the 2014 Lwili Revolution.  I code the following regime under interim 
president Michel Kafando as provisional – the regime was explicitly set up to prepare for 
democratic elections, which did in fact take place in late 2015.  Late 2015 marks the beginning of 
a democratic regime.  There was an attempted coup in late 2015, but the coup failed to 
ultimately unseat Kafando. 
Guinea: GWF code Guinea as becoming a democracy following the free and fair election of 
President Conde in 2010.  Guinea’s status as a “democracy” is certainly problematic – the 
regime repeatedly delayed holding parliamentary elections until 2013, and the elections 
themselves were marked by significant violence and allegations of fraud.   However, the 2015 
presidential election, while characterized by violence, was judged to be relatively free and fair 
by international observers (Freedom House).  Thus, by a strict reading of the GWF coding rules 
Guinea should be considered a democracy.  I thus code Guinea’s regime from the 2010 election 
through the present as democratic. 
Ivory Coast: I code the regime in Ivory Coast as ending in 2011 with the arrest of Laurent Gbagbo 
following the civil war after the 2010 election.  While the 2010 election was widely considered 
acceptably free and fair, and thus the subsequent regime could be coded as a democracy 
(following GWF’s coding rules), the electoral outcome was ultimately not determinative of the 
new regime.  Thus, I code the following regime as provisional until the 2015 election in which 
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President Outtara won re-election in an election that was widely considered free and fair 
(Freedom House). 
Niger: I code the regime in Niger as ending with the 2010 coup that ousted President Mamadou 
Tandja.  The following regime I code as an authoritarian military regime that continued until the 
2011 presidential elections.  These elections were judged as relatively free and fair, and initiated 
a democratic regime that continued until the end of 2015. 
Mali: I code the Malian democratic regime as ending in 2012 with the coup that overthrew 
President Toure.  The subsequent regime I code as military – the government was first directly in 
the hands of the military, and then under a nominal civilian administration which was 
nonetheless dominated by the military.  I code Mali as returning to democracy following the 
2013 presidential elections, which were judged to be free and fair by international observers 
(Freedom House). 
Guinea Bissau: I code the Guinea Bissau democratic regime as ending in 2012 with the coup that 
took place between the two rounds of the presidential election.  I code the following regime as 
military, and ending with the agreement that put in place the transitional unity government in 
early 2013.  The transitional government I then code as ending in 2014 when relatively free and 
fair presidential elections took place.  I code the subsequent regime as democratic. 
Ukraine: This is the only place where I directly diverge from a coding by GWF.  They code 
Ukraine as democratic from its independence from the Soviet Union in 1992.  However, by their 
coding rules autocratic regimes start when an executive achieves power through undemocratic 
means, i.e. elections that are not reasonably competitive.  According to experts, the 1999 
election of Leonid Kuchma was very far from free and fair, and Kuchma subsequently 
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significantly changed the rules for choosing leaders and policies, centralizing presidential power 
(Freedom House).  Thus I code Ukraine as autocratic from 1999 to 2004, when the Orange 
Revolution defeated Kuchma’s successor.  I code Ukraine as democratic subsequently.   V-Dem 
shows a precipitous decline in Ukraine’s polyarchy score following the Euromaidan protests and 
ouster of President Yanukovych.  I decided to code a regime failure event in 2014, considering 
the dramatic change in rules for choosing leaders and policies that took place in the aftermath 
of the Euromaidan protests.  However, because Yanukovych’s ouster and a free and fair 
executive election both took place in 2014, the country-years show up as a continuous 
democratic period. 
Missing Prior Regimes for Civil Resistance Transitions 
 In addition to expanding the GWF data through 2015 I also filled in some missing values 
from the GWF data on regimes in existence prior to the beginning of a civil resistance transition.  
Almost all of these codings were fairly straightforward and uncontroversial, however, for the 
sake of transparency and clarity I include each of these codings here. 
Guatemala 1945: I code the previous regime as personalistic.  The regime prior to the civil 
resistance campaign here was dominated by the dictator Jorge Ubico.  While Ubico emerged 
from the military he did not rule as part of a military junta or other military structure but rather 
as a personalistic dictator. 
India 1947, Morocco 1956, Ghana 1956, Malawi 1960, Democratic Republic of the Congo 1960, 
Zambia 1964, and Timor-Leste 2002 I all code as being foreign-ruled since the prior regime in all 
these cases was a colonial authority. 
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Belarus 1991, Latvia 1991, Estonia 1991, Lithuania 1991, and Kyrgyzstan 1991 I all code as being 
single-party ruled since they were all part of the Soviet Union. 
Slovenia 1991 I similarly code as being single-party ruled, since they were part of the single-
party Communist regime in Yugoslavia. 
Guyana 1992. I code the previous regime as single-party due to the domination of politics by the 
People’s National Congress (PNC) party.  See Hinds, David. 2005. “Problems of Democratic 
Transition in Guyana: Mistakes and Miscalculations in 1992.” Social and Economic Studies 54, vol 
1. 67-82. 
Additional Information on Sources and Variable Construction  
 In this section I present additional information on all of the variables that go into my 
analysis, including the secondary controls used in robustness checks.   To illustrate each variable 
Democracy: The Polyarchy Score 
 I operationalize my dependent variable using the polyarchy score from the Varieties of 
Democracy project.  I described the polyarchy index in brief in the main text – its goal is to, as 
far as is possible, capture the multi-dimensional nature of the concept of democracy in a single 
aggregated index.  To that end, the polyarchy score is an index of indexes, aggregating different 
dimensions of democracy that themselves are made up of particular empirical indicators.  To 
give a better sense of the underlying concept of polyarchy that the creators of V-Dem are 
seeking to capture through the polyarchy score I quote from the codebook at some length: 
“The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers 
responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s 
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approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society 
organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or 
systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of 
the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent 
media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-
Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of 
any other conception of (representative) democracy – liberal, participatory, 
deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.” (Coppedge, et al., V-Dem Codebook v7, 2017, 
p. 47). 
 
Practically speaking ,the polyarchy score is constructed by aggregating the scores from 
five different indexes: V-Dem’s freedom of association index, freedom of expression index, clean 
elections index, elected officials index, and suffrage index.  These indexes are aggregated by 
taking their weighted average and then adding their multiplicative interaction.  This 
incorporates the ideas both that, on the one hand, weaknesses along one dimension can be 
made up for by strengths in another but also that being particularly “weak” in any one 
dimension can undermine the strength of the other dimensions.  For more detail, see the V-Dem 
codebook, pages 47-48, as well as Teorell et al 2016. 
 
Transitional Mobilization 
 
 As I describe in Chapter 2, this measure seeks to capture the degree to which political 
action and engagement continue through the transitional period.  That is to say, how much is 
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the mobilization of the civil resistance campaign carried through once its major goals of regime 
change have been achieved? 
 My independent variable is a factor made up of three underlying components, two of 
which capture more conventional political engagement while the third captures more 
unconventional, typical “civil resistance” type activities.  Here I put coding details for each of 
these three underlying variables, as described in their original data sources. 
 
Engaged Society 
 
 This is an expert-coded variable from the V-Dem dataset.  Experts were asked to code 
their responses to the question: “when important policy changes are being considered, how 
wide and how independent are public deliberations?”  Their answers could take one of six 
possible ordinal levels, defined as follows: 
 
“0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed. 
1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels 
is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in 
them. 
2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite 
actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites. 
3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups 
participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be 
the same across issue-areas. 
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4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of nonelite 
groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas. 
5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss 
major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, 
or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained. “ 
(Coppedge, et al., V-Dem Codebook v7, 2017, pp. 202-203). 
 The V-Dem coders then transform these aggregated ordinal codings from multiple 
expert coders into a single continuous variable using the V-Dem Item Response Theory 
methodology as described in the main text. 
Civil Society Participation 
 
 This is another expert-coded variable from the V-Dem dataset.  V-Dem asked its country 
experts to code their responses to the question: “Which of these best describes the 
involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)?”  Their answers could take 
one of four ordinal values:  
 
“0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people 
may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary. 
1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them. 
2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal. 
3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least 
occasionally active in at least one of them.” 
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(Coppedge, et al., V-Dem Codebook v7, 2017, p. 246). 
As above, the V-Dem coders then transform these aggregated ordinal codings from 
multiple expert coders into a single continuous variable using the V-Dem Item Response Theory 
methodology. 
Contentious Mobilization 
 
 This variable is intended to capture more contentious, confrontational, non-
conventional and yet nonviolent forms of collective action, or in short: nonviolent resistance as I 
have defined it in Chapter 1.  My primary source is the Phoenix Historical Event Data Set 
recently released by the Cline Center for Democracy at the University of Illinois and produced in 
collaboration with the Open Event Data Alliance (OEDA).   
 Researchers at the Cline Center and the OEDA produced the Phoenix Historical Event 
Data by first collecting a corpus of roughly 14 million news articles from three distinct sources: 
the New York Times, the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) Summary of World Broadcasts 
(SWB) and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) produced by the CIA.  These articles 
were then transformed into event data using the second version of the Python Engine for Text 
Resolution and Related Coding Hierarchy (PETRARCH-2) software, with some minor 
modifications (Althaus, Bajjalieh, Carter, Peyton, & Shalmon, 2017, pp. 1-2).  PETRARCH-2 
interprets the information contained in news articles to produce conflict event data following 
the CAMEO structure of actors performing verbs on targets (Schrodt, Gerner, YIlmaz, & 
Hermreck, 2008). 
 As an almost-fully automatically collected and coded dataset, the Phoenix Data has one 
key advantage and one key disadvantage.  Its advantage is its breadth and scope.  The greater 
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efficiencies of automated coding allow the project to incorporate a vast amount of data and 
code a staggering number of events.  The complete dataset incorporates almost 5 million events 
from its three sources from every country in the world for a period of seventy years.  To create 
the same data using human coders would be prohibitively time-consuming and expensive. 
 However, the disadvantage of automated coding is its accuracy.  As the dataset’s 
creators readily acknowledge, their process results in significant duplication of events and mis-
categorization based on their algorithm’s misinterpretation of non-conflict related events such 
as soccer matches.  The problem of duplication is particularly problematic when attempting to 
code over a long period of time, as the quality and scope of coverage has increased over time, 
and certain countries are almost certainly covered in greater depth than others.   
 Hence, the events in Phoenix are best used not as individual units of analysis, but as part 
of a larger trend-line, and with the biases of uneven coverage over time and space taken into 
account. 
 Hence, in transforming this data for my purposes I take three key steps before using the 
data in analysis.  First, I take the annual account of “protest” events from each country as 
reported by each of the three different sources in Phoenix and then average the three 
numbers.65   I then take each annual global cross-section and average the number of events per 
country reported in that year.  I then adjust the event counts by subtracting this average from 
each country’s event count in that year to account for temporal reporting bias.  I then perform 
                                                          
65 “Protest” events are those with a CAMEO root code of 14.  The broad category contains more specific 
categories such as “demonstrate or rally,” “conduct hunger strike,” “conduct strike or boycott,” “obstruct 
passage, block,” and “protest violently, riot” (Althaus, Bajjalieh, Carter, Peyton, & Shalmon, 2017, pp. 19-
20). 
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the same operation on each country-specific time series, subtracting the mean from each 
annual count within that country.   
 The result is a continuous variable that captures the relative degree of protest activity in 
a country in a particular year, taking into account some degree both temporal and geographic 
reporting bias.  These efforts to address potential bias issues, and my use of the data not in 
terms of the attributes of single events but rather in large aggregates give me confidence that 
this is the best data source to use in measuring contention during transitional periods. 
 However, since this source is relatively new I perform robustness checks using an 
alternative measure of political contention: the Cross-National Time Series Data Archive 
originally created by Arthur Banks (2016).  The archive contains data on many different aspects 
of countries’ economic, social, and political systems.  Their most relevant set of variables are 
those capturing annual counts of so-called “domestic conflict events.”  This set of variables and 
their coding rules are listed in Table Ap.1 below: 
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Table Ap.1: Bank Cross-National Time Series Domestic Conflict Event Codings 
Variable Domestic Conflict Event Data Definitions 
Anti-
government 
Demonstrations 
Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary 
purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies 
or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign 
nature. 
Assassinations 
Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high 
government official or politician. 
General Strikes 
Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves 
more than one employer and that is aimed at national government 
policies or authority. 
Guerrilla 
Warfare 
Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent 
bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the 
present regime. 
Major 
Government 
Crises 
Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of 
the present regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at such 
overthrow. 
Purges 
Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition 
within the ranks of the regime or the opposition. 
Revolutions 
Any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at 
such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose 
aim is independence from the central government. 
Riots 
Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving 
the use of physical force. 
 
 I summed the number of anti-government demonstrations and general strikes to create 
my “contention” variable.   
 The primary benefit of the CNTS is its wide scope.  Annual data have been collected 
from 1815 through 2015 (excluding the periods of WWI, 1914-1918, and WWII, 1940-1945).  The 
drawback is that the data’s sourcing is somewhat unclear and limited, particularly for non-
Western countries.    Thus, while I consider this source adequate as a robustness check I do not 
consider it as good a source as the Phoenix data. 
Maximalism 
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 As I describe in Chapter 2, this variable seeks to capture the degree to which the tools of 
civil resistance are employed in a way that is destructive of the current system and is essentially 
“winner-take-all” in its orientation.  The maximalism factor that I use in my analysis incorporates 
four underlying indicators, three from V-Dem and one from the Polity IV dataset.  I detail the 
coding rules for each of them here. 
Electoral Boycotts  
 
 This is an ordinal expert-coded variable.  V-Dem asked its country experts to answer the 
question: “In this national election, did any registered opposition candidates or parties 
boycott?” with the clarification that “a boycott is a deliberate and public refusal to participate in 
an election by a candidate or a party who is eligible to participate.”  Coders could give one of 
five responses: 
 “0: Total.  All opposition parties and candidates boycotted the election. 
1: Significant. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but it is 
unclear whether they would have constituted a major electoral force. 
2: Ambiguous. A few opposition parties or candidates boycotted and they were 
relatively insignificant ones. 
3: Minor. A few opposition parties or candidates boycotted and they were relatively 
insignificant ones. 
4: Nonexistent. No parties or candidates boycotted the elections.”  
(Coppedge, et al., V-Dem Codebook v7, 2017, pp. 96-97) 
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As above, the V-Dem coders then transform these aggregated ordinal codings from 
multiple expert coders into a single continuous variable using the V-Dem Item Response Theory 
methodology. 
 
Acceptance of Electoral Results 
 
This is also an ordinal expert-coded variable.  V-Dem asked its country experts to answer 
the question: “Did losing parties and candidates accept the result of this national election within 
three months?”  Coders could give one of five responses: 
 “0: None.  None of the losing parties or candidates accepted the results of the election, 
or all opposition was banned. 
1: A few. Some but not all losing parties or candidates accepted the results but those 
who constituted the main opposition force did not. 
2: Some. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results but it is 
unclear whether they constituted a major opposition force or were relatively 
insignificant. 
3: Most. Many but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results and 
those who did not had little electoral support. 
4: All. All parties and candidates accepted the results.”  
(Coppedge, et al., V-Dem Codebook v7, 2017, p. 107) 
As above, the V-Dem coders then transform these aggregated ordinal codings from 
multiple expert coders into a single continuous variable using the V-Dem Item Response Theory 
methodology. 
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Anti-System Movements 
 
 This was also an ordinal, expert-coded variable from V-Dem that asked expert coders 
the question: “Among civil society organizations, are there anti-system opposition movements?”  
With the clarification that:  “an anti-system movement is any movement – peaceful or armed = 
that is based in the country (not abroad) and is organized in opposition to the current political 
system.  That is, it aims to change the polity in fundamental ways, e.g., from democratic to 
autocratic (or vice versa), from capitalist to community (or vice versa), from secular to 
fundamentalist (or vice versa).  This movement may be linked to a political party that competes 
in elections but it must also have a “movement” character, which is to say a mass base and an 
existence separate from normal electoral competition.  If there are several movements, please 
answer in a general way about the relationship of those movements to the regime.”  Coders 
could assign one of five values: 
 “0: No, or very minimal. Anti-system movements are practically nonexistent. 
 1: There is only a low-level of anti-system movement activity but it does not pose much 
of a threat to the regime. 
2: There is a modest level of anti-system movement activity, posing some threat to the 
regime. 
3: There is a high level of anti-system movement activity, posing substantial threat to 
the regime. 
4: There is a very high level of anti-system movement activity, posing a real and present 
threat to the regime.” 
(Coppedge, et al., V-Dem Codebook v7, 2017, p. 247). 
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As above, the V-Dem coders then transform these aggregated ordinal codings from 
multiple expert coders into a single continuous variable using the V-Dem Item Response Theory 
methodology. 
 
Sectarian Political Competition 
 
 The next component of my maximalism measure comes from the Polity IV dataset, 
which, among its various components measures the degree of “regulation of participation” in a 
political system.  This is originally a five-point scale going from unregulated to regulated.  
However, each step on the scale has its own detailed description.  I determined after examining 
these descriptions that the closet approximation of maximalism as I had theorized it was the 
level that the Polity IV authors describe as “sectarian.”  The complete description of “Sectarian” 
political competition from the Polity IV codebook is as follows:  
“Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent 
posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less regularly between 
intense factionalism and government favoritism, that is, when one identity group 
secures central power it favors group members in central allocations and restricts 
competing groups' political activities, until it is displaced in turn (i.e., active 
factionalism). Also coded here are polities in which political groups are based on 
restricted membership and significant portions of the population historically have been 
excluded from access to positions of power (latent factionalism, e.g., indigenous peoples 
in some South American countries).” 
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(Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016, p. 26). 
 
I created a binary variable measuring whether or not a country’s politics in a particular 
year were coded as “sectarian” by Polity IV. 
 
Modernization 
 
 My measure of modernization is a factor variable made up of four underlying elements: 
GDP per capita, urbanization, education, and infant mortality.  I present details on each of these 
underlying elements below: 
GDP Per Capita (Logged) 
 
 I import this variable from V-Dem and transform it using the natural logarithm.  The 
variable’s original source is the Maddison Project.  For details on their data collection process, 
see Bolt and van Zanden 2014 as well as the project’s website: 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm. 
Urbanization 
 
 The variable is the ratio of the total urban population to the country’s total population.  
Urban population is defined according to “the criteria of each area of country.”  I import this 
variable from V-Dem.  The original data comes from the Clio-Infra project at the International 
Institute of Social History in the Netherlands.  V-Dem then fills in missing years of data through 
linear interpolation.  For more detail see the V-Dem codebook, v7, pages 391-92 or the Clio-Infra 
project website at https://www.clio-infra.eu/.  
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Education 
 
 The variable is the average number of years of education received for those over the 
age of 15, with some years of missing data imputed using a linear model based on sources that 
measure the average years of educational attainment, primary school completion rate, 
secondary school enrollment rate, and literacy rate.  I import this variable from V-Dem.  They 
base the variable on several original sources – primarily Clio Infra, but also data from the World 
Bank and others.  For more detail see the V-Dem codebook, v7, page 369 or the Clio Infra 
website at https://www.clio-infra.eu/. 
Infant Mortality 
 
 The base variable is the number of deaths prior to age 1 per 1000 live births in a year.  I 
invert the variable so that the “good” outcome of lower infant mortality is at the high end of the 
variable, and thus the variable can be incorporated into a modernization factor.  I import the 
variable from V-Dem.  They draw the data for the variable from Gapminder and Clio Infram and 
linearly interpolate missing data within a time series.  For more detail see the V-Dem codebook, 
v7, pages 389-390, and the Clio Infra and Gapminder websites at https://www.clio-infra.eu/ and 
www.gapminder.org respectively.   
Trade Data 
 
 My data on trade used in generating the Western linkage control variable comes from 
the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).  I sum the annual flow of exports and imports for 
each country from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the Euro Area, and 
then divide by the country’s GDP.     
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Transitional Endpoints 
 
 Determining the endpoint of a political transition is a challenging task, often only fully 
realizable post facto.  Since transitions by definition are period in which the rules of the political 
game are in flux, one can only tell whether the flux has concluded by observing recurring 
patterns over a particular period of time. 
 I use the V-Dem polyarchy score to determine my primary measure of transitional 
endpoints.  I first create a variable measuring the annual difference in polyarchy score.  I then 
created three different variables to measure what degree of flux was necessary to consider a 
country “still in transition.”  The first measure considers a transition to be continuing any time 
there is a continuous change in the polyarchy score of at least one standard deviation.  The 
second and third measures consider transitions to be ongoing if the level of change in polyarchy 
score exceeds a cut-off point of either 0.1 and 0.05.  These cut-off points are, of course, 
somewhat arbitrary, but reflect the pattern of change in the polyarchy score around these 
transitional moments.66 
 The three measures are highly correlated with one another, with only minor differences.  
For all three measures, the modal length of transition is a single year while the maximum length 
is ten years.   
 I use these measures of transitional endpoints for two purposes.  First, I measure my key 
dependent variables related to levels of democracy at the transitional endpoint rather than at 
                                                          
66 The mean change in polyarchy score in the year of a civil resistance transition is 0.13.  The mean annual 
change in polyarchy score over a five-year period following a civil resistance transition is 0.62. 
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an arbitrary point in the future following the initiation of the transition.  Second, I perform tests 
where I average my independent variables across all years in the transitional period. 
 As I describe in the main text, I determine the beginnings of transitions by looking at 
authoritarian regime failures as described in the data on authoritarian regimes produced by 
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz.  I supplement their data with data on civil resistance campaigns 
that successfully overthrew a non-democratic regime from Chenoweth, Shay, and Lewis.   
 A coding challenge arose when considering regime failure events coded by Geddes, 
Wright and Frantz that fell within periods of time that I had determined, based on the pattern of 
change in the polyarchy score, to be within a single transition.  After careful examination of all of 
the country-years in which this was the case I determined that the best way to address this 
problem was through dropping these as instances of regime failure and incorporating them as 
part of the transition already ongoing when they occurred. 
 My key rationale for making this choice was that, in all of these cases, the “regimes” 
that were put in place still involved significant fluctuations in the polyarchy score, indicating that 
they had not truly reached a stable equilibrium point.  Thus, considering them as regimes that 
broke down, initiating their own transitions, did not match well with the actual historical record. 
 For example, in Haiti, a 1986 primarily nonviolent uprising ousted the authoritarian 
president Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier.  Duvalier put in place a transitional government that 
was tasked with creating a new constitution and holding presidential elections.  Elections in 
1987 were canceled after widespread violent attacks on voters.  Elections in 1988 brought 
President Leslie Manigat to power, but almost the entire population boycotted the election, 
giving it little democratic legitimacy.  Manigat only remained in power a few months before 
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being ousted in a coup by General Henri Namphy.  Namphy ruled until late 1990, when another 
presidential election brought Roman Catholic Priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power.  However, 
Aristide also was ousted in less than a year in a coup led by General Raoul Cedras, who 
instituted a brief-lived military dictatorship.  While military rule in this case lasted somewhat 
longer than the previous presidencies, it too only lasted until 1994, when an international 
intervention spearheaded by the United States ousted the military regime and brought Aristide 
back to power.   
After Aristide’s return, Haitian politics settled into a more regularized pattern, with 
Aristide remaining in power until 1996, then handing over power to Rene Preval after Preval 
won the 1996 presidential election. Preval subsequently returned power to Aristide in 2001, and 
Aristide ruled until 2004, when he was ousted in the 2004 Haitian uprising. 
Geddes and her co-authors code regime failures (and thus transitions to a new regime) 
occurring in 1986 with the overthrow of Duvalier, in 1988 with General Namphy’s military coup, 
in 1990 with the election and almost immediate overthrow of Aristide, and in 1994 with the 
ousting of the military regime and Aristide’s return to power.  While I agree with them that each 
of these points marked an important turning point, I argue that it makes more theoretical and 
empirical sense to consider each of these as points within a lengthy transition rather than new 
regimes whose failure in each case initiated a new transition.  I base my argument on the 
definitions of a regime and a transition. 
 As I describe in Chapter 1, the definition of a regime that I am using in this project is the 
set of rules and institutions that define who governs in a society and the primary means of 
political access.  These rules must have enough staying power that major political actors’ 
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expectations are able to converge around them.  Political transitions, the period between 
regimes, last until these rules become at least somewhat routinized, the point at which 
“abnormality” no longer characterizes politics (O'Donnell & Schmitter, Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, 1986).   
 From 1986 until 1994 in Haiti, while many different groups of people governed, in no 
case were these governments able to establish themselves in a stable way.  This was most 
prominent, of course, for the elected presidents: Manigat and Aristide, whose terms of office 
only lasted months, but the military regimes as well were not characterized by the 
institutionalization of a new set of governing rules but rather by erratic changes.  Only after the 
1994 intervention and return of Aristide did Haiti settle into a new, relatively stable pattern of 
political authority.  This pattern did, of course, break down as well, but only after a lengthy 
period of relative stability.  Note as well that this pattern was not “democratic” per se, as 
evidenced by the middling value of the polyarchy score (hovering around 0.45 from 1995 until 
2004).  Nevertheless, it proved able to reproduce itself for a period of time longer than two or 
three years, indicating a certain ability to shape actors’ expectations. 
 To illustrate, Figure AP.1 below shows the polyarchy score for Haiti from 1970 until 
2010.  The polyarchy score remains almost completely flat for nearly the entire period of the 
Duvalier regime, then swings significantly back and forth until 1995, when the intervention 
restoring Aristide to power.  After 1995 it remains stable until Aristide’s 2004 overthrow.  Thus, 
in my counting of transitions and calculation of transitional endpoints I consider this transition in 
Haiti (and similar cases in a handful of other countries) to have begun in 1986 and ended in 
1995, as indicated by the two vertical lines on the graph. 
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Figure AP.1: Polyarchy Score in Haiti, 1970-2010 
 
   
INGO Membership 
 
 An additional measure of western linkage is the degree to which countries are 
embedded in the international network of INGOs.  A common way of measuring INGO presence 
is through the absolute count of the number of INGOs in which the country is either a member 
or which have offices in that country.  However, as Paxton et al (2015) argue, INGO membership 
is not the same for all countries because the global set of INGOs constitute a network that links 
states in relative positions of network centrality.  Two states may have the same absolute 
number of INGO memberships but be at radically different positions in this network.   
 I follow Paxton and her co-authors in using a measure of network centrality: a country’s 
eigenvector score, as a more theoretically informed alternative to the absolute count score.  
Eigenvector scores measure the degree to which countries are connected to other highly 
connected countries, thus capturing their proximity to the “center” of the global network.   
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 Paxton and her co-authors generate their scores by recording country-level 
memberships in over five thousand INGOs at 11 points in time from 1950 until 2008.  They then 
convert these into eigenvector scores.  I use linear interpolation for scores in intervening years, 
and linear extrapolation to determine the scores from 1945-1949 and 2009-2016. I logically 
bound my extrapolations at 0 and 1, with any extrapolated values above or below these limits 
set at the liminal value.  
Religious Membership (Percent Muslim Population) 
 
 I use the World Religion Dataset (WRD) produced by Zeev Maoz and Errol Henderson 
(2013) to get my variable for the percentage of a country’s population that is Muslim.  The 
finding that a large Muslim population decreases the likelihood of democratization is highly 
contested, with various arguments that the finding is spurious because of the effects of oil 
wealth (Ross 2012) or of unique regional dynamics in the Middle East (Solingen 2009).  Thus it is 
not one of the variables that I include in my main tests.  However, I do include the variable in 
some additional models that I run for the sake of robustness checking. 
 WRD’s National Religion dataset contains estimates of the numbers of adherents of 
each of the world’s main religions in every country in the international system from 1945 to 
2010. The data is collected at five-year intervals.  The dataset reports both the raw numbers of 
adherents as well as an estimate of the percentage of the total population that adheres to a 
particular faith.  For my testing I use WRD’s “isgenpct” variable, which measures the total 
number of Muslims in a country.  These numbers do not vary much from year to year, thus I use 
linear interpolation to fill in the missing years and linear extrapolation for the years 2011-2016.  
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As with the INCS scores, I logically bound my extrapolations at 0 and 1, with any extrapolated 
values above or below these limits set at the liminal value. 
Inequality (Gini Coefficient) 
 
 For my measure of inequality, I employ the most commonly used measure in academic 
work on inequality: a country’s Gini coefficient.  The Gini coefficient is a mathematical measure 
derived from the Lorenz Curve, a graphical tool for depicting the distribution of income or 
expenditure in a society.  The Lorenz Curve plots the percentage of the country’s population 
against the percentage of income that that portion of the population possesses.  A perfectly 
straight Lorenz curve line moving at a 45 degree angle from 0 to 100 would depict a society with 
perfectly equal distribution of income.  The Gini coefficient measures the two-dimensional space 
between a 45 degree Lorenz curve and the actual Lorenz curve, divided by the total area 
beneath the 45 degree line.   
 Many different academics and public policy professionals have sought to measure Gini 
coefficients globally, yet the practicalities of measuring individual or household-level income in 
methodologically robust ways, particularly in developing countries, means that obtaining a 
global time-series of Gini coefficients stretching back for a significant period of time is almost 
impossibly costly.   
 The most comprehensive dataset on Gini coefficients globally is the United Nations 
University (UNU) World Income Inequality Database (WIID).  WIID aggregates many different 
data collection measures for 182 countries around the world.  It includes data on income 
distribution from the World Bank, the OECD, Eurostat, and a wealth of different academic 
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studies, including, for example, the Deininger and Squire (1996) data on inequality that Carles 
Boix (2003)used in his influential book Democracy and Redistribution.   
 While WIID contains many thousands of observations, the irregular and aggregative 
nature of the dataset means that it does not simply report a simplified country-year time-series 
cross-sectional dataset.  Thus, to use it for my purposes some adaptation was necessary.  First, I 
averaged the different measures of the Gini coefficient for the same country-year, only dropping 
those measures that WIID reports to be of “Low” quality.  The WIID creators caution against 
this, since different data sources employ different methods of calculating the Gini coefficient.  
However, I believe this to be a reasonable procedure since what I am seeking to measure is the 
general underlying degree of inequality, rather than any specific type of inequality.  It is 
reasonable to assume that different measures of the Gini coefficient all capture some degree of 
inequality, and that the actual measure is somewhere in between them. 
 Simply averaging the scores is a fairly crude method of getting at this underlying aspect 
of inequality.  Factor analysis or Item Response Theory measures would be a more 
methodologically robust way of doing so.  However, the spottiness of the different data sources 
made these more robust measures impractical.  Since I am limited to this fairly crude method, 
the results I report with Gini coefficients should thus be taken with a grain of salt.  It bears 
mentioning, however, that results from other well-respected academic studies that use the Gini 
coefficient over a lengthy time period are subject to the same critique.  Inequality is simply 
something difficult to measure. 
 After creating these country-year average scores, I then use linear interpolation to fill in 
missing years, and linear extrapolation for up to a five year window back from the earliest and 
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forward from the latest scores where necessary.  Reported Gini coefficients tend to remain 
within a fairly narrow band, without dramatic changes over time, thus I find the assumptions of 
the linear interpolation and extrapolation to be reasonable.  However, since over the longer 
term the likelihood of a stochastic shock to inequality becomes more likely I do not extrapolate 
beyond five years from the known data.  
In addition, because of the limited range of variation in the observed Gini coefficients, I 
put bounds on the maximum extent to which the linear extrapolation can diverge from the 
known data.   In no country does the maximum or minimum observed score exceed a distance 
of more than 2.6 standard deviations from the mean.  Hence, my logical bounds for the 
extrapolated Gini scores are 2.6 country-specific standard deviations from the mean observed 
Gini coefficient.  
Additional Results Not Reported in Main Text 
Effects of Civil Resistance on Post-Transition Democracy 
 
 In this section I present additional tests, primarily robustness checks, not reported in the 
main text of the dissertation. 
Figure AP.2 shows residuals versus fitted plots for my two OLS models looking at the 
entire population of transitions from 1945-2011.  Model 1 includes a binary measure of whether 
the transition was a civil resistance transition, while Model 2 contains only my primary structural 
variables. 
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Figure AP.2: Residuals versus Fitted Value Plots for Models of CRT impact on Post-Transition 
Democracy 
 
 Table AP.2 shows the variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for each of the variables 
included in these two models, a standard way of testing for the possibility of multicollinearity 
between the independent variables affecting the outcome.  As the table shows, VIF scores are 
universally low for each of the independent variables, with the highest falling just short of a 
score of 2 - well below the standard cut-off point of 10. 
Table AP.2: VIF Scores for Models 1 and 2 
Variable 
VIF Score - 
Model 1 
VIF Score - 
Model 2 
Trade Linkage 1.015431 1.014614 
Previous Polyarchy 1.120589 1.104891 
CRT 1.302282 
 
Democratic Neighbors 1.330532 1.328308 
INCS Score 1.599519 1.422195 
Modernization 1.922559 1.886904 
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 The RVF plots and VIF tables I report here are from regression models run on the first of 
my five Amelia imputations, rather than averages of regressions run on all five Amelia 
imputations.  I only report results from this single imputation for the sake of brevity and clarity – 
tests run on regression models in the other four imputations are substantively identical to the 
results reported here. 
 I also ran these models showing the impact of CRTs relative to other forms of transition 
using my two alternative definitions of transitional endpoints, that is to say when the fluctuation 
in the polyarchy score declines below 0.1 or 0.05 for a period of at least two years respectively.  
Models 1(2) through 4(3) below replicate the results I report in Table 2.9, with Models 1(2) 
through 4(2) using the 0.1 cut-off and models 1(3) through 4(3) using the 0.05 cut-off.  Finally, I 
ran the models measuring democracy at a fixed point in the future: five years after the 
transition.  Models 1(4) through 4(4) in table AP.5 report these results. 
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Table AP.3: Effects of Civil Resistance on Post-Transition Democracy (Alternative Endpoint 1) 
  Model 1(2) Model 2(2) Model 3(2) Model 4(2) 
 
OLS OLS Logistic Logistic 
Civil Resistance Transition .18373***   2.0854***   
 
(.02580) 
 
(.46189) 
 Modernization .07503*** .09015*** 1.3438*** 1.4712*** 
 
(.01547) (.01888) (.29920) (.28920) 
Democratic Neighbors .19382*** .21270*** 1.2844 1.2548 
 
(.05050) (.05549) (.83308) (.75888) 
Trade Linkage .07850 .04645 1.9815 1.4577 
 
(.08714) (.10824) (1.7349) (2.2699) 
INGO Network Centrality .04808 .19515** .60949 2.0802* 
 
(.06221) (.06782) (.93817) (.89003) 
Previous Polyarchy Level .50697*** .44326*** 4.1298** 2.8591* 
 
(.06967) (.07399) (1.3705) (1.4198) 
Constant .15708*** .18651*** -4.5866*** -3.7660*** 
 
(.02899) (.03441) (.59041) (.54512) 
n 325 325 325 325 
r2/Pseudo r2 .58015 .48582 .41690 .33659 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table AP.4: Effects of Civil Resistance on Post-Transition Democracy (Alternative Endpoint 2) 
  Model 1(3) Model 2(3) Model 3(3) Model 4(3) 
 
OLS OLS Logistic Logistic 
Civil Resistance Transition .18313***   2.1877***   
 
(.02668) 
 
(.46448) 
 Modernization .07523*** .09030*** 1.2854*** 1.4095*** 
 
(.01545) (.01876) (.29843) (.28553) 
Democratic Neighbors .20133*** .22016*** 1.4158 1.3590 
 
(.04966) (.05431) (.81249) (.74655) 
Trade Linkage .07614 .04422 1.9857 1.4299 
 
(.08887) (.10969) (1.7287) (2.2745) 
INGO Network Centrality .05566 .20225** .92486 2.4220** 
 
(.06512) (.07037) (.89705) (.88814) 
Previous Polyarchy Level .48105*** .41755*** 4.0152** 2.6559 
 
(.06985) (.07506) (1.4070) (1.4646) 
Constant .16370*** .19304*** -4.6386*** -3.7458*** 
 
(.02757) (.03299) (.59697) (.57402) 
n 325 325 325 325 
r2/Pseudo r2 .57084 .47833 .42898 .34051 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table AP.5 Effects of Civil Resistance on Post-Transition Democracy (Five-Year Fixed Point) 
  Model 1 (4) Model 2 (4) Model 3 (4) Model 4 (4) 
 
OLS OLS Logistic Logistic 
Civil Resistance Transition .16464***   2.1896***   
 
(.02837) 
 
(.43228) 
 Modernization .07341*** .08655*** 1.1832*** 1.2850*** 
 
(.01631) (.01922) (.29444) (.28302) 
Democratic Neighbors .23610*** .25172*** 1.0144 1.0412 
 
(.04852) (.05289) (.83610) (.73351) 
Trade Linkage .03205 .00351 1.5060 .96564 
 
(.08919) (.10747) (1.6986) (2.1399) 
INGO Network Centrality .10005 .23320** .41881 2.0900* 
 
(.06958) (.07462) (.87582) (.86686) 
Previous Polyarchy Level .40359*** .35283*** 1.4874 .51265 
 
(.07681) (.08407) (1.3429) (1.4410) 
Constant .16712*** .19237*** -3.5866*** -2.8642*** 
  (.02910) (.03443) (.56890) (.50895) 
n 320 320 320 320 
r2/Pseudo r2 .54492 .47130 .37822 .28005 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 I also replicated the same model using my primary transitional endpoint but substituting 
the Polity IV score for the V-Dem Polyarchy score.  Models 1(5) through 4(5) report the results.  
The effect of a civil resistance transition is similar, highly significant both in improving the linear 
predicted Polity score and in improving the likelihood of crossing the democratic threshold.  The 
control variables also have effects of similar size and direction as in the Polyarchy score tests, 
though levels of significance are somewhat different for some controls. 
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Table AP.6: Effects of Civil Resistance Transitions on Post-Transition Democracy (Polity IV Score) 
  Model 1 (5) Model 2 (5) Model 3 (5) Model 4 (5) 
  OLS OLS Logistic Logistic 
Civil Resistance Transition 4.0934***   1.6318***   
 
(.76357) 
 
(.33262) 
 Modernization 1.1090* 1.4458** .33632 .46020* 
 
(.44058) (.49006) (.18660) (.19416) 
Democratic Neighbors 6.7529*** 7.1740*** 2.4963** 2.4833** 
 
(1.4494) (1.5828) (.79646) (.81589) 
Trade Linkage .84662 .13246 -1.5510 -1.5886 
 
(1.1762) (1.5278) (1.1539) (1.2501) 
INGO Network Centrality 2.4179 5.6944** .91709 2.1066** 
 
(1.8757) (1.9288) (.83946) (.81191) 
Previous Polyarchy Level 10.270*** 8.8511*** 2.3357* 1.5536 
 
(2.2089) (2.2090) (1.0329) (1.0021) 
Constant -4.6170*** -3.9613*** -2.4859*** -2.0748*** 
  (.92025) (.98420) (.45420) (.43685) 
n 325 325 325 325 
r2/Pseudo r2 .36232 .30343 .23419 .17344 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Finally, I ran the same set of models using data that had not been put through the 
Amelia multiple imputation process.  Instead all observations with missing data on any of the 
variables were removed using listwise deletion.  The results are robust to this reduction in 
sample size.  Table AP.6 reports the coefficients and standard errors from these models. 
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Table AP.7: Effects of CRTs relative to non-CRTs (non-Amelia data) 
  Model 1(6) Model 2(6) Model 3(6) Model 4(6) 
 
OLS OLS Logistic Logistic 
Civil Resistance Transition 0.164***   2.726***   
 
(0.0287) 
 
(0.810) 
 Modernization 0.0852*** 0.0977*** 1.996** 2.108*** 
 
(0.0196) (0.0240) (0.619) (0.577) 
Democratic Neighbors 0.208** 0.249** 1.278 1.701 
 
(0.0735) (0.0937) (1.338) (1.458) 
Trade Linkage 0.0751 0.0856 5.353*** 5.370*** 
 
(0.0429) (0.0536) (1.290) (1.462) 
INGO Network Centrality 0.0664 0.161 -0.374 0.632 
 
(0.0823) (0.0952) (2.047) (1.869) 
Previous Polyarchy Level 0.216 0.176 -0.954 -1.893 
 
(0.122) (0.146) (3.710) (3.544) 
Constant 0.219*** 0.250*** -3.651* -2.421* 
 
(0.0476) (0.0573) (1.507) (1.130) 
N 178 178 178 178 
r2/Pseudo r2 0.535 0.438 0.546 0.424 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 These results show that the findings reported in the main chapter are robust to several 
different specifications, and not a statistical artifact of the Amelia process. 
Additional Tests of Hypotheses 2-4: The Three Patterns of Behavior 
The Baron-Kenny Mediation Tests 
 As I describe in Chapters 1 and 2, in a seminal article Baron and Kenny (1986) propose a 
series of simple tests using various regression models to determine whether a theorized 
mediating relationship exists between two independent variables and a dependent variable.  
These tests are crucial to demonstrate the character of the relationship between the 
independent variables, and demonstrate both that a theorized mediator does in fact affect a 
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portion of the causal effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable, but also has its 
own independent impact on the dependent variable.  In the case of the mechanisms that I am 
proposing for understanding democratization in CRTs, this is crucial to demonstrate that 
mobilization and radicalization mediate the effect of structural variables such as modernization. 
 Table AP.6 reports the Baron-Kenny models for my mobilization factor, averaged across 
the five Amelia imputations.  As shown in Model BK1, both modernization and trade linkage are 
significant predictors of the mobilization factor.  The other structural variables are not, hence I 
drop them and run a second model of the mobilization factor simply including modernization 
and trade linkage.  Model 3 reports the direct effects of these two structural factors on the final 
dependent variable of democracy, while Model 4 includes both mobilization and the two 
structural factors.  The relationships pass all of Baron and Kenny’s tests.  In particular, the 
coefficient sizes for modernization and trade linkage are significantly smaller when the 
mobilization factor is included in the regression equation.  Thus, I consider the theoretical 
assertion that mobilization acts as a mediator for these structural factors to be well supported 
by the data. 
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Table AP.8: Baron-Kenny Mediation Test Models for Mobilization Factor 
  Model BK1 Model BK2 Model BK3 Model BK4 
 
DV: 
Mobilization 
DV: 
Mobilization 
DV: 
Democracy 
DV: 
Democracy 
Mobilization 
   
.16478*** 
    
(.02496) 
Modernization .26881*** .27465*** .17330*** .12804*** 
 
(.07673) (.06884) (.01540) (.01729) 
Trade Linkage 1.5167** 1.6026** .33882 .07475 
 
(.49026) (.46337) (.17902) (.15517) 
Democratic  -.28204 
   Neighbors (.28405) 
   INGO Network  .17498 
   Centrality (.27114) 
   Previous Polyarchy  .85794 
   Level (.46626) 
   Constant .38492* .56826*** .47952*** .38588*** 
 
(.15633) (.07666) (.02081) (.02366) 
N 78 78 78 78 
r2 .23336 .19372 .47814 .63597 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 Table AP.7 performs the same set of tests on the maximalism factor.  Modernization is 
the only one of my structural variables that significantly predicts maximalism, hence it is the 
only structural variable that I retain in Models BK5-BK8.  As shown in comparing Models BK7 and 
BK8, adding the maximalism factor reduces the effect size of modernization on post-transition 
democracy, indicating that maximalism is mediating the effect of modernization.  
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Table AP.9: Baron-Kenny Mediation Test Models for Maximalism Factor 
  Model BK5 Model BK6 Model BK7 Model BK8 
 
DV: 
Maximalism 
DV: 
Maximalism 
DV: 
Democracy 
DV: 
Democracy 
Maximalism 
   
-.13337*** 
    
(.03116) 
Modernization -.34034** -.37925*** .17433*** .12384*** 
 
(.11450) (.09274) (.01540) (.02313) 
Trade Linkage -.40380 
   
 
(.64375) 
   Democratic  -.32094 
   Neighbors (.30337) 
   INGO Network  -.02230 
   Centrality (.36466) 
   Previous Polyarchy  .43120 
   Level (.52844) 
   Constant -.19600 -.18843* .48578*** .46081*** 
 
(.18990) (.08683) (.02031) (.02059) 
N 78 78 78 78 
r2 .26662 .24674 .46959 .59119 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Figure AP.3 contains scatter plots of all three of my patterns of behavior plotted against 
the polyarchy score at the conclusion of the transition.  Clear patterns of correlation can be 
easily observed for both the mobilization and maximalism factors, with a positive relationship 
between mobilization and post-transition democracy and an inverse relationship between 
maximalism and democracy.  The relationship is much less clear in the scatter plot for the index 
of lustration policies, with a range of polyarchy scores across most of the values of the index.   
However, this could be obscured in part by the non-continuous nature of the variable.  Thus, 
figure AP.3 also contains a bar graph of the mean values of polyarchy at the end of a transition 
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across the different values of the ILP index.67  The mean values provide some indication of the 
curvilinear relationship I argue for in the theory chapter, with the highest levels of democracy at 
middling values of the index. 
Figure AP.3: Scatter and Bar graphs of main independent variables and EOT polyarchy scores.68 
 
Figure AP.4 shows the residuals versus fitted values plots for Models 9 and 10 from the 
main text, that is to say tests of the impact of the three patterns of behavior on the post-
transition level of democracy in addition to structural factors in CRTs (Model 9) and the impact 
                                                          
67 For visual ease the x axis is simply labeled in numerical ascending order rather than with the actual 
numerical values of these categories after the centering and normalizing process. 
68 Scatter plots generated from imputation 1 of the Amelia data.  The shape of the data is fundamentally 
similar in each of the five Amelia imputations. 
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of structural factors alone on post-transition democracy in CRTs (Model 10).  As the figure shows 
there is no clear pattern in the plot, indicating no homoscedasticity. 
Figure AP.4: RVFplots for Models 9 and 10 
 
 Table AP.6 reports variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for all independent variables in 
both of these models as well.  The VIF scores are well below 10, indicating no problematic 
multicollinearity among the variables. 
  
 326 
 
Table AP.10: VIF Scores from Models 9 and 10 
Variable 
VIF Score - 
Model 9 
VIF Score - 
Model 10 
Modernization 2.578615 1.027104 
ILP Index 1.982721 
 
ILP Index (Squared) 1.931574 
 
INGO Network 
Centrality 
1.853216 1.499119 
Democratic Neighbors 1.635201 
 
Mobilization 1.411611 
 
Maximalism 1.326271 
 
Previous Polyarchy 
Score 
1.127628 1.662535 
Trade Linkage 1.081497 2.055682 
 
 I also tested the condition numbers of these models.69  The standard baseline for 
potential for multicollinearity is a condition number above 15, while a number above 30 
represents almost certainly problematic multicollinearity.  The condition number for model 9 is 
roughly 10.6, while the condition number for model 10 is roughly 7.4, indicating that neither 
model is suffering from multicollinearity. 
 I ran all four models on data that had not been put through Amelia.  The OLS models, 
displayed as Models 9(2) and 10(2) below, show the same relationship as in the Amelia data, 
with similar coefficient sizes and relative levels of statistical significance, as well as similar 
increases in the model’s r2 relative to the purely structural model.  However, as would be 
expected, the significantly decreased number of observations results in somewhat decreased 
levels of statistical significance overall. 
                                                          
69 See Belsley et al 1980 for a classic discussion of the derivation of the condition number of a regression 
model. 
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 The logistic regression models were more problematic.  With the significant reduction in 
the number of observations, my statistical software was no longer able to estimate a model 
using the full suite of independent and control variables.  All of the observations were 
completely determined by the model, making it impossible to estimate coefficients.  This is 
unsurprising considering the number of variables and observations (9 independent variables on 
23 observations) almost of necessity creates overfitting, falling well below advised proportions 
of n to k in standard texts on logistic regression modeling (Peduzzi, Concato, Kemper, Holford, & 
Feinstein, 1996; Vittinghoff & McCulloch, 2007).   
 To still present some meaningful results, I performed a modified stepwise deletion 
procedure, removing from the model the independent variable with the highest p-values from 
Model 11 (the full logistic regression model on the Amelia-imputed data), and attempting to 
estimate a model on the non-Amelia data.  Through this procedure I first deleted the ILP index 
and its squared term, and then the trade linkage variable.  I present the model that remained 
after this procedure as Model 11(2) below.   
 The effects of a still relatively large number of independent variables on a very small 
sample of cases make the results unstable.  Only the INGO Network Centrality score is a 
significant predictor at the p < 0.05 level, quite surprising considering that it is far from 
significant in any other model, and the coefficients for almost all of the independent variables 
are radically different than in other models.  It does bear mention, however, that the signs of 
the independent variables are consistent with other logistic regression models, indicating at 
least some similarities in the overall pattern of variation. 
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Table AP.11: Main Tests on Non-Amelia Imputed Data 
 
Model 9 (2) Model 10 (2) Model 11 (2) Model 12 (2) 
 
OLS OLS Logistic Logistic 
Mobilization 0.190*** 
 
0.197 
 
 
(0.0402) 
 
(1.711) 
 
Maximalism -0.130* 
 
-6.402 
 
 
(0.0516) 
 
(3.832) 
 
Lustration Index -0.0446 
   
 
(0.0465) 
   
Lustration Index 0.0739 
   
(Squared) (0.0601) 
   
Modernization 0.0293 0.108** 2.075 1.859* 
 
(0.0436) (0.0394) (1.209) (0.821) 
Trade Linkage -0.948 0.456*** 
 
9.035** 
 
(4.554) (0.102) 
 
(3.164) 
Democratic Neighbors 0.113 0.153 1.699 1.335 
 
(0.129) (0.125) (2.102) (1.737) 
INGO Network Centrality -0.0732 0.119 -7.237* 0.571 
 
(0.150) (0.180) (3.445) (3.041) 
Previous Polyarchy Level 0.0398 0.119 1.609 0.885 
 
(0.133) (0.182) (4.036) (3.975) 
Constant 0.331** 0.394*** -0.525 -1.808 
 
(0.0884) (0.0939) (2.927) (1.734) 
n 23 53 26 53 
r2/Pseudo r2 0.860 0.469 0.683 0.429 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 I also ran these primary models again while shifting the definition of the transitional 
endpoint to my two alternative measures.  As shown in Tables AP.8 and AP.9 below, in neither 
case does the change in endpoint definition result in any significant change in coefficient size, 
sign, or significance.  The inclusion of the three patterns of behavior also significantly increases 
the r2 and pseudo r2 over a purely structural model. 
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Table AP.12: Main Tests with Alternative Transitional Endpoint 1 
 
Model 9 (3) Model 10 (3) Model 11 (3) Model 12 (3) 
 
OLS OLS Logistic Logistic 
Mobilization .14777*** 2.9985* 
 
 
(.01882) 
 
(1.3148) 
 
Maximalism -.11164*** -3.3660* 
 
 
(.01896) 
 
(1.2601) 
 
Lustration Index .01013 
 
.46893 
 
 
(.01766) 
 
(.69347) 
 
Lustration Index -.00585 
 
-.41841 
 
(Squared) (.02101) 
 
(.47422) 
 
Modernization .08024** .16062*** 1.9305** 1.8406*** 
 
(.02268) (.02485) (.73586) (.48757) 
Trade Linkage .02547 .28549 2.9689 6.0282* 
 
(.12852) (.16058) (3.5534) (2.9766) 
Democratic Neighbors .10817 .09458 2.2617 1.6528 
 
(.08346) (.10200) (1.9619) (1.4529) 
INGO Network Centrality -.09358 -.03324 -3.7851 .05133 
 
(.07295) (.09223) (2.7634) (1.3895) 
Previous Polyarchy Level .08824 .14541 1.4135 1.4356 
 
(.08024) (.13755) (3.6659) (3.0950) 
Constant .38247*** .45565*** -4.2315* -2.0570* 
 
(.04122) (.04710) (1.9612) (.98192) 
n 78 78 78 78 
r2/Pseudo r2 .78056 .52896 .61839 .36211 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table AP.13 Main Tests with Alternative Transitional Endpoint 2 
  Model 9 (4) Model 10 (4) Model 11 (4) Model 12 (4) 
 
OLS OLS Logistic Logistic 
Mobilization .16696***   2.2477**   
 
(.01926) 
 
(.82429) 
 Maximalism -.11128*** 
 
-2.4473** 
 
 
(.02086) 
 
(.88834) 
 Lustration Index -.00659 
 
.03878 
 
 
(.01881) 
 
(.61351) 
 Lustration Index .00346 
 
-.11381 
 (Squared) (.02080) 
 
(.43433) 
 Modernization .06975** .14994*** 1.2224* 1.6372*** 
 
(.02443) (.02752) (.52968) (.45301) 
Trade Linkage .04474 .28223 4.8900 6.3296* 
 
(.12554) (.17668) (3.5823) (3.0692) 
Democratic Neighbors .13046 .13058 2.7025 2.0202 
 
(.08339) (.10964) (1.8613) (1.4814) 
INGO Network Centrality -.06521 -.01444 -.84458 .85088 
 
(.07966) (.10900) (1.9344) (1.2362) 
Previous Polyarchy Level .03309 .11626 -.55868 .89124 
 
(.08506) (.14287) (3.8531) (3.2901) 
Constant .36553*** .45341*** -3.5953* -2.0687* 
  (.04640) (.05216) (1.5531) (1.0144) 
n 78 78 78 78 
r2/Pseudo r2 .77541 .49247 .57920 .36374 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 Next I run the same model with the dependent variable measured five years after the 
beginning of the transition.  This is a less reliable indicator of post-transition democracy because 
some transitions are still ongoing at this point while other have long ended.  However, it is an 
additional way to confirm that my results are not spurious.  I change the measurement of my 
mobilization and maximalism factors slightly in this test, using the scores in the year after the 
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initiation of the transition rather than the average score across all years in the transition.  I make 
this change because some transitions are longer than five years. 
The findings are substantively similar to tests using my various more dynamic measures 
of transitional endpoints.  Most importantly, they confirm the statistically significant impact of 
transitional mobilization and maximalism on future levels of democracy.  The r2 across all 
models is lower than in models using a more dynamic definition of transitional endpoints, as we 
would expect considering that the arbitrary cut-off point is capturing different dynamics of 
existing regimes and continuing transitions. 
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Table AP.14: Main Tests with Polyarchy Measured 5 Years after Initiation of Transition 
  Model 9 (5) Model 10 (5) Model 11 (5) Model 12 (5) 
 
OLS OLS Logistic Logistic 
Mobilization .16088***   2.1724**   
 
(.02517) 
 
(.78002) 
 Maximalism -.10327*** 
 
-1.8201* 
 
 
(.02556) 
 
(.77909) 
 Lustration Index .02686 
 
.82331 
 
 
(.02692) 
 
(.59938) 
 Lustration Index -.02579 
 
-.57301 
 (Squared) (.01957) 
 
(.32636) 
 Modernization .06456* .14341*** .78858 1.3171** 
 
(.02991) (.03355) (.64592) (.47255) 
Trade Linkage -.20014 .14284 3.2436 5.9236 
 
(.19119) (.24502) (6.0503) (3.2699) 
Democratic Neighbors .22034* .15449 3.2651 1.8517 
 
(.09868) (.11094) (1.8835) (1.3932) 
INGO Network Centrality -.03045 .05711 -.69295 .68507 
 
(.10200) (.12799) (1.9314) (1.3185) 
Previous Polyarchy Level .05034 .15391 -.01253 .88864 
 
(.10985) (.13988) (2.8131) (2.5802) 
Constant .37243*** .40770*** -2.5613 -1.7243* 
  (.05280) (.06213) (1.3278) (.84737) 
n 78 78 78 78 
r2/Pseudo r2 .71665 .47142 .52065 .29009 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 Next I shifted my measurement of the dependent variable from the Polyarchy score to 
the Polity IV score.  As described in Chapter 2, I consider this to be an inferior measure to the 
polyarchy score, with less reliable and theoretically satisfying definition of democracy and 
democraticness.  However, it also provides a meaningful way of providing additional robustness 
to my results. 
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 Using the Polity score as my measurement of post-transition democracy leads to two 
key differences from my primary tests.  In the linear tests maximalism loses its significance.  
However, in the logistic regression models predicting the likelihood of crossing the democratic 
threshold the mobilization factor, which falls below the p < 0.05 level of significance in my 
primary tests, is now a significant predictor of post-transition democracy. 
Table AP.15: Main Tests with Polity IV Score as Dependent Variable 
  Model 9 (6) Model 10 (6) Model 11 (6) Model 12 (6) 
 
OLS OLS Logistic Logistic 
Mobilization 4.7374***   1.5965*   
 
(.80612) 
 
(.76166) 
 Maximalism -.97115 
 
-1.8188* 
 
 
(.76708) 
 
(.77945) 
 Lustration Index -.66370 
 
.87763 
 
 
(.60223) 
 
(.65432) 
 Lustration Index .24414 
 
-.81142 
 (Squared) (.38695) 
 
(.42139) 
 Modernization 1.2459 2.8174*** .21821 .95818* 
 
(.59771) (.58953) (.59999) (.43381) 
Trade Linkage -4.0013 2.2134 -.87821 2.0265 
 
(3.7938) (3.1284) (9.5982) (3.5722) 
Democratic Neighbors 3.4331* 2.0023 2.3296 1.0353 
 
(1.5062) (2.1836) (2.3132) (1.5157) 
INGO Network Centrality -3.7287 -3.0559 .12616 .86019 
 
(1.9264) (2.2151) (1.7301) (1.5161) 
Previous Polyarchy Level .55626 4.9721 6.9058 5.1706** 
 
(3.3330) (2.7435) (4.2543) (1.9248) 
Constant 1.4723 3.5344** -1.9405 -1.3628 
  (1.3241) (1.1012) (1.5694) (.78978) 
n 78 78 78 78 
r2/Pseudo r2 .57638 .28370 .47996 .23376 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Finally, I ran the models including the secondary control variables: logged area in square 
km, British colonialism, military regime, the gini coefficient, the Muslim population, and oil and 
gas rents.  I report the results in Model 9(5) in Table AP.10 below.  Even with these additional 
controls the mobilization and maximalism variables have relatively unchanged coefficient sizes 
and significance levels. 
 In Table AP.10 I also report the results of running this extended structural model 
through a stepwise deletion process, that is to say running the model iteratively while deleting 
the least significant independent variable from the model in each iteration until only variables 
with a p value below a certain threshold remain.  I chose an elimination threshold of p > 0.1.  
Comparing Models 9(5) and 11(5) with the SWD models shows the robustness of the 
mobilization and maximalism measures relative to structural predictors.  The most significant 
structural variable, modernization, is eliminated by stepwise deletion, while the gini coefficient, 
insignificant in the original model, ends up as the most significant structural predictor of 
democracy.  In contrast to these fluctuating levels of significance for structural factors, 
throughout the stepwise deletion process the mobilization and maximalism measures remain 
highly significant, and are often the most significant predictors by an order of magnitude. 
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Table AP.16: Models with Secondary Controls and Stepwise Deletion 
  
Model 9 
(5) 
Model 10 
(5) 
Model 11 
(5) 
Model 12 
(5) 
SWD 
Model 
SWD 
Model 
 
OLS OLS Logistic Logistic OLS Logistic 
Mobilization .1172**   .2928   .1475*** 
 
(.0353) 
 
(.9442) 
 
(.0265) 
 Maximalism -.1068** 
 
-4.2642* 
 
-.1232*** -2.47*** 
 
(.0351) 
 
(1.5479) 
 
(.0245) (.68579) 
Lustration  .02901 
 
1.0545 
   Index (.0249) 
 
(.9812) 
   Lustration 
Index -.0143 
 
-.8215 
   (Squared) (.0303) 
 
(.8431) 
   Modernizatio
n .0557 .11609* 2.4747* 2.2040* .0573* 1.486*** 
 
(.0384) (.04607) (.9644) (1.0602) (.0230) (.42093) 
Trade Linkage -.3834 -.9141 -16.531 -10.941 
  
 
(.9989) (.8804) (16.693) (12.477) 
  Democratic  .1373 .1145 2.6060 2.2348 .1777* 
 Neighbors (.1030) (.1072) (2.5036) (1.9144) (.0763) 
 INGO Network  .0159 .2252 -4.4276 1.7643 
  Centrality (.1395) (.1512) (5.3753) (3.3901) 
  Old Polyarchy  .1103 .0356 8.3761 2.0846 
  Level (.1621) (.1986) (5.7011) (4.9896) 
  Land, sq km .0004 -.0077 .2008 -.15095 
  (logged) (.0129) (.0160) (.4595) (.50575) 
  British Colony .0177 .0294 2.6860 2.2539 
  
 
(.0493) (.0660) (1.4054) (1.7338) 
  Military  -.0410 -.0590 1.4441 .25956 
  Regime (.0556) (.0676) (1.2971) (.80780) 
  Gini  -.0036 -.0030 -.1033 -.03895 -.0033* 
 Coefficient (.0023) (.0026) (.0827) (.04975) (.0016) 
 Muslim  -.0535 -.0459 .2976 -.86646 
  Population (.0763) (.1074) (2.2033) (2.2824) 
  Oil and Gas  -.0000 -.0001 .0006 .00035 
  Revenue (.0000) (.0001) (.0014) (.00106) 
  Constant .5206** .6450*** -2.9776 -.13339 .4606*** -2.01*** 
  (.1656) (.1751) (4.2949) (4.2875) (.0646) (.4932) 
n 58 58 58 58 67 78 
r2/Pseudo r2 .7237 .5602 .6257 .4545 .7114 .4734 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix B: Complete List of Interviewees 
Table AP.17: Nepal Interviewees 
Nepal 
Name Position 
Interview 
Date 
Aditya Adhikari Journalist, Kathmandu Post 12/22/2016 
Indra Adhikari 
Deputy Executive Director, Institute of Foreign 
Affairs 
12/14/2016 
Rabindra Adhikari Member of Parliament, CPN-UML 12/7/2016 
Govinda 
Sharma 
Bandi Advocate, Supreme Court of Nepal 12/18/2016 
Lok Raj Baral 
Executive Chairman, Nepal Center for 
Contemporary Studies 
12/12/2016 
Basanti Basatoli Journalist, Sancharika Samuha 12/14/2016 
Binod Bhattarai 
Founding President, Inter-Party Society of 
Nepal (IPAS-Nepal) 
12/12/2016 
Rajan Bhattarai Member of Parliament, CPN-UML 12/8/2016 
Meena Bishwakarma Central Committee Member, Nepali Congress 12/5/2016 
Rem 
Bahadur 
Biswokarma President, Collective Campaign for Peace 12/10/2016 
Shobhakar Budathoki 
Independent NGO Contractor and Human 
Rights Activist 
12/1/2016 
Devraj Dahal 
Nepal Country Director, Friedrich-Ebert 
Stiftung 
12/6/2016 
Khim Lal Devkota Spokesman, Naya Shakti Party 12/11/2016 
Daman 
Nath 
Dunghana Former Speaker of the House, Nepali Congress 12/5/2016 
Yubraj Ghimire Editor, Annapurna Post 12/17/2016 
Yogendra Ghising Member of Parliament, CPN-MC 12/17/2016 
Dipak Gyawali 
Former Minister and Academician, Nepal 
Academy of Science and Technology 
12/7/2016 
Vijay Karna 
Professor of Political Science, Tribhuvan 
University 
12/11/2016 
Ajaya Khanal Former Editor, Himalayan Times 12/14/2016 
Muma 
Ram 
Khanal 
Central Committee Member, Communist Party 
of Nepal (Maoist), 1996-2004 
12/9/2016 
Sridhar Khatri 
Professor of Foreign Affairs, Tribhuvan 
University 
12/13/2016 
Suresh Ale Magar 
Secretariat Member, Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist Center) 
12/23/2016 
Pancha Maharjan 
Professor, Center for Nepal and Asian Studies 
(CNAS), Tribhuvan University 
12/1/2016 
 337 
 
Bharat Nepali Executive Director, Feminist Dalit Organization 12/13/2016 
Krishna Pahadi 
Founding Chair, Human Rights and Peace 
Society 
12/13/2016 
Devendra 
Raj 
Pandey 
Convener, Citizen's Movement for Democracy 
and Peace 
12/21/2016 
Kamal Pangeni Member of Parliament, Nepali Congress 12/18/2016 
Krishna 
Man 
Pradhan Executive Director, Nepal Law Society 12/6/2016 
Prateek Pradhan Editor-in-Chief, Bharapuri Online Newspaper 12/9/2016 
Charan Prasai Coordinator, Accountability Watch Committee 12/15/2016 
Subodh 
Raj 
Pyakurel Chairperson, Informal Sector Service Center 12/2/2016 
Sushil Pyakurel 
Special Advisor to the President, Government 
of Nepal 
12/20/2016 
Gaurav Rana 
Chief of General Staff, Nepal Army (2012-
2015) 
12/21/2016 
Uday 
Shamsher 
Rana Member of Parliament, Nepali Congress 12/13/2016 
Minendra Rijal 
Former Minister and Member of Parliament, 
Nepali Congress 
12/16/2016 
Hari Rokka Independent Analyst in Political Economy 12/9/2016 
Bishnu Sapkota Country Director, FHI 360 Nepal 12/22/2016 
Om 
Prakash 
Sen Director, Advocacy Forum-Nepal 12/16/2016 
Abhishek 
Pratap 
Shah 
Member of Parliament, Federal Socialist 
Forum 
12/20/2016 
Tula Shah Executive Director, Nepal Madhes Foundation 12/2/2016 
Min 
Bahadur 
Shahi Chairperson, Human Rights Alliance 12/15/2016 
Bala 
Nanda 
Sharma General (Ret.), Nepal Army 12/15/2016 
Hari Sharma Director, Alliance for Social Dialogue 12/20/2016 
Prakash 
Mani 
Sharma Senior Advocate, Pro Public 12/20/2016 
Sumit Sharma 
Executive Director, Nepal Transition to Peace 
Initiative 
12/12/2016 
Kapil Shrestha Professor, Tribhuvan University 12/3/2016 
Sabin Shrestha 
Executive Director, Forum for Women, Law, 
and Development 
12/19/2016 
Shyam Shrestha Member of Parliament, CPN (Maoist Center) 12/15/2016 
Renu Sijapati General Secretary, Feminist Dalit Organization 12/13/2016 
Malla K Sundar 
Founding Member, Nepal Federation of 
Indigenous Nationalities 
12/14/2016 
Padam Sundas Chairperson, Samata Foundation 11/29/2016 
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Ujjwal Sundas Managing Direction, Samata Foundation 11/29/2016 
Deepak Thapa Director, Social Science Baha 12/16/2016 
Dinesh Tripathi Advocate, Supreme Court of Nepal 12/4/2016 
Padma 
Ratna 
Tuladhar Independent Left Politician 12/8/2016 
Dina Upadhyay Member of Parliament, Nepali Congress 12/19/2016 
Bishnu Upreti 
Director, Nepal Center for Contemporary 
Research 
12/13/2016 
George Varughese 
Nepal Country Representative, The Asia 
Foundation 
12/8/2016 
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Table AP.18: Zambia Interviewees 
Zambia 
Name Position 
Interview 
Date 
Darison Chaala 
Former General Secretary, Civil Servants and 
Allied Workers of Zambia Union 
3/31/2017 
Theresa Chewe 
Administrator, Southern Africa Center for 
Constructive Resolution of Disputes 
(SACCORD) 
4/10/2017 
McDonald Chipenzi 
Former Executive Director, Foundation for 
Democratic Process (FODEP) 
3/28/2017 
Chris Chirwa Director, Image Publishers Limited 3/28/2017 
Mbita Chitala 
Founding Deputy Secretary, Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy 
4/5/2017 
Mark Chona 
Founding Permanent Secretary, Zambian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
4/4/2017 
Rodger Chongwe Former President, Law Association of Zambia 3/22/2017 
Bright Chunga 
Former Presidential Chief of Staff, 
Government of Zambia 
3/27/2017 
Jacob Goma 
General Secretary, Forum for Democracy and 
Peace 
3/20/2017 
Lee Havasonda 
President, Transparency International 
Zambia; Former Executive Director, SACCORD 
3/27/2017 
Batuke Imenda 
Former Member of Parliament, National 
Assembly of Zambia 
4/12/2017 
Jack Kalala Foreign Service of Zambia 3/25/2017 
Austin Kaluba Journalist, National Mirror 4/3/2017 
Enoch Kavindele Former Vice-President of Zambia 3/28/2017 
Sarah Longwe Chair, NGO Coordinating Committee 3/29/2017 
Bradford Machila 
Former Minister for Lands, Government of 
Zambia 
4/6/2017 
Peter Machungwa 
Former Home Affairs Minister, Government 
of Zambia 
4/11/2017 
Amos Malupenga 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local 
Government and Housing 
3/24/2017 
John Mambo 
Chairperson, Civil Society Constitutional 
Agenda 
4/4/2017 
Akashamb
atwa 
Mbikusita-
Lewanika 
Founding National Secretary, Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy 
3/18/2017 
Chibeza Mfuni Founding President, Social Democratic Party 3/31/2017 
Stanley Mhango 
Former President, Foundation for Democratic 
Process (FODEP) 
4/10/2017 
Laura Miti 
Executive Director, Alliance for Community 
Action 
3/30/2017 
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Jotham Momba 
Associate Professor of Political Science, 
University of Zambia 
4/12/2017 
Alfred Mudenda 
Deputy Secretary General, Zambian Congress 
of Trade Unions 
3/23/2017 
Gilbert Mudenda 
Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy 
4/9/2017 
Teddy Mulonga 
Former Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, 
Government of Zambia 
3/24/2017 
Mike Mulongoti President, People's Party 3/23/2017 
Christine Munalula Program Manager, CARE International 3/22/2017 
Charity Musamba 
Lecturer in Development Studies, University 
of Zambia 
4/4/2017 
Frederick Mutesa 
Founder, Zambians for Empowerment and 
Development Party 
4/6/2017 
Lucy Muyoyeta 
Former Chairperson, NGO Coordinating 
Council 
4/12/2017 
Vernon Mwaanga 
Founding Vice-Chair for Publicity, Movement 
for Multiparty Democracy 
3/27/2017 
Maureen Mwanawasa Former First Lady of Zambia 4/11/2017 
Tentani Mwanza President, National Democratic Party 3/21/2017 
Lewis Mwape 
Executive Director, Zambia Council for Social 
Development 
4/3/2017 
Raphael Nakacinda 
National Secretary, Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy 
4/11/2017 
Bizeck Phiri 
Professor of Political Science, University of 
Zambia 
4/3/2017 
Sketchley Sacika 
Former Secretary to the Cabinet, 
Government of Zambia 
4/7/2017 
Richard Sakala Editor, Daily Nation Newspaper 3/29/2017 
Guy Scott Acting President of Zambia, 2014-2015 4/14/2017 
Fackson Shamenda 
Former President, Zambian Council of Trade 
Unions 
3/30/2017 
Emily Sikazwe 
Commissioner, Electoral Commission of 
Zambia 
3/31/2017 
Neo Simutanyi Executive Director, Center for Policy Dialogue 4/5/2017 
Ludwig Sondashi President, Forum for Democratic Alternatives 3/29/2017 
Keli Walubita 
Founding Vice-Chair for Security and 
Intelligence, Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy 
3/21/2017 
Sikota Wina 
Former Minister (various portfolios), 
Government of Zambia 
4/1/2017 
Simon Zukas 
Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy;  
3/29/2017 
Ballard Zulu 
Outreach Director, Indaba Agricultural Policy 
Research Institute 
4/13/2017 
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    Table AP.19: Brazil Interviewees 
Brazil 
Name Position 
Interview 
Date 
Jaime Almeida Professor, University of Brasilia 6/7/2017 
Criméia Almeida 
Activist, Comissão de Familiares de Mortos e 
Desaparecidos 
6/28/2017 
Ademar Bertucci Former President, Caritas 6/6/2017 
Carlos 
Henrique 
Cardim Ambassador, Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 6/20/2017 
Athos 
Magno 
Costa e Silva Founding Member, Workers Party (PT) 6/9/2017 
Antonio 
Carlos 
Alves 
Coutinho Brigadier General, Escola Superior de Guerra 5/31/2017 
Alvaro Dias Senator, PMDB 6/1/2017 
Helio Doyle Founding Member, Workers Party (PT) 6/19/2017 
Helio Duque Constituent Assembly Member 6/30/2017 
Elio Gaspari Journalist, O Globo/Folha de S. Paulo 6/14/2017 
Eliana 
Magalhães 
Graça 
Sociologist, Special Secretariat on Women's 
Politics (SPM) 
6/29/2017 
Ada Lemos 
Political Analyst, Party of the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement (PMDB) 
6/23/2017 
Ivan Marx 
Federal Attorney, Transitional Justice Working 
Group 
6/30/2017 
Delano Menezes 
Brigadier General; Director, Escola Superior de 
Guerra 
5/26/2017 
Vera Mercucci 
Lobbyist, Health Professionals Syndicate 
(SINDISAUDE) 
6/20/2017 
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